دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Hegemonicization of Progressivism Discourse (Jadidism) in “Bukhara Sharif” Newspaperهژمونیکسازی گفتمان ترقیخواهی (جدیدی) در روزنامة بخارای شریف1227786810.22059/jcep.2020.287352.449864FAسیده فهیمهابراهیمیاستادیار تاریخ، دانشگاه علامۀ طباطبائیJournal Article20190815Although Central Asia’s entry into the modern world in the nineteenth / thirteenth centuries was late in comparison with its neighbors, like all of them it was after the first military defeats against colonialism. In this region, the decline and backwardness of the Muslims occurred and then their astonishment was added step by step. Here was the point of intellectuals birth, which was then called “Jadidi”. They used to call their traditional and conservative rivals Qadimi (those who were bounded to their old ideas). Jadidi intellectuals who, as a result of their deep understanding of the extent of social, scientific, and cultural backwardness, and at the same time acquaintance with the accelerating and progressive Western civilization, understood the need for reform in all areas, had faced the dominant and hegemonic discourse of” Qadimism”. This group had many resources; one of the most important of these was its influence among the masses and finding a justified base among them. Jadidists who had found the origin of their intellectual thoughts outside their homeland borders needed to utilize internal resources to influence a society that was in transition from traditional to modernism otherwise they would be lost in the competition. The press was one of these tools in the service of Modernists throughout the modern world that the Qadimists had no interest in it and they forbade its reading. Although the only official newspaper of Bukhara was published with great risk, it provided the group with an unparalleled opportunity to introduce its semantic system (which included sub-concepts and intellectual elements) to new masses and by strengthening it, made their thoughts dominant. The present article is investigating this ambiguity and wants to study how this happened? In other words, the question is, “How does the Jadidists, despite the consolidation of the (old) discourse, made its semantic system hegemonic by using tools like the press?” <br />In the present article, while avoiding entering into the usual discussion of new and old lawsuits and positive and negative judgments about them, we examine the issue how does Jadidism, despite the establishment and objectivity of the ruling (old) discourse, use the press to make its semantic system hegemonic? In order to come up with a comprehensive and accurate answer, we need a theoretical framework for pulling such a system out of the only Bukharas Newspaper and the most important official news agency, Bukharaye sharif. Therefore, we apply the Laclau and Mouffe discourse theory, which is highly effective in the context of the conflict between different political forces in society, and is useful in categorizing concepts and creating rational order in textual research. Our initial answer is Jadidi’s newspaper writers while being aware of the state of the world and adhering to the original Islamic tradition, in an effort to awaken the religious wisdom of the masses, marginalized the rival semantic system that emphasized indigenous religious traditions and took steps to establish themselves. <br />The newspaper, as a tool that had a wide-ranging influence and was able to operate in extremely fragile conditions, attempted to go through this process by producing specific contents in three layers: First, to introduce the components of the semantic system and to represent its relation to the focal thought (nodal point).(The purpose of this section is to evoke the feelings of the audiences), another way is to highlight the concepts of backwardness (critique of the status-quo and description of the desirability) and religionism (aimed at provoking the audience sentiments). The above concepts are highlighted to enter into the field of competition with the dominant discourse in the newspaper. The third layer is making “the other” and marginalization of rival discourse. The method of presenting the semantic system is such that in order to reinforce the central idea of (religious progress) a set of sub-concepts are repeated in each article. In a way that was mentioned, the evolution and the changes of the world, it extends to Bukhara and raises a critique of society. In the next step, he points out the need for improvement, first using persuasive verses and arguments to persuade readers, then argue with them, and finally urging them to move on in order to avoid laziness, learn new sciences and industries and rid themselves of ignorance and backwardness. The crucial point is that throughout this process, it also wisely reads out the religious texts, meaning that by trying to redefine the Islamic texts and emphasize religious wisdom, it seeks to pull out of it an ordinance for living world and bring about social change. Religion-based progress as the theme of a Jadidists desire, for its consistency has some sub-concepts that reinforce it. These include scientism, rationality, education, and avoiding laziness. The theme that is constantly repeated is that religion not only did not forbid the sciences that make the Muslim world happy<span style="text-decoration: line-through;">,</span> but also encourages it. In rationalism, it emphasizes that religion has led them to reason. For education, concepts of teacher and school are redefined according to the Islamic traditions and are compared to the status quo. For avoiding laziness, it was considered a disaster for the Muslim world and investigates its causes. Aware of the world situation and adhering to the original Islamic tradition, the new writers of the newspaper, while trying to awaken the religious wisdom of the people, pushed aside the rival semantic system that emphasized indigenous religious traditions and destiny and took steps to establish themselves. <br />After the publication of 153 issues of Bukhara Sharif, the tsarist government representative in Bukhara saw that the newspaper was publishing reformist notions not only in Bukhara but throughout Central Asia. It shows that Jadidits were successful in their ways, so under the name of Bukhara emir, they closed the newspaper in 1913 when its material and spiritual powers had reached its perfection. Due to the importance of this important cultural event, today Tajiks call the first day of its publishing the Press Day in their country.شکلگیری جریان نوگرایی در فرارود قرن نوزدهم/سیزدهم که نظام اندیشهای مسلط بر آن بهدلیل تعاملنداشتن با جهان در رکود و ایستایی کمنظیری بود، آغاز رقابتی جدی و پرتنش میان دو جریان فکری بود. مطالعة این رقابت، ابهام جدی در مورد نحوة بهکارگیری قدرت و یارگیری آنها در جامعه ایجاد میکند. در این نوشتار با پرهیز از ورود به بحث مرسوم دعوای جدیدی و قدیمی و قضاوت مثبت و منفی دربارة آنها، این مسئله را بررسی میکنیم که چگونه جریان جدیدی با وجود تثبیت و عینیت گفتمان حاکم (قدیمی)، با استفاده از ابزار مطبوعات نظام معنایی خود را هژمونیک میسازد؟ چارچوبی که برای نظمبخشی و دقت در متن روزنامه به کارگرفته میشود، نظریة گفتمان لاکلا و موفه است؛ زیرا در شرایط وجود دشمنی میان نیروهای سیاسی مختلف در جامعه در دستهبندی فرایندی مفاهیم کارکرد مناسبی دارد. پاسخ آغازین ما این است: «محرّران جدیدی روزنامه با آگاهی از احوال جهان و تمسک به سنت اصیل اسلامی، ضمن تلاش برای بیداری خرد دینی تودههای مردم، نظام معنایی رقیب را که بر سنتهای بومی و دینی تأکید داشت به حاشیه راندند و در راه تثبیت خود گام برداشتند». نتیجه این شد که فرایند هژمونیکسازی نظام معنایی جدیدی در روزنامۀ بخارای شریف بهوسیلۀ معرفی خردهمفاهیم جدیدی، برجستهسازی مفاهیم پذیرفتهشده و همچنین غیریتسازی ضعیف گفتمان رقیب، صورت پذیرفت.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77868_e4167a4da1ea3f8ae006d1f46edce3e1.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Evaluation and Estimation of Iran’s Food Industry, the Potentials of Exports to the Russian Marketارزیابی و برآورد ظرفیتهای صادراتی محصولات صنایع غذایی ایران به بازار روسیه23467786910.22059/jcep.2020.276017.449829FAمیرعبدالهحسینیاستادیار اقتصاد بینالملل، مؤسسۀ مطالعات و پژوهشهای بازرگانیبیتانوروزیدانشجوی دکتری اقتصاد بینالملل، مؤسسۀ مطالعات و پژوهشهای بازرگانیJournal Article20190213In the age of globalization and the regional economic integrations (REIs) of the world economy, economic development is not just a national issue. In order to achieve the desired level of national development, the states should also avail themselves of existing regional and international resources and opportunities. <br />Nowadays, the world is experiencing different levels of regional Trade/economic integration (RT/EIs) in different regions. In the region surrounding Iran, there also exist several regional economic arrangements which are called ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization), CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), CAC (Central Asian Cooperation Organization: FTA between Russia with CIS members) and SCR (Caspian Sea Region) which can be considered as Iran’s potential natural trade partners (NTPs). At first, there seem to be clear differences among member states of the three arrangements, including, inter alia, incongruous economic structures, uneven human/economic development, varying political systems, and ethnic and cultural diversity. <br />Having substantial potential, most CAC/CSR/ECO member countries also have long been pushing for establishment of regional economic and trade cooperation. These efforts imply an interest on the side of CAC/CSR/ECO countries. However, despite these efforts, no commensurate progress has been made. It appears that, under these circumstances, it is not feasible to establish an efficient economic and trade arrangement embracing all CAC/CSR/ECO member states and taking an incremental or step-by-step approach would probably be more successful. Thus, the most practical way to achieve the long-term goal of “sustainable regional development” would be to create an active nucleus of CAC/CSR/ECO members with more capacity, interest and coordination for economic and trade issues which could pave the ground for other countries to join later. <br />In the following article it is intended to assess Russia’s Market for Iran’s food industries’ export capacity and trade potentials (between Iran and Russian Federation) by using Several indices of trade potential and revealed Comparative Advantages (RCA) between 2006-2017. The findings of the research are as follows: <br />The examination of Iran’s food industries’ exports to Russia during the last decade by focusing on the individual market in terms of Iran’s foodstuff exports’ trend, composition/diversification and dynamics on the one hand and the individual the foodstuff (HS 6-digit codes) in terms of changing trend, composition/diversification and comparative advantage on the other, reveals a wide gap between actual and ideal states. In effect, in foodstuffs value chain, Iran generally stands at an early stage, with low value added and high local content in its food industries’ products, being far away from ideal state in terms of product diversification and differentiation, economies of scale, structural reforms and endogenous competitive advantage. <br />A pathological study of Iran’s food industries’ exports to Russia at various levels of state, associations and enterprises in terms of economic diplomacy, trade policy, institutional factors and infrastructures reveals that the requirements and infrastructures for the promotion of production and export of Iran’s food industries’ products are not adequate at international/regional, state and institutional levels and the stakeholders of production and trade, especially the export sectors of food industries’ products suffer a high transaction cost compared with other rival countries, even in the region. <br />The estimation of export potentials and the analysis of the prospects of import demand for foodstuffs in the Russian market through analysis of Iran’s complementarity of foodstuffs exports to Russia’s market (products with existing and growing advantage on an HS 6-digit code basis); prospects of import demand of selected countries for food industries’ products, assessed by all indices; and the relationship between the growth of demand for foodstuffs and the growth of food industries reveal a relatively high potential for exports to Russia in terms of number, diversification, value and capacity. <br />The analysis of challenges to import demand of the Russian market for food industries’ products in terms of the rivals and changing market shares; changes in import policy of Russian market toward Iran; restrictions and barriers to Iran’s presence in Russian market; and challenges facing Iran at international/regional, state and associational levels does not suggest promising prospects for export and penetration into Russian market, with economic inefficiencies affecting various levels. <br />There is a similar situation for Iran’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Analysis shows that lack of intra-regional trade development is due to the export-import (trade) structure that Iran and Russia in bilateral trade, and other CAC/CSR/ECO members are facing and thus, the Regional economic integration seems impossible at the moment, but the exploitation of the trade integration benefits is expected with an enhancement of trade/economic structure of the I. R. of Iran and Russian Federation.توسعۀ تجارت ایران با تنگناهای داخلی و خارجی متعدد از جمله محدودیت دسترسی به بازارهای هدف روبهرو است. با آغاز بهکار اتحادیۀ اقتصادی اوراسیایی، با محوریت روسیه عضو مهم آن، توسعۀ صادرات و دسترسی به بازار روسیه، موضوع اصلی است. این نوشتار در پی آن است که بداند ظرفیت وارداتی روسیه برای محصولات غذایی صادراتی ایران به چه میزان است و در دهۀ اخیر چه تغییر و تحولهایی را شاهد بوده است؟ چه میزان از ظرفیت صادراتی محصولات غذایی ایران به بازار روسیه استفاده نشده است و چه اقدامهایی باید برای توسعۀ صادرات به بازار روسیه انجام شود و چه راهکارهایی اندیشیده شود؟ این نوشتار با ارزیابی عملکرد صادرات ایران و چشمانداز تقاضای وارداتی محصولات غذایی روسیه، ظرفیت صادرات محصولات غذایی ایران به بازار روسیه را مطالعه میکند. عملکرد صادرات محصولات غذایی ایران به بازار روسیه از یکسو روند، ترکیب (تنوع) و پویایی صادرات محصولات غذایی ایران و از سوی دیگر به جدایی محصولات غذایی (ردیف تعرفه شش رقم نظام هماهنگ) از جنبۀ تغییرهای روند، ترکیب (تنوع) کالایی و مزیتهای نسبی، حکایت از آن دارد که شکاف بزرگی وجود دارد میان آنچه هست و آنچه باید باشد. در واقع، از برآورد ظرفیتهای صادراتی و تجزیه و تحلیل چشمانداز تقاضای وارداتی محصولات غذایی در بازار روسیه، نتیجه میشود که ظرفیت صادراتی بهنسبت زیادی در محصولات غذایی به بازار روسیه- از نظر تعداد، تنوع، ارزش و ظرفیت صادراتی- استفاده نشده وجود دارد. در زنجیرۀ ارزش محصولات غذایی، در حال حاضر ایران در ابتدای زنجیره، بدون ارزشافزودۀ بالاتر و بیشتر به محصولات غذایی که دارای محتوای داخلی بالاتری است، اتکا دارد. بنابراین پیشنهاد میشود به تنوع و تفاوت محصول، صرفههای مقیاس، تحولات ساختاری و برتریهای رقابتی درونزای محصولات غذایی توجه کافی و اهتمام ویژه شود.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77869_0210c27ac8ecd6677df366c1ba072600.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Prohibition of Annexation and Remedial Secession Theory in the Crimean Crisisممنوعیت پیوستهسازی سرزمینی و نظریۀ جدایی چارهساز در بحران کریمه47707787010.22059/jcep.2019.286616.449862FAروح اللهرهامیاستادیار حقوق بینالملل، پردیس فارابی، دانشگاه تهرانمحمد علیبهمنی قاجاردکتری حقوق بینالملل عمومی، پردیس فارابی، دانشگاه تهرانJournal Article20190914The principle of “Self-determination” has been classified amongst the most fundamental rules of international law. In the context of positive international law, the principle can be interpreted as equivalent to decolonization and the prohibition of forced occupation. However, another theory named “Remedial Secession” has been proposed that the ethnic and racial groups inside a State may resort to external aspects of self-determination right, in exceptional circumstances and as the last option. The remedial secession theory has resulted in independence of some States. But some states have also used this theory as a scheme to occupy other countries or segregate some parts of their territories whether officially or as a de facto situation of annexation with flimsy and mock independence. Therefore, more or less, a contradiction and tension have been evolved between the two rules, i.e. prohibition of annexation, as a Jus cogens norm of international law which, in its turn, has derived from the right to self-determination, and the remedial secession theory as a new interpretation of the same right. In these circumstances, the Russian Federation has used the remedial secession theory as a tool to pursue its territorial expansionism policies. The Russians have resorted to the theory, inter alia, to segregate Crimean peninsula from Ukraine and annex it to their territory.
The main question of this paper is whether the secession of Crimea from Ukraine was a remedial secession or merely a type of annexation and territorial arrogation by the use of force and under the guise of the right to self-determination and the remedial secession theory. The assumption of the research is based on the hypothesis that the prohibition of occupation and annexation of lands are amongst the jus cogens rules of international law and one of the main examples of the right to self-determination, and the remedial secession theory cannot blemish these essential rules. In order to achieve a fair and unbiased conclusion, the arguments of both parties of the dispute, i.e. Ukraine and Russia have been examined by a descriptive and analytical approach and finally the validity of these arguments has been assessed carefully.
The Russian government claims that its military presence in Ukraine is legitimate on the basis of the principle of defense and the Crimean people’s right to self-determination as a legal basis for possession and annexation of Crimea. Russia claimed that the developments in Crimea were threatening the life of the Russian population in Crimea and therefore, Russia had to resort to military interference in Crimea and to support the process of secession from Ukraine. The Russian Federation also claimed that its presence in Ukraine is based on the invitation from the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych. Finally, the Russian Federation argued that the Crimean people had the right to self-determination and according to the theory of remedial secession they can secede from Ukraine and choose their path.
In response to the Russian’s arguments, the Ukrainian government invoked the principle of immunity of its territorial integrity and considered the Russian operation in the Ukrainian territory as an act of aggression. The Ukrainian government also considered the referendum in Crimea in contrast with the internal law of Ukraine and international law and emphasized that such referendum was non-democratic and was performed under the pressure. In an evaluation of the reasons for the parties, it should be noted that the Russian operation in the Ukrainian territory cannot be justified as self-defense. As self-defense should have the criteria of proportionality and necessity and none of these two standards is met about the Russian operation in Ukraine. The alleged invitation from the Ukrainian president also cannot justify the Russian military action in Ukraine. As the Ukrainian president was already deposed and the Russian operation was not aimed to restore the former president to power. Moreover, the Russian interference in the Ukrainian affair was not deniable and the referendum in Crimea was just a guise for annexation. With regard to the right of self-determination, it should be noted that the Ukrainian people have different cultures and identities and should be considered as “people” enjoying the right to self-determination from the objective and subjective perspectives. However, in the context of the positive international law, the Crimean people cannot enjoy the external aspect of the right to self-determination and the right to independence and secession.
The internal aspect of the Crimean people’s right to self-determination was virtually respected in the context of Ukrainian integrity. Even if the right was not respected fully, the legitimate solution to provide such rights or other human rights of the Crimean people is to negotiate with the Ukrainian government. Regardless of the fact that under the positive international law, separatism is not justifiable out of the context of decolonization, even in the perspective of the theory of remedial secession, there is no legitimate option for independence of Crimea. Since the remedial secession is only justifiable as the final solution and when all other options to maintain the right to self-determination of people are failed and their human rights are violated: the circumstance which is not compatible with the particular situation in Crimea. Therefore, the secession of Crimea from Ukraine and its annexation to Russia, shall be considered as a classical example of territorial annexation and possession of land by the use of force which is illegitimate and in contrast with the fundamental principles of international law, inter alia, the principle of immunity of territorial integrity of States. The example is comparable with similar historical cases such as annexation of Manchuria to Japan, establishment of the puppet regime in northern Cyprus by Turkey and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. اصل حق مردم به تعیین سرنوشت خود از قواعد بنیادین حقوق بینالملل است، این اصل در حقوق بینالملل موضوعه دربرگیرندۀ نفی اشغالگری و استعمارزدایی است. اما نظریهای نیز به نام جدایی چارهساز مطرح شده است که در صورت بهدستآوردن شرایط و بهعنوان آخرین راهکار، برای گروههای جمعیتی در درون یک کشور امکان توسل به جنبۀ خارجی حق تعیین سرنوشت وجود دارد. اما بعضی کشورها نیز با توسل به نظریۀ جدایی چارهساز در عمل، سرزمین کشورهای دیگر را اشغال و مناطقی از آن کشور را تجزیه میکنند و بهطور رسمی یا عملی به کشور خود پیوسته میسازند. از اینرو، نوعی تضاد و تنش میان ممنوعیت پیوست سرزمینی بهعنوان یک قاعدۀ آمرۀ حقوق بینالملل که از حق تعیین سرنوشت نیز تأثیر میپذیرد با نظریۀ جدایی چارهساز، پدیدار شده است. در این میان، دولت روسیه با توسل به نظریۀ جدایی چارهساز، شبهجزیرۀ کریمه را از اوکراین جدا و به خاک خود ملحق کرده است. با وجود این، این پرسش مطرح میشود که آیا جدایی کریمه از اوکراین جدایی چارهساز بوده یا نوعی اکتساب سرزمین به زور در پوشش آیین جدایی چارهساز است؟ در پاسخ، این فرضیه مطرح میشود که منع اشغال و ممنوعیت پیوستهسازی سرزمینی از قواعد آمرۀ حقوق بینالملل و مصادیق حق تعیین سرنوشت هستند و نظریۀ جدایی چارهساز نمیتواند خدشهای به این قواعد وارد سازد.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77870_52069d38e79ef82ab2d5454a146491ff.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Influencing Factors on Shaping Russia - Iraq Alignment (2011 - 2018)عاملهای مؤثر بر شکلگیری صفآرایی روسیه و عراق (2011 تا 2018)71907787110.22059/jcep.2019.285732.449852FAزهرازمردی انباجیدانشجوی دکتری روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه تربیت مدرسامیرمحمدحاجی یوسفیدانشیار روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه شهید بهشتیسید مسعودموسوی شفائیدانشیار روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه تربیت مدرسJournal Article20190719The 1970s coincided with the expansion of Iraq-Soviet Union relations and Iraq was considered to be one of the most important Soviet Union allies in the Middle East. The collapse of the Soviet Union didn’t end the alliance between the two countries and they continued to cooperate during the 1990s. The invasion of Iraq by the United States and subsequent overthrow of the Baathist regime led to the termination of the Iraq- Russia alliance. Thus, we witnessed a minimal Russian role in post-Saddam Iraq from 2003 to 2011. With the beginning of the Arab uprisings and the spread of unrest to Syria and then Iraq, followed by the occupation of large parts of Iraq by ISIS, a new Iraqi-Russian alignment was formed. This article aims to examine the influential factors involving the formation and continuation of Iraq-Russia alignment from 2011 to 2018. Thus, our main question is: what are the main factors which influenced Russia-Iraq alignment from 2011 until 2018? The hypothesis is that the Arab uprisings (2011) and subsequent regional developments in the Middle East (especially the Syrian crisis) created internal and external threats against the existential security of the Iraqi central government; while the United States (during the Obama administration), as the most important and dominant ally of the Iraqi government, was reluctant to engage itself more in the Iraqi quagmire, Russia took the opportunity to play an active role in Iraq’s political scene. In other words, on the one hand, the Russian leaders’ perceptions of their position in the international system have changed and they assumed that at that time Russia was not as weak as it used to be in the 1990s and 2000s, and on the other, regional and international developments had provided an opportunity for Russia to re-align itself with Iraq. To examine our hypothesis, first we offer a conceptual and theoretical framework in which we follow Glen Snyder who redefines the concept of alignment as a broader concept and more fundamental than alliance. As such alignment is considered to be derived from particular interests of states and is constantly shifting as the patterns of power, resources, and thematic priorities of states, change. Further we use the neoclassical realism research program as our guide to examine factors influencing Iraq-Russia alignment. Neoclassical theoreticians examine states’ goals and behaviors in the international and regional environment by combining unit level and systemic level factors. According to neoclassical realism, international and regional opportunities, threats and states’ relative potencies are systemic level factors considered to be independent variables of this research program. These independent variables are interpreted through intervening variables (leaders’ perception of their position in international system and international and regional developments).Therefore, developments in Iraq and Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy are systemic level variables and Russian leaders’ perception of their position and power in international system is the intervening variable of this research. Finally by providing an overview of Russia-Iraq relations post World War II until 2011, we will discuss our independent variable. Therefore the 2011 Arab Uprising, the emergence of ISIS and changes in Iraq’s security environment will be mentioned followed by the assessment of the United States Pivot to Asia. The adoption of buck passing and offshore balancing strategies by the Obama administration encouraged states such as Russia which was willing to change the status quo, to enter into the international and regional developments that coincided with changes in Moscow’s leaders’ perception of their position in international system. In other words, the Russian leaders who witnessed the failure of US policies towards Afghanistan and Iraq during the late 2000’s, the 2007-2008 economic crisis, the emergence of powers such as China indicating a conversion from unipolar to multipolar system, and also the increase in oil prices, understood that the distribution of Russia’s relative capabilities in the international system has increased. As a result, they initiated some policies to change the position of Russia (especially in Central Asia and Eastern Europe) and utilize opportunities to transform it into a great balancing power in international system. Alignment with Iraq’s central government and Russia’s arms sales to this country in addition to intelligence cooperation, military training and investments in oil and gas sectors in Iraq indicated Russia’s effort to acquire a foothold and reach maximum influence in the important and strategic land of Mesopotamia.روابط عراق و اتحاد شوروی از دهۀ 1970 گسترش یافت و عراق بهعنوان یکی از مهمترین متحدان این ابرقدرت در خاورمیانه (غرب آسیا) محسوب میشد. فروپاشی نظام شوروی و پایان جنگ سرد، منجر به پایان اتحاد میان عراق دوران صدام حسین و روسیه نشد و این دو کشور در دهۀ 1990 با وجود فرازونشیبها به همکاری ادامه دادند؛ اما حملۀ ایالات متحد آمریکا به عراق و سرنگونی رژیم بعث در سال 2003 نقطۀ پایانی بر اتحاد روسیه و عراق بود. بدینترتیب در سالهای 2003 تا 2011 شاهد ایفای نقش حداقلی روسیه در عراق پس از صدام بودیم. بهنظر میرسد با شروع خیزشهای عربی و سرایت ناآرامیها به سوریه و سپس عراق و به دنبال آن اشغال بخش وسیعی از سرزمین عراق توسط داعش، صفآرایی جدیدی میان روسیه و عراق شکل گرفته است. بنابراین این پرسش مطرح میشود که چه تحولهایی بر شکلگیری صفآرایی میان روسیه و عراق بین سالهای 2011 تا 2018 تأثیر گذشته است. فرضیۀ نوشتار این است که خیزشهای عربی (2011) و بهدنبال آن تحولهای منطقۀ خاورمیانه، بهویژه بحران سوریه موجب شکلگیری تهدیدهای داخلی و خارجی علیه امنیت وجودی دولت مرکزی عراق شد؛ در برابر چنین تهدیدهایی ایالات متحد آمریکا (در دورۀ اوباما) بهعنوان مهمترین و قدرتمندترین متحد عراق، بیمیل به همکاری و حمایت حداکثری از دولت عراق بود؛ بنابراین در شرایطی که ادراک رهبران روسیه نسبت به جایگاهشان در نظام بینالملل در مقایسه با دهۀ 1990 و 2000 تغییر یافته است، تحولهای منطقۀ خاورمیانه و نظام بینالملل فرصتی مناسب را پیشروی روسیه نهاد تا بار دیگر در عراق نقشآفرینی کند.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77871_ecf66ed63cf72c953798ba7ff8d37f75.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320From Attempts to Form a Coalition to Worsened Relations; Transformation in Iran and Russia Relations in the Seventeenth Centuryاز تلاش برای ائتلاف تا تیرگی مناسبات؛ تحول روابط ایران و روسیه در سدۀ هفدهم911167787210.22059/jcep.2020.297111.449900FAمنصورصفت گلاستاد تاریخ، دانشگاه تهرانسید مهدیحسینی تقی آباددانشجوی دکتری تاریخ ایران دورۀ اسلامی، دانشگاه تهرانJournal Article20200202The process of neighborliness between Iran and Russia began in the middle of the sixteenth century and was implemented until the end of the same century. In the meantime, the two sides pursued diplomacy backed by common enemies and business incentives. Potentials for tensions emerged during the first half of the seventeenth century with the restoration of Iranian sovereignty over its Caucasian territory from Ottomans and the Russian efforts to break into Georgia and Dagestan. However, the balance of forces prevented the situation from becoming worse. This situation continued until Peter’s reign in the late seventeenth century. This article attempts to examine the evolution of Iranian-Russian relations from the attempt to military cooperation to the direct and indirect conflicts in the 17th century. The method of writing is descriptive-analytical based on the analysis of data extracted from primitive sources and authentic research. This study seeks to answer the question of why in the process of developing bilateral relations, despite potentials for cooperation, potentials for tension led to conflicts between the two sides. The result of this study shows that Russia was not able to face Iran directly in the 17th century, so it benefited from the nurturing activities of its citizens, especially Don Cossacks, along the Iranian Caspian coast, and on Caucasian issues, it was also advancing with the recruitment of local rulers and fortifications in the buffer zones between its territory and Iran. Russia’s key goal was to dominate the strategic segments of the North-South Corridor both at sea and on land. <br />Iran’s historical relation with Russia dates back to about a thousand years, and in addition to trade, it includes the Varangians’ invasion to Iran via both land and the Caspian Sea during the 9<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup> centuries. The history of official relations between Iran and Russia goes back to the reign of Ivan III of Russia. Realizing the importance of the Aq Qoyunlu, he sought to establish relations with them. Although Uzun Hasan responded to the embassy initiatives, he did not prioritize relations with distant neighbors. The turning point in Iran-Russia relations was the fall of Kazan in 1552 AD and Astrakhan in 1556 at the hands of Ivan “the fourth” and beginning of neighborliness between Iran and Russia through the Caspian Sea. <br />The official relations between Iran and Russia were formed in the second half of the sixteenth century on three axes: trade, political-military cooperation, and geographical conflict, consequently, tensions between the two countries were not unexpected in such a situation. <br />During the period between the two countries’ maritime neighborliness in 1556 and their land contacts in 1591 and 1604, the first capacities of tensions arose in relations between the two countries, indicating further complications. The desire of Tsarist Russia to receive the ownership of west coast of the Caspian Sea from Iran was revealed in the case of the Vasilchikov embassy in 1587. Of course, Iran's firm stance against Russian movements on its borders became apparent in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. <br />In the meantime, the internal engagements of the two sides and their priorities in the face of their enemies led both sides to try to rely on the positive and constructive aspects of relations and contain the capacities of tension. As during the First Russo-Persian War (1651-1653), Tsar Alexei, the father of Peter, and the architect of many of Russia’s foundations of power, quickly sent an ambassador to make peace, or even during Razin’s invasion to Iranian ports of the Caspian Sea from Darband (Derbent) to Astarabad, Russia kept its diplomatic wing very active in its relations with Iran. <br />If in the late sixteenth century the confrontation with the Ottomans and the Shaybanids was a serious incentive for the parties to cooperate, but with the fall of the Shaybanids at the end of the sixteenth century and the end of the Iran-Ottoman conflict, especially with the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639, Trade and neighborhood requirements became the main drawbacks of relations; while the Russian side pursued a dual game in its relations with Iran based on its activities on the coasts of the Caspian Sea and established Caucasian communications. <br />Iran’s action to destroy Russian castles on the banks of the Sunzha River and expelling the Russian trade delegation with diplomatic cover, followed by the plundering of Iranian shores by Russian Cossacks, were three Pieces of evidences of the severity of relations that did not tend to be obvious. In 1653, following the success of the Sunzha River operation, Khosrow Khan Shervani was ready to march to Tersky, but Shah Abbas II preferred the path of diplomacy. On the issue of the Cossack’s attack, Iran also preferred to respond to Russian diplomacy. <br />Russia’s proliferation on the Caspian Sea coasts and its infiltration into Dagestan and Georgia were the main roots of tensions in relations between the two sides, which were managed due to Iran’s balance of power and relative superiority. <br />Although the benefits of trade with Iran for Russia and the interests of Russia from being the route for Iran’s trade with Europe was very important to Moscow, but in a model reminiscent of the conflict between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhans in the Caucasus, the Kremlin sought to dominate both the sea and the land route, pursuing indirect destructive actions in its relations with Iran in the cases of Caspian sea shores and the Caucasus that overshadowed at least its own short-term interests. <br />The Russian governors of Astrakhan and Tersky had been cooperating with the Cossack bandits at many times, similar to the Khazar Khaganate’s action in 913 AD, which allowed the Varangians to cross their territory and move from Don River to Volga river and to the Caspian Sea to access Iranian shores for plundering the civilians. With so much evidence, these governors' coordination with Moscow cannot be questioned. Therefore, duplicitous behavior and indirect persecution should be considered part of Moscow's policy towards Isfahan. <br />In the seventeenth century, Russia, in the balance of power with Iran, was gradually trying to change the balance in its favor. The Tsars’ continued efforts to establish relations with the Dagestani and Georgian elites, especially with those who were dissatisfied with Iran. Russia’s failed attempts to make its relations with several Georgian elites to a bargaining tool with Iran and interference in Georgia’s affairs, were examples of Moscow’s soft political approach in its rivalry with Iran during seventeenth century. However, the invasion of Iran by Peter the Great in 1723 marked another aspect of a macro-politics, a policy that continued from the Ivan the “fourth”, Boris Godunov, and the Romanovs in three dynasties. <br />It can be said that the developments of Iran-Russia Relations during seventeenth century showed that the relations between the two sides should have been considered as an equation in which the key effective factors were geopolitical conflict, commercial and political interests , rivalries , cooperation and competition in foreign policy, which over time, the results were different.فرایند همسایگی ایران و روسیه در نیمۀ سدۀ شانزدهم آغاز و تا اواخر همان سده عملی شد. در این فاصله دو طرف دیپلماسی را با پشتوانۀ دشمنان مشترک و انگیزههای تجاری بهکار گرفتند. از دهههای نخست همسایگی نشانههای توسعهطلبی روسها در زمینهای قفقازی ایران آشکار شد. قلمروی که در بخش عمدۀ دورۀ یادشده در اشغال عثمانی بود. در نیمۀ اول سدۀ هفدهم با بازیابی حاکمیت ایران بر قلمرو قفقازیاش و تداوم تکاپوهای روسیه در رخنه به داغستان و گرجستان، ظرفیتهای تنش آشکار شد. با این حال، توازن قوای دو طرف مانع بحرانیشدن شرایط بود. این وضعیت تا قدرتگیری پتر در واپسین سالهای سدۀ هفدهم ادامه داشت. در این نوشتار کوشیدیم که تحول روابط ایران و روسیه از تلاش برای همکاری نظامی تا بروز درگیریهای مستقیم و غیرمستقیم در سدۀ هفدهم را بررسی کنیم. روش نوشتار، توصیفی ـ تحلیلی بر مبنای تحلیل دادههای استخراجشده از منابع دستاول و پژوهشهای معتبر است. در این نوشتار میکوشیم به این پرسش پاسخ دهیم که چرا در فرایند شکلگیری روابط ایران و روسیه با وجود پیشرانهای همکاری، ظرفیتهای تنش بهبروز درگیریهایی بین دو طرف منجر شد؟ نتیجۀ این بررسی نشان میدهد که روسیه درسدۀ هفدهم قدرت رویارویی مستقیم با ایران را نداشت. در نتیجه، در حاشیۀ خزر از تحرکهای آزاردهنده اتباع خویش بهویژه قزاقهای دُن بهره میبرد و در موضوعهای قفقازی نیز با برقراری ارتباط و جذب حاکمان محلی، بهویژه ناراضیها از ایران و قلعهسازی در زمینهای حائل بین قلمرو خویش و ایران مشغول پیشروی بود. هدف اصلی روسیه تسلط بر بخش راهبردی راهروی شمال ـ جنوب در دریا و خشکی بود.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77872_7e35a130f261468e6fb38b966ffb0d63.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Submarine Oil and Gas Pipelines under the Aktau Convention and the EIA Protocol to the Tehran Conventionخطوط لولۀ زیردریایی نفتوگاز از دیدگاه کنوانسیون آکتائو و پروتکل ارزیابی زیستمحیطی کنوانسیون تهران1171427787310.22059/jcep.2020.300393.449914FAساسانصیرفیاستادیار حقوق بینالملل، دانشگاه تهرانJournal Article20200404On August 12, 2018 at the fifth Caspian Summit in Aktau, Kazakhstan, the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (hereinafter Aktau Convention) was signed by the Presidents of the five Caspian littoral states. If this landmark treaty comes into force, it will establish a new legal order for the Caspian Sea. The Aktau Convention is the result of 21 years of difficult negotiations, whereby the Caspian states endeavored to create a unique legal regime that would reflect the characteristics of the Caspian Sea and the diverse interests of its littoral states in the post-Soviet era. Indeed, if the Aktau Convention is implemented, it is likely to have a substantial impact on the geopolitical landscape of the Caspian region. A key element of the new Caspian legal regime is its submarine oil and gas pipelines. This was a point of contention throughout the negotiations on the above-mentioned issue. On the one hand, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan sought the right to lay submarine pipelines on the bed of the Caspian Sea to transport their oil and gas to European markets and on the other, Russia and Iran, ostensibly concerned with the environmental effects of submarine oil and gas pipelines, believed that the construction of such pipelines should be approved by all littoral states. Still, the Russian and Iranian position had more to do with their opposition to the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (hereinafter TCP) project. Under the TCP project, it is proposed that a submarine pipeline be constructed on the Caspian seabed that would connect Turkmen gas fields to the Azeri shores in order to export Turkmen gas to the European market. Originally conceived and supported by the United States (US), the TCP project is also supported by the European Union (EU), which wants to import Turkmen gas to Europe via the so-called Southern Gas Corridor. But Russia and Iran have long been opposed to the TCP project since it effectively circumvents them as transit countries; not to mention that it would enable Turkmenistan to compete with Russia in the European gas market.
Of course, the dispute over the TCP must be seen in the wider context of energy geopolitics in the Caspian Sea region. Given that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are land-locked states, they are dependent on pipelines for the export of their oil and gas to foreign markets. That is why various pipeline projects have been either planned or implemented in the Caspian region during the past three decades. The underlying geopolitical significance of these pipeline projects is due to their transit routes as transit states, whose territories, not only benefit economically but are also able to exert political influence over the exporting states and its customers. As such, since the fall of the Soviet Union, Western policy has supported pipeline projects along the so-called Western Route, namely from Azerbaijan via Georgia and Turkey to terminals on the Black Sea and Mediterranean coasts or to southern Europe. The purpose of this policy is to deprive Russia and Iran form the political and economic benefits of transit pipelines and reduce Europe’s dependence to Russian gas. The TCP would connect Turkmenistan to the Western Route through which Turkmen gas can be transported to Europe without transiting either Russia or Iran, hence their opposition to the TCP and conceivably similar submarine-pipeline projects will arise.
It was in this context that the two sides reached a compromise, which is reflected in Article 14 of the Aktau Convention. According to paragraph 1 of Article 14, Caspian littoral states “may lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the Caspian Sea”. However, paragraph 2 of the said Article provides that “[t]he Parties may lay trunk submarine pipelines on the bed of the Caspian Sea, on condition that their projects comply with environmental standards and requirements embodied in it... the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea and its relevant protocols”. Therefore, the construction of submarine trunk pipelines such as the TCP is conditional upon compliance with the environmental standards and requirements of the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea (hereinafter Tehran Convention) and its protocols.
At first view, Article 14 should satisfy both sides as it allows Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to construct oil and gas pipelines on the bed of the Caspian Sea while addressing Russia and Iran’s concerns about the environmental impacts of such projects. However, the key phrase in paragraph 2 of Article 14 is “relevant protocols”, which is a hidden reference to the Protocol on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans boundary Context (hereinafter EIA Protocol). This additional protocol to the Tehran Convention was signed in Moscow three weeks before the Aktau Convention. Indeed, Russia and Iran reportedly considered the conclusion of the EIA Protocol as a precondition for signing the Aktau Convention. More importantly, Russia and Iran seem to have a peculiar understanding of the legal effects of the EIA Protocol insofar as Russian and Iranian authorities have implied that the EIA Protocol effectively gives them environmental veto power over submarine trunk pipeline projects such as the TCP.
This paper seeks to examine the provisions of the Aktau Convention and the EIA Protocol with regard to submarine oil and gas pipelines to clarify their effect on the TCP and other similar projects in the future. As such, the paper’s main question is how will the implementation of the Aktau Convention and the EIA Protocol to the Tehran Convention impact submarine oil and gas pipeline projects in the Caspian Sea? The hypothesis is that although the EIA Protocol enables all Caspian states to participate in the environmental impact assessment procedure of submarine oil and gas pipeline projects, it does not make such projects subject to their approval.کنوانسیون وضعیت حقوقی دریای خزر(کنوانسیون آکتائو) با هدف پیریزی یک رژیم حقوقی نوین برای دریای خزر بین پنج کشور ساحلی آن بسته شده است. از عناصر اصلی این رژیم حقوقی، مسئلۀ خطوط لولۀ زیردریایی نفتوگاز است که مدتها بین کشورهای ساحلی محل نزاع بوده است، زیرا ایران و روسیه ظاهراً از نظر آثار زیستمحیطی خطوط لولۀ زیردریایی نفتوگاز و در واقع برای حفظ منافع سیاسی و اقتصادی خود خواستار این بودند که ساختن این نوع خطوط لوله ـ و بهطور مشخص اجرای طرح خط لولۀ سراسری دریای خزر ـ وابسته به تأیید همۀ کشورهای ساحلی باشد. مادۀ 14 کنوانسیون آکتائو گذاشتن خطوط لولۀ اصلی نفتوگاز بر بستر دریای خزر را به شرط رعایت مقررات کنوانسیون چارچوب حفاظت از محیط زیست دریای خزر (کنوانسیون تهران) و پروتکل ارزیابی آثار زیستمحیطی فرامرزی این کنوانسیون، مجاز میشمارد. ادعا میشود که با وجود این پروتکل ایران و روسیه از نوعی حق وتو در برابر طرحهای ساختن خطوط لولۀ زیردریایی برخوردار شدهاند. این نوشتار به روش توصیفیـ تحلیلی و با بهرهگیری از منابع کتابخانهای در پی پاسخ به این پرسش است که اجرای کنوانسیون آکتائو و پروتکل ارزیابی زیستمحیطی کنوانسیون تهران چه اثری بر طرحهای ساخت خطوط لولۀ زیردریایی نفتوگاز در دریای خزر خواهد داشت؟ فرضیۀ نویسنده این است اگرچه پروتکل ارزیابی زیستمحیطی امکان شرکت همۀ کشورهای ساحلی خزر در ارزیابی آثار زیست محیطی طرحهای خطوط لولۀ زیردریایی نفتوگاز را فراهم میکند، اما اجرای این طرحها را رضایت همۀ کشورها مشروط نمیکند.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77873_6e8b8d1cd5b9c92d9d4c0fdebb7144f4.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Evolution of Priorities in Shanghai Cooperation Organization since its Establishment up to 2019تحول اولویتها در سازمان همکاری شانگهای از زمان تأسیس تا سال 20191431607787410.22059/jcep.2020.287851.449867FAفرهادعطاییاستاد روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه تهرانسمیهزنگنهدانشجوی دکتری مطالعات منطقهای، دانشگاه تهرانJournal Article20190825The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established in 1996 at the initiative of China to solve border problems of five neighboring countries. Nearly a quarter century after its creation, it has become a major regional organization expanding most of Eurasia. With 20 percent of the world’s oil and 50 percent of the world’s gas reserves, it has the potential to become one of the world’s largest international economic and energy hubs in the coming decades, managing and controlling much of the world’s energy. Extensive geographical Territory, large population, vast energy resources, possessions of nuclear weapons, strong armed forces, veto power of two of its member countries in the United Nations Security Council, and other factors, give the organization this great economic, political, and military potentials. SCO has the largest gas producing and the largest energy consumers countries among its members. After a brief review of developments in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, this paper examines the organization’s capabilities in terms of economic and energy security and shows how this limited regional agreement has become a huge regional cooperation organization. In this article, we also review the energy routes in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s vast geography. We look at the various regional, ethnic, and political conflicts that have a negative effect on the Organizations internal dynamic. We especially examine the policies of its two giant partners, namely, China and the Russian Federation. <br />We also review the evolution of the organization’s goals and priorities, ranging from resolving border disputes between China and Russia to economic cooperation and securing energy lines. This paper suggests that despite its great potentials, this organization will not be able to materialize this potential. This study shows that after nearly a quarter of a century, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has not been able to materialize its huge potential. The reasons may be found in two important political and economic factors. A prerequisite for economic success of such associations or unions is complementary economies, where each country contributes to the union what other member countries lack. In today’s globalized world, however, countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization look elsewhere for cooperation. China’s economy, for example, is more tied to the huge US market than to its allies in SCO. Russia’s huge energy resources, in turn, are aimed more at the European market, rather than at China’s. <br />Politically, unlike EU member states that have a liberal democratic system and a common ideology, members of the Shanghai Organization have different worldviews and different governmental and ideological systems. Political instability in some of SCO countries has been an additional obstacle to realization of the mentioned potential. Regional conflicts, frozen and active, such as those in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Sinkiang region further inhibit free and safe multilateral economic cooperation. <br />The initial goals and priorities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have evolved during the past quarter of century because of economic, political, and security dynamics of this vast region in a globalized world. The huge potential envisioned by many of policymakers in the organization has not materialized.سازمان همکاری شانگهای در سال 1996 به ابتکار چین و با هدف حل مشکلات مرزی پنج کشور همسایه تشکیل شد و امروز پس از 23 سال به پیمان منطقهای بزرگی تبدیل شده است. این سازمان با دراختیارداشتن 20 درصد ذخایر نفتی و 50 درصد ذخایر گاز جهان، قابلیت آن را دارد که در دهههای آینده به یکی از بزرگترین قطبهای بینالمللی اقتصادی و انرژی تبدیل شود و مدیریت و کنترل بخش عظیمی از انرژی جهانی را در اختیار بگیرد. بررسی اطلاعات آماری مربوط به کشورهای عضو سازمان همکاری شانگهای نشان میدهد که اعضای این سازمان قابلیت آن را دارند که در دهههای آینده به یکی از بزرگترین قطبهای بینالمللی اقتصادی، تجاری، سرمایهگذاری خارجی، انرژی و نظامی در جهان تبدیل شوند. قلمرو جغرافیایی وسیع، جمعیت زیاد، منابع انرژی گسترده، سلاحهای هستهای، نیروهای مسلح، حق وتو در شورای امنیت و عاملهای دیگر به این سازمان ظرفیت اقتصادی، سیاسی و نظامی بالایی میبخشد. این سازمان هم بزرگترین تولیدکنندۀ گاز و هم بزرگترین مصرفکننده را در خود دارد، بنابراین پایۀ اصلی رقابتهای آینده بهسوی مدیریت منابع انرژی است. این نوشتار پس از مرور تحولهای گذشتۀ سازمان همکاری شانگهای، قابلیتهای این سازمان را از جنبههای اقتصادی و تأمین امنیت انرژی بررسی میکند و نشان میدهد چگونه این پیمان منطقهای محدود، به یک سازمان همکاری منطقهای بزرگ تبدیل شده است. فرضیۀ نوشتار این است که با وجود ظرفیتهای بسیار، این سازمان به یک قطب اقتصادی و راهبردی جهانی تبدیل نخواهد شد.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77874_a5593a96dfbb5539c367811ffbe518aa.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Russian Armenians and Diaspora Functionsارمنیان روسیه و کارکردهای دیاسپورایی1611867787510.22059/jcep.2020.299441.449909FAشیواعلی زادهاستادیار مطالعات منطقهای، دانشگاه تهرانJournal Article20200313The impact of Diaspora on domestic politics and foreign affairs of homeland and the host country is a matter to reckon with in non-state-centered approaches to International Relations. Diaspora groups can play an important role in shaping domestic and foreign policies of their homeland and the host country. The quality and strength of this role are largely determined by the way they organize and mobilize resources. The attitudes of the governments of homeland and the host country are another vitally important factor. Diaspora may represent any of them while dealing with the other. Consequently both sides may take advantage of powerful diaspora communities. Diaspora communities can contribute to the economic development of their homeland. They also make considerable efforts to protect their cultural legacy, especially language, religion and social values. Armenian Diaspora has been traditionally an attractive subject for the researchers of Diaspora Studies. <br />Armenians have been one of the most influential ethnic groups in Russia over the centuries. Armenians emigrated to Russia over the centuries for different reasons and their lands had been incorporated into Russian Empire and the Soviet Union for more than 150 years. Now Russia hosts the most populous Armenian community outside Armenia. To some extent, Armenian communities around the world are usually well-organized and powerful enough to influence the policies of the host countries. Armenians of Russia are latecomers to the world of Diaspora politics. However, their potential is being mobilized gradually by the most prosperous elements of this community. This paper is the result of qualitative research about Armenians of Russia to find out their main features and to examine how they are involved in Diaspora activities in homeland and Russia. In other words, in the following pages this question has been addressed: “What are the main concerns of the Armenian community of Russia and how does this group affect the relationship between Russia and Armenia?” To answer this, the author has assumed that “Armenian community of Russia is largely preoccupied with protecting interests of Armenian businesses in Russia, preserving Armenian culture and language and helping newcomers from Armenia. This community puts an effect on the relationship between homeland and the host country by making efforts to gain a more prominent role in Armenia’s economy and to perpetuate strategic partnership of Moscow and Yerevan especially in the economic sphere”. In comparison with Armenian communities of Europe, U.S. and Middle East, this community may seem less organized and less cohesive, but at least its more powerful and wealthier elements have turned out to be stakeholder when it comes to relations with their homeland. <br />Armenians of Russia are not a homogenous group in terms of education and social status. In addition, they do not enjoy the same degree of involvement in the Armenians’ associational life. Some of them are among the economic, political and cultural elite of the Russian Federation. Some have become successful businessmen. But many of the newcomers have been employed as unskilled workers. The population of the latter group increases constantly as more Armenians leave Armenia to find a job in Russia. <br />Although still sending remittances is the most usual involvement of the Armenians of Russia in Armenia’s economy, a top-down mobilization to realize diaspora function has been going on for at least two decades. The organization of Armenian associational life began in late 1990s. Events of the final days of the Soviet Union and early 1990s led Armenians of Russia to pay more attention to what was going on in Armenia. Since then, the more eagerly support Armenian traditions, customs and language. <br />Armenian organizations in Russia often cope with problems of migrant workers who badly need support to survive in the host country. They also lobby to protect interests of Armenian businesses and companies in Russia. On the other hand, Russian government encourages Armenian entrepreneurs in Russia to make huge investments in Armenia. Armenian government copes with them more easily than their counterparts in the West. This easy interaction originates from shared experience of living in the same country for decades. <br />The fact that Russia is home to the world’s most populous Armenian community and the severe dependence of Armenian economy on the Russian job market seriously affects Armenia’s policy towards Russia. However, it must be mentioned that Armenians’ collective memory is void of hostility toward Russia. Thus, besides economic needs and security dependencies, positive attitude of Armenian community towards Russia contributes to a friendship between the two states. <br />Regarding the relations between Armenia and Russia, it can be said that without the presence of the Armenian community in Russia, this relationship would have been hardly different from what it is today. Just as countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan- with strong security and economic dependence on Russia, Armenia with its small economy and security-military needs, has become strategic ally of Moscow not just for the presence of the Armenian community in Russia. Strategic importance of the former Soviet republics for Moscow and the ties and dependencies left over from the past are the most important factors influencing Armenian-Russian relations. In this context, it can be seen that the Armenian community in Russia is aligned with the Kremlin and can hardly be considered an independent actor when it comes to the Russian-Armenian relations. The Armenian diaspora functions of the Russian Armenians take two main forms: first, attempts to advance the interests of the host country in the homeland and gaining a share of strategic sectors of the homeland economy, second, playing a considerable role in bilateral trade on the one hand and supporting Armenians in Russia on the other. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Armenian community in Russia benefits from the strategic relations between Russia and Armenia, and therefore is one of the actors who will try to maintain the strategic nature of these relations as much as possible. Providing a platform for the strong presence of Armenian billionaires of Russia in the Armenian economy is one of the manifestations of the integration of this part of the Diaspora community in the host country.تأثیر دیاسپورا و سازمانهای دیاسپورایی بر سیاست داخلی و روابط خارجی کشورهای میزبان و میهن، موضوعی است که در دهههای اخیر بیشتر در رویکردهای غیردولتمحور روابط بینالملل مورد توجه قرار گرفته است. اجتماعهای دیاسپورایی میتوانند در توسعۀ اقتصادی میهن خود نقش مهمی بازی کنند. آنها همچنین برای حفظ میراث فرهنگی جامعۀ خود بهویژه زبان، مذهب و ارزشهای اجتماعی آن تلاش میکنند. دیاسپورای ارمنی همواره برای پژوهشگران مطالعات دیاسپورا موضوعی جذاب بوده است. روسیه میزبان پرجمعیتترین جامعۀ ارمنی در خارج از جمهوری ارمنستان است. نوشتار پیش رو نتیجۀ پژوهشی کیفی در مورد ارمنیهای روسیه است. در این نوشتار میکوشیم به این پرسش پاسخ دهیم که «جامعۀ ارمنی روسیه چه دغدغههایی دارد و چگونه روابط روسیه و ارمنستان را در تأثیر قرار میدهد؟» در پاسخ به این پرسش این فرضیه را بیان میکنیم: «جامعۀ ارمنی روسیه بیشتر در پی تأمین منافع کسبوکارهای ارمنی در روسیه، حفظ فرهنگ و زبان ارمنی و حل مشکلات مهاجران ارمنی تازه وارد است و تأثیرگذاری آن بر روابط دو کشور نیز با تلاش برای حضور پررنگتر در اقتصاد ارمنستان و تثبیت روابط راهبردی مسکو و ایروان بهویژه در حوزۀ اقتصاد انجام میشود.» ارمنیهای روسیه دیر به جهان سیاست دیاسپورایی وارد شدند. با وجود این، ظرفیتهای چشمگیر این گروه بهتدریج در حال بسیجشدن در چارچوبهای دیاسپورایی است. هرچند ارمنیهای روسیه هنوز انسجام و سازماندهی ضعیفتری در مقایسه با ارمنیهای اروپا، آمریکا و خاورمیانه دارند، اما دستکم بخشهای قدرتمندتر و ثروتمندتر آنها به بازیگران بهنسبت مهمی در روابط روسیه و ارمنستان تبدیل شدهاند.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77875_15981e302552d47effdeb71dde356581.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Transferring to the East: the Path for ISIS Survival as a Terrorist Organizationانتقال به شرق: مسیر بقای داعش بهمثابۀ سازمانی تروریستی1872087787610.22059/jcep.2019.284004.449848FAسید احمدفاطمی نژاداستادیار روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهدJournal Article20190622While ISIS was raised in Iraq and Syria, its founders and followers considered its goals in occupying more territories. However, regarding successive defeats and failures of ISIS in the Middle East, it seems that the group is collapsing more than ever. The situation obliges the leaders of ISIS in trying to find some remedies for surviving the group. Meanwhile, there are three main approaches among them: a) continuing resistance in Syria and Iraq; b) management and programming for sporadic operations around the world; c) occupying new territories. In the context of this approach, getting new base is very important for ISIS. The purpose of this article is to show the importance of the East as a potential base for ISIS and its survival. Here, I mean the East as all places and territories which are located in Eastern Arab lands of the Middle East and Levant including Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, China’s west, and South East Asia. <br />The main question here is what role the East has played in the survival of ISIS? To answer the question, it is possible to propose this hypothesis that the East contributes to ISIS survival in causal, tactical, and functional terms. By clarifying influential factors on ISIS survival, I will use functional explanatory research method. Accordingly, the role which the East is playing to reach a special function (ISIS survival) is assessed in this research. The East plays an important role in ISIS survival. ISIS terrorists have different reasons to invade the East which includes religious teachings, establishing its caliphate, as an emergent entity and jihadist motives. To achieve its goals, ISIS has applied tactics such as economic supports, propaganda, linkage with the terrorists, opportunism from jihadists, proxy terrorism and gaining allegiance. Lastly, ISIS has different destinations in the East which are as follows: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asian countries, India, Philippine, Bangladesh, and China. <br />The above-mentioned hypothesis has been studied in three steps: first of all, subjective reasons and objective causes of ISIS in enlarging itself to the East have been argued. Religious reasons are among the most important ones which justify the place of the East for ISIS. According to Religious world view, Pakistan as well as Afghanistan is respected by Sunni radical groups; because the army of Mujahedeen in the apocalyptic period would stand up from this region. Another cause is related to realistic ones. It seems that ISIS could equip itself with financial support, jihadi troops, weapons, shelters, and so forth in the region. Furthermore, it seems that emergency of ISIS after its defeats in Syria had forced it to spill over to the East. Now, it is obvious to see ISIS operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. <br />Representing ISIS tactics for enlargement has constituted the second step in the article. After clarifying ISIS reasons and motives for enlargement to the East, the question raised here is what tactics have been employed by ISIS for the enlargement. The first tactic is spending funds to attract local troops and followers. Given the severe poverty in the East, the tactic could be successful. Using advertising and propaganda is the second tactic of ISIS. On the one hand, the group has tried to attract isolated and passive Muslims and on the other, separate jihadists who support other radical groups and attract them toward itself. This is a unique opportunity for ISIS to enlarge its recruitment and prepare for its new rise. <br />After understanding ISIS world view and its transfer tactics, it is necessary to recognize the destination(s) of the group in the East. Until August 2015, ISIS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were recognized and accepted by radical jihadists in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, northern Caucasus and in Levant as well. ISIS had selected its destination regarding several factors such as Muslim population, popularity of radicalism, weakness of ruling governments, possibility of military and suicide operations, and abundance of jihadists. <br />Hence, it is useful to break up potential and actual destinations of ISIS in the East. Some factors including Muslim society, weakness of ruling state and … indicate that a country has the potentials to become a host for ISIS. But, it is not enough. The most important factor which turns a potential host to an actual one is the presence of jihadi troops who have pledged their allegiances to ISIS, directly or indirectly, and are following its path. So, it is possible to remind the following states as potential and actual destinations of ISIS: <br />a) Afghanistan: given the factors listed above, the country is a potential aim of ISIS which has experienced ISIS and its operations more than others. The first proof of the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan is related to its centrality for Islamic state of Khorasan (IS-k). The second sign of the spread of ISIS to Afghanistan is rooted in centrifugal and autonomous regions which provide a secure shelter for ISIS. IS-K terrorist operations in the provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar constitutes the third indication. <br />b) Pakistan: the country is another destination for ISIS in the East. Some factors like Muslim population, radicalism, and centrifugal regions do prepare the ground for the growth and recruitment of ISIS. Furthermore, it is possible to list some signs of activities of ISIS in the country: the first is Pakistanis scattered support of ISIS in cities such as Karachi, Lahore, Sialkot, and Hyderabad. The second is the compliance of some Pakistani radical groups like Jundallah, Tahreek-e-Khilafat, Jamaat-ul-ahrar, and Uzbekistan Islamic movement (IMU) with ISIS. <br />c) Bangladesh: the state is a potential destination for ISIS in the East. There have been some signs of ISIS supporters since the inception of the group. It seems that, in recent years, militant activities have increased in Bangladesh. <br />Lastly, the findings of the article show that the more the ISIS is subjected to pressure in Levant, the more the East becomes attractive for its growth. So, in recent years, many signs indicate ISIS is operating in the region more actively. با توجه به شکستهای پیاپی داعش، کشتهشدن رهبران ردۀ اول و میانی این گروه و بهبود وضعیت امنیتی دولتهای هدف داعش در منطقۀ خاورمیانه، احتمال فروپاشی و نابودی این گروه بیش از گذشته مطرح شده است. در این شرایط، رهبران و فرماندهان داعش نیز دست از فعالیت نکشیده و برای بقای این گروه چارهاندیشی کردهاند. بهنظر میرسد که سه رویکرد برجسته در میان سران داعش مطرح بوده است: 1. برخی بر تداوم مقاومت در عراق و سوریه تأکید دارند که بهویژه با توجه به آشوبهای جدید در این کشورها درخور توجه است؛ 2. گروه دوم بر مدیریت عملیاتهای پراکنده در سراسر جهان دست گذاشتهاند؛ 3. گروه سوم بهدنبال تصرف مناطق جدیدی برای مرکزیت داعش هستند. در چارچوب این رویکرد، بهدستآوردن پایگاههای جدید برای داعش اهمیت زیادی دارد. هدف این نوشتار این است که اهمیت شرق را بهعنوان پایگاه بالقوۀ داعش و ابزار بقای آن نشان دهد. پرسش اصلی نوشتار حاضر این است که شرق چه نقشی در تداوم بقای داعش ایفا کرده است؟ در پاسخ به این پرسش این فرضیه مطرح میشود که شرق از دیدگاه علی، تاکتیکی و کارکردی به بقای داعش کمک کرده است. روش پژوهش در این نوشتار، روش تبیینیکارکردی است که نقش عاملهای تأثیرگذار در بقای داعش را نشان میدهد. فرضیه را در این سه گام بررسی میکنیم: دلیلهای ذهنی و علتهای عینی گسترش داعش به شرق، تاکتیکهای انتقال و هدفهای انتقال داعش در شرق.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77876_1391f3997cb3c92f17970cd7838b73f9.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Identifying and Investigating the Future Agenda of Iran’s Environmental Diplomacy in the Caspian Seaبررسی و شناسایی دستور کار آیندۀ دیپلماسی زیستمحیطی ایران در دریای خزر2092327787710.22059/jcep.2019.285413.449850FAابوذرفتاحی زادهاستادیار علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه یاسوج0000-0003-0340-3107جاسبنیکفراستادیار علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه یاسوجرضیهمحمدیان مالشیخدانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه یاسوجJournal Article20190714Todays, due to the human desire to maximize extraction of available resources, the world is facing so many environmental threats in terms of pollution in various spheres of the planet. Hydrosphere is one of the most important areas of the biosphere that has suffered most damages from this phenomenon. As a coastal country, Iran is also struggling with problems related to water pollutants and the use of shared resources in its three territorial waters. Khazar is one of these triple territorial waters. The five littoral states of the Caspian Sea disagreements about division of the territorial waters have led many of its problems to be ignored. Environmental crises are the most important of these issues that have had a huge negative impact on the lives and economies of people living in the coastal regions of the sea. Furthermore, contrary to reluctances of states to give up their sovereignty claims in this subject, environmental issues are categorized in low politics, and states show less sensitivity in cooperation on these matters. So, the environmental problems of the Caspian Sea could serve as a platform for initiation of cooperation between coastal states, its expansion to other fields and finally the intensification of convergence between the states. Therefore, the main question of the present article is what kinds of unsought crises can be considered in Iran’s environmental diplomacy agenda with the Caspian Sea littoral states and thereby intensify the convergence with these countries? <br />To answer this question, first we looked at the concept of environmental diplomacy and its relation to cooperation issue in international politics from a functionalist perspective, and showed that the main reason for the relative failures of these long-term negotiations have been the question of how to divide the sea waters and what is the share of each state in this territory; That is, the issue is contained under the high politics. The sensitivity of coastal states to this issue has left many other problems and issues unresolved. The environmental problems of the Caspian Sea are among these problems; Coastal governments, however, have paid much more attention to other issues over the past four decades. For instance, in 2003, they signed the Caspian Sea Environmental Protocol called the Tehran Convention and entered it into force in 2006; and with the signing of Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea in 2018, they tried to solve some of these problems. However, many of these problems still remain or have not been addressed at all. According to the classical theory of convergence, it seems that further attention to the environmental issues of the Caspian Sea, as issues in the field of low politics, can be one of the starting points for intensifying the level of convergence between five coastal states in order to reach a full and comprehensive agreement on the legal regime of the Caspian Sea. <br />To solve these problems and expand cooperation based on Tehran Convention - as an appropriate legal and political framework that is the product of years of diplomatic negotiations - We have to answer the question, how can this environmental regime be developed? A development that, according to previous statements, helps to intensify convergence. It seems that most of the solutions and environmental negotiations on this matter have been based on planned and centrist policies; because many problems in the negotiation process have been considered insignificant and have not been raised, or there has been no awareness to them at all. Therefore, in our opinion, it is logical that in order to overcome the policy-making weakness in this specialized field, one should refer to experts and specialists who have been directly confronted with the environmental problems of the Caspian Sea for professional reasons. <br />In order to identify the problems that should be included in the future agenda of Iran’s environmental diplomacy in the Caspian Sea based on Delphi method, we tried to gather a panel of experts; those who directly faced with environmental problems of the sea for professional reasons or during their research in the three coastal provinces (Gilan, Mazandaran and Golestan). Using the snowball method, 34 professionals and experts were invited to participate; but only 9 of them continued cooperation until the end of the research and sent their questionnaires. They were asked: 1) in the direct confrontation with the ecosystem of the Caspian Sea and neighboring provinces of the sea, what kinds of environmental problems you have faced? Problems that originate from littoral states pollutant sources and wrong extraction of natural and mineral resources by these countries? 2) What actions have been taken by the government’s Department of Environment or its provincial branches in Golestan, Mazandaran and Gilan or other organizations and the government itself to solve these environmental problems regarding the two above-mentioned subjects at the international level? 3) What kind of problems have been ignored by government’s Department of Environment in these two areas that are common between Iran and other coastal countries, or the Department is unaware of ? <br />They identified 11 pollutant sources and 7 crises due to wrong exploitation of natural and biological resources of the sea and seabed. While expressing Iran’s achievements and constructive actions in this field, they brought up 12 important problems that had been ignored by the coastal states or had not been paid attention to. We have also proposed a series of diplomatic solutions to each of these problems, which we have finally grouped them into five general axes: 1) to establish an environmental diplomacy center under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 2) proposing a plan to establish International Organization of Caspian Sea (IOCS) ; 3) Participation of non-governmental environmental experts and institutions in Iran’s public diplomacy with the Caspian Sea littoral states; 4) Implementation and promotion of Tehran Convention protocols; and 5) Proposing and following-up of “Joint Environmental Audit on Caspian Sea”, “Preservation of the hydrological characteristics of the Caspian Sea”, “Nuclear safety of the Caspian Sea” and “compliance with environmental standards in exploration, extraction and transportation of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea and its continental shelf and Seabed” protocols in order to annex them to Tehran Convention.اختلافنظر پنج کشور ساحلی دریای خزر در مورد شیوۀ تقسیم این قلمرو آبی، سبب شده است که بسیاری از مشکلات مربوط به آن از جمله بحرانهای زیستمحیطی همچنان نادیده گرفته شوند؛ بحرانهایی که تأثیرهای منفی بسیاری بر زندگی و اقتصاد مردم ساکن در نواحی ساحلی این دریا برجای گذاشتهاند. از سوی دیگر، برخلاف اینکه این دولتها حاضر نیستند از دعواهای حاکمیتی خود در تعارض یادشده دست بکشند، مسائل زیستمحیطی در حوزۀ سیاست کمارزش شدهاند و دولتها حساسیت کمتری نسبت به همکاری در این زمینه از خود نشان میدهند. بنابراین مشکلات زیستمحیطی دریای خزر میتواند دلیلی برای شروع همکاریها میان دولتهای ساحلی، گسترش آنها به سایر حوزهها و در نتیجه تشدید همگرایی میان این دولتها باشد. بنابراین در این نوشتار بهدنبال پاسخ این پرسش هستیم که ایران میتواند چه مشکلات نااندیشیدهای را در دستور کار دیپلماسی زیستمحیطی خود با کشورهای حاشیۀ خزر بگنجاند و بدینوسیله به همگرایی با این کشورها شدت بخشد؟ برای پاسخدادن به این پرسش، ابتدا مقدمۀ نظری و روششناختی لازم را بیان میکنیم. سپس با استفاده از روش دلفی، هجده گروه از مشکلات زیستمحیطی دریای خزر از دیدگاه صاحبنظران را شناسایی و عملکرد دیپلماسی زیستمحیطی ایران در این دریا را از دیدگاه آنها بررسی میکنیم. نتایج نشان داد که آنها دوازده راهکار برای حل مشکلات باقیمانده یا تداومیافته دارند. در آخر نیز با توجه به این راهکارها، دستور کاری دیپلماتیک، مشتمل بر پنج محور اصلی برای آیندۀ دیپلماسی زیستمحیطی ایران در دریای خزر را بیان میکنیم.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77877_989097da8626ec962213110f3ae1487c.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Elements and Obstacles of Iran’s Geocultural Approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asiaمؤلفهها و موانع رویکرد ژئوکالچر ایران در قبال ابتکار کمربند و راه چین در آسیای مرکزی2332527787810.22059/jcep.2019.288212.449868FAمحمدرضامجیدیدانشیار مطالعات منطقهای، دانشگاه تهرانمحمد حسیندهقانیان فراشاهدانشجوی دکتری مطالعات منطقهای، دانشگاه تهرانJournal Article20190901The Belt and Road Initiative as the biggest and the boldest plan in China’s foreign policy is perceived as a great stride toward China’s self-expression and abandoning the legacy of Deng Xiaoping in keeping a low profile, which would have wide repercussions worldwide. This structural change will be especially felt in regional dimensions, and as the closer the regions are to China, the greater will be the effects upon them. Central Asia is a region that will be affected strongly by this initiative. China inaugurated its vast and ambitious strategy to revive the Silk Road in 2013 during a visit by Xi Jinping to Kazakhstan, which shows the importance of Central Asia as the gateway for China’s modern Silk Road. The nature of Chinese strategy is expansion of connectivity to have new routes for its exports to its main markets especially to Europe. Therefore a historic opportunity is provided for active participation by other states in this great endeavor to expand cultural interaction besides transit of goods. In this regard, Iran as a great nation in Western Asia with shared borders with Central Asia has vested interests in this region. Historically and culturally Iran has many commonalities with Central Asia. So, this question arises that what would be the best and the most efficient approach in regional foreign policy of Iran in Central Asia as a response to Belt and Road Initiative and what are its consequences? To answer this question it is argued that based on constructivism theory and its effects on new regionalism, an approach based on Cultural Iran is regarded as the best policy for Iran which in comparison with other approaches would be more beneficial in realizing the comparative advantage of Iran. Cultural Iran is a concept which differentiates between geographical and cultural domains of Iran. Based on its deep historical and civilizational roots, Iran is regarded as among those few states in the world which have wider cultural spheres than their actual geographical borders. Cultural Iran means those invisible borders that embrace the historical and cultural roots of ancient Persia are still alive and potentially revivable.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the best strategy for Iran in the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia would be a cultural approach, based on Iran`s soft power. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of three kinds of approaches in Iran’s regional policy in Central Asia, including geopolitics, geo-economics and geo-culture will be provided. At the end, the obstacles of Iran’s geo-culture will be examined. Our assumption on the nature of the Belt and Road Initiative is that it is a multi-dimensional concept with different geopolitical, geo-economical and geo-cultural aspects. The main assumption in the West and especially in the United States is that BRI is a geopolitical strategy by China in challenging the current American and western global order. So, the best response to BRI must be a geological response based on power and show of force. On the other hand, China constantly emphasizes that BRI is exclusively an economic strategy without any geopolitical aspects. China claims that BRI is a helping hand for strengthening globalization, which is being undermined by the U.S. actions. Our assumption in this paper is that BRI is a mutually beneficial strategy for both Iran and China, and Iran is ready and willing to participate in it. However, as Iran has deep historical and civilizational roots in Central Asia which can be used as a soft power, it will be better positioned in BRI by trying to revive these ancient roots. In conclusion, we argue that Iran’s foreign policy has different expressions in different regions and sub-regions. Iran has mainly a geopolitical approach in the Middle East which is of course based on the nature of developments in this region. In South Asia, the Iranian foreign policy is most geo-economic, which is the main reason in Iran’s balanced relations with both India and Pakistan. Iran’s main strategy in this region is North-South Transportation Corridor, by the participation of India, Russia and Iran and the possibility for inclusion of Pakistan and China. At the end, it is argued that Iran’s strategy and approach in Central Asia should be mainly a geo-cultural one. This approach is proposed because Iran is not willing and able to challenge the traditional geopolitical influence of Russia in Central Asia and is not willing and able either to challenge the geo-economic influence of China in the region. However, by focusing on the Iranian historical and civilizational roots in the region, there will be no challenge for Russia and China but great benefits will be provided by this approach for the nations in the sphere of Cultural Iran. However, there are some challenges for Iran in realizing this geo-cultural approach. One of the main obstacles is the religious one, as Iran is a Shiite country and the Central Asian states are mostly Sunnis. Also, the Central Asian countries are secular states with a cautious foreign policy in relations to Iran. Although Iran has had a pragmatic approach in relation with the countries in the region and has been a great helping hand for them in difficult times, the image framed by the West regarding Iran, has been quite negative. ابتکار کمربند و راه چین بهعنوان بزرگترین و جسورانهترین طرح در سیاست خارجی این کشور همچون گامی بلند بهسوی ابراز وجود و کنارگذاشتن سیاست خارجی محتاطانه برجایمانده از دوران دنگ شیائوپینگ تلقی میشود که پیامدهای آن میتواند در گسترۀ جهانی احساس شود. با این حال، در بعد منطقهای بهنظر میرسد که آسیای مرکزی از مناطقی است که بهدلیل موقعیت جغرافیایی خود و همسایگی با مناطق غربی چین که مورد توجه و سرمایهگذاری فزایندۀ دولت چین قرار گرفتهاند از این سیاست بیشترین اثر را میپذیرد. با توجه به اینکه ماهیت اصلی راهبرد چین، توسعۀ راههای ارتباطی و انتقالی است که فرصتی تاریخی برای مشارکت فعال در آن با هدف گسترش تبادل اندیشه و فرهنگ در کنار انتقال کالا فراهم میشود، این پرسش مطرح میشود که بهترین و کارآمدترین رویکرد سیاست منطقهای ایران در آسیای مرکزی با توجه به ابتکار کمربند و راه و پیامدهای منطقهای آن چه خواهد بود؟ در پاسخ به این پرسش با اتکا بر نظریۀ سازهانگاری و بهویژه تأثیر این نظریه در حوزۀ منطقهگرایی نوین، رویکرد مبتنی بر ایران فرهنگی بهعنوان بهترین سیاست معرفی میشود که در مقایسه با رویکردهای رقیب از مزیت نسبی مناسبی برای کشور برخوردار است. در این نوشتار، میان سه رویکرد ژئوپلیتیک، ژئواکونومیک و ژئوکالچر در سیاست منطقهای ایران در آسیای مرکزی بررسی مقایسهای کوتاهی انجام میدهیم. همچنین موانع رویکرد ژئوکالچر ایران را بررسی میکنیم.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77878_be987a4aa8032ba48b497ffbbc2f86e9.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Analysis of Material and Immaterial Reasons and Factors of the Annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federationتحلیل دلیلها و عاملهای مادی و غیرمادی پیوستهسازی شبهجزیرۀ کریمه به فدراسیون روسیه2532757787910.22059/jcep.2020.285877.449853FAعلیموسائیدانشجوی دکتری روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه اصفهانعنایت اللهیزدانیدانشیار روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه اصفهان و دانشیار روابط بینالملل مدرسه مطالعات بینالملل دانشگاه سان یات سن، جوهای، چینمحمد علیبصیریدانشیار روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه اصفهانJournal Article20190721Material and Immaterial factors are the most important determinants of relations in international politics between the actors. Accordingly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and termination of East and West conflicts, it seemed that the era of peace and security had arrived. But it was not more than two decades since the collapse of the Berlin Wall that the situation changed in such a way the West and Russia in Ukraine faced each other again in support of a part of Ukrainian society. Ukraine has been dominated by Russia and the West for centuries; the western provinces have historically been linked to the Habsburg Empire and Poland, while the eastern provinces and the Crimean Peninsula have traditionally been part of the Russian empire. But the rivalry between Russia and the West has escalated significantly since the Soviet Union collapsed and Ukraine’s independence. On the one hand, Ukraine has always been in the spotlight for Russia due to its geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economics position as well as its historical, cultural, racial, linguistic, and religious ties with Russian society. On the other, unifying Eastern European countries in Western institutions such as NATO and the European Union has been one of the chief goals of Western Europe and the US after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in order to prevent them from reconciling with Russia in future. Also, with their direct presence in the afore-mentioned areas, they will consolidate their global dominance. The West assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union meant the emergence of a unipolar world. Also considering the turbulence after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis of the Russian Federation, the country would not be able to counter the expansion of the West to the East. Therefore, the expansion to the east and Integration of the countries remaining from the Soviet Union in Western institutions such as NATO and the European Union was on its agenda. In the meantime, due to Ukraine neighborhood with Russia and its geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic importance, as well as its strong desire to move westward in order to distant itself from Russia after the independence and getting more intimate with western institutions, The West took the opportunity to act more swiftly to its original objective of sabotaging Russia’s geopolitics by restricting its territories. Therefore, all these reasons have caused Ukraine to face post-independence conflicts and witness serious struggles and political crises such as the events of the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2006 Blue Revolution, and the 2014 crisis which were provoked by the West and Russia. In this regard, the crisis in Ukraine began in 2014, when Ukrainian President Yanukovych, within the framework of the February 25, 2013 Brussels Agreement with EU officials, admitted finalizing the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine (the negotiations on which Initiated on 1999), in order to apply a series of reforms to the Ukrainian judiciary and electoral system by November 2013, but under Russian pressure, despite the majority of the Ukrainian people preferences who desired to join the European Union, On November 21, 2013, in Lithuania, he announced that it would not sign a free trade agreement with the European Union. Consequently, Ukraine’s 2014 crisis was triggered by him, provoking a wave of protests and strikes and within three months the conflicts spread throughout the country and many were injured in demonstrations which were held by the protestors. In mid-2014, the governments of France, Germany, and Poland sought to prevent the crisis from spreading and forced the government and the opposition to negotiate. But suddenly, with the vote of the parliament, he was ousted by the presidency and fled to Russia and Alexander Turchinov was elected as interim president, by announcing a desire to sign a European Union treaty, Russia saw its interests at stake and decided to destabilize Ukraine and occupy and eventually annex the Crimean peninsula to the Russian Federation. Russia first under the pretext of defending Russian citizens of eastern Ukraine, deployed Seven thousand troops to Crimean peninsula and they occupied all important stations, airports and buildings. Then it increased its troop levels to fifteen thousand and finally on March 16, 2014, after a positive vote by Crimean Peninsula MPs to join Russia, a referendum, which was illegal under the Ukrainian constitution, was held in Crimea to join Russian Federation, and eventually more than 96% of those participating in the referendum voted in favor of annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation. On March 21, 2014, Vladimir Putin approved the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to the country’s territory and by Russian legislation; officially Crimea was annexed to the Russian Federation. The annexation was strongly condemned by Western countries and was immediately responded with their economic and political sanctions. Russia, meanwhile, legalized the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula based on historical evidence as well as on the peninsula people’s preferences, who are mostly Russians. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to apply the descriptive-analytical method based on the theoretical framework of defensive realism and constructivism to respond to the following questions; firstly, why Russia decided to annex the Crimean peninsula to the Russian Federation, secondly, what are the reasons for the spread of the crisis and the success of this incorporation? The results of this paper indicate that the reasons for Russia's decision to annex the Crimean peninsula to the Russian Federation should be explained within the process of power framework and the removal of the threat posed by the expansion of NATO and the EU towards the Russian security frontiers. Furthermore the historical, linguistic, ethno-religious ties between the two Russian and the Crimean peninsula communities have been crucial causes for the expansion of the crisis as well as the success of the Crimean peninsula incorporation. In this paper, we attempted to provide a comprehensive analysis of the material and immaterial causes of Crimean Peninsula annexation by Russian Federation, which had a logical link between the reasons for Russia’s decision to Crimean Peninsula annexation (material causes) and causes of the crisis’s expansion and success of this incorporation (Immaterial causes). The data collection is based on the library method.بعد از فروپاشی اتحاد شوروی در سال 1991 و پایان منازعات شرق و غرب، بهنظر میرسید دوران صلح و امنیت فرا رسیده باشد؛ اما تنها بیش از دو دهه از سقوط دیوار برلین نگذشته بود که شرایط بهگونهای تغییر کرد که دوباره، غرب و روسیه در اوکراین به حمایت از بخشی از جامعۀ اوکراین روبهروی یکدیگر قرار گرفتند. روسیه پس از گسترش بحران، تصمیم به پیوستهسازی شبهجزیرۀ کریمه به فدراسیون روسیه گرفت و پس از اشغال و برگزاری همهپرسی که با موافقت 96 درصدی مردم آن همراه شد، در 21 مارس 2014 بهطور رسمی شبهجزیرۀ کریمه را به فدراسیون روسیه پیوسته ساخت. از اینرو، هدف اصلی این نوشتار، با استفاده از روش توصیفیتحلیلی و بر اساس چارچوب نظری واقعگرایی تدافعی و سازهانگاری، پاسخگویی به این پرسشها است که چرا روسیه تصمیم به پیوستهسازی شبهجزیرۀ کریمه به فدراسیون روسیه گرفت؟ و علتهای گسترش بحران و موفقیتآمیزبودن این پیوستهسازی چیست؟ نتایج بهدستآمده از این مقاله، حاکی از آن است که علتهای تصمیم روسیه به پیوستهسازی شبهجزیرۀ کریمه به فدراسیون روسیه را باید در چارچوب فرایند قدرت و رفع تهدیدی توضیح داد که بهوسیله گسترش و توسعۀ ناتو و اتحادیۀ اروپا بهسوی مرزهای امنیتی روسیه به وجود آمده بود. همچنین اشتراکها و پیوندهای تاریخی، زبانی، قومی، نژادی و مذهبی میان دو جامعۀ روسیه و شبهجزیرۀ کریمه از دلیلهای مهمی بودهاند که هم در گسترش بحران و هم در موفقیتآمیزبودن پیوستهسازی شبهجزیرۀ کریمه به فدراسیون روسیه نقش مهمی داشتهاند.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77879_6535106c7baa6cb1f447ac6f54ca0fa3.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320The Impact of Social Actions on the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federationتأثیر کنشهای اجتماعی بر سیاست خارجی فدراسیون روسیه2772977788010.22059/jcep.2020.280722.449840FAمرتضینورمحمدیدانشیار روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائیhttps://orcid.org/00رامینآریان رادکارشناسی ارشد مطالعات آسیای مرکزی و قفقاز، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائیJournal Article20190506Russia, as one of the republics left from the Soviet Union prior to its collapse, used to define its identity as a superpower and the life plan of its nation was based on Communist teachings. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a change in the geography of Eurasia. The Soviet was divided into 15 countries and Russia succeeded the Soviet in international system. Although this country did not enjoy the same authority as the Soviet, it was still of great importance due to three reasons: possession of nuclear weapons, having veto power in the United Nations Security Council, and unique geographical situation. This collapse, once again, made the people of Russia face the problem of defining their identity or “self”. Russians had to present a new face through which the world would identify the performance of this country as the heir to the Soviet Union in international scene. Just like any other government, the identity of Russian government is composed of two parts: the identity of the Self and the identity of the other. The identity of the other (the outside world) had not undergone change; therefore the government of the new Russia had to redefine itself once more. This redefinition of Russia took the shape of something in between being Western or not. But why was the West important for the definition of Russia’s new identity?
Historical analysis shows that Russia has always been under attack by Western governments including the attack by Sweden after putting an end to the domination of Mongols, Napoleon war, World War I and World War II. The collapse of the Soviet Union was an opportunity for Russia to settle in the West but it did not happen. Russian leaders believed that the ideological fight was over. But Russia was a different nation than Europe. The four elements of Orthodox religion, Russian heritage, political system and the geography of Russia which constitute a great power have formed the identity of Russian government. Russian leaders decided to determine their identity at a time when they found their identity sources were being attacked by the western world. Russia and the west experienced a period of collaboration and tension, but these collaborations did not continue. Some analysts of mainstream theories believe that the tensions between these two have a political and economic basis, but years of economic collaboration has not led to any convergence between Russia and the west.
Therefore, even though the Soviet lost its influence after its extermination, it inherited an entity which was still searching for a new position and was looking to preserve its historical and political legacy. The new Russia had to express its identity foundations apart from those which used to be expressed by the Soviet Union. For instance, why Russia did not interfere in Kosovo but, in the case of Georgia, it went into war with Georgian government even though there was the possibility of United States’ support from Georgia? Why Russia separated Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia? Why it insisted on interfering with Georgia’s case despite the fact that Russia knew it was running the risk of being sanctioned by the west? Why did Russia, given the possibility of a military war against the West, decided to separate Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine? And why the heavy sanctions of the West, which based on annual statistics would undermine Russia’s economy for 40 billion dollars, could not stop Russia from interfering in Ukraine? Why did Moscow decide to involve in Syria’s war against the West? These measures stand in contrast with Russia’s physical security. In fact, it needs to be pointed out that with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia could see itself as a nation for the very first time in history. The Russian government should re-depict its identity in order to make itself known to others. Depicting this identity, stabilizing and guaranteeing it would imply social actions which would protect the identity security of Russian government. The question is how do social actions affect the foreign policies of the Russian federation and what is the reason for these actions? The research hypothesis is that doing social actions would guarantee Russia’s identity security. Although ethical and philanthropic action is costly and against Russia’s strategic benefits and can weaken its physical security, Russia’s identity security is guaranteed through these actions. Actions such as aiding the United States in Afghanistan war and allowing the establishment of military bases in the commonwealth of independent countries were some of the ethical and philanthropic actions to show good will in collaboration to the fight against terrorism, but the results were unfavorable for Russian government. This led to the west trying to undermine the influence of Russia through revolutions in Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia. Russia has protected its ontological security by sending troops to Tajikistan, disagreeing with the military presence of the United States in Iraq, Georgia’s war and the independence of Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, annexing Crimea and participating in Syria’s war. In fact, the Russian government has taken a series of military actions by centralizing ontological security, a military action that has often been met with inaction by the West. It should be borne in mind that Russia, by introducing its identity components, has shown its importance to the West while the West has withdrawn from provocative measures by recognizing this identity. For example, the survival of the Assad regime has shown public opposition to US policies outside the traditional Russian borders. The policy of full-fledged presence in the Syrian war depicted the component of great power and showed the Western world that they had to recognize Russia’s role in all world affairs as a great power.با فروپاشی اتحاد شوروی در سال 1991، دولت روسیه برای شناسایی خود به دیگران باید هویت خود را بازتعریف میکرد. ترسیم این هویت و تثبیت و تضمین آن دربرگیرندۀ کنشهای اجتماعی است که امنیت هویتی دولت روسیه را استمرار میبخشد. پرسش این است که کنشهای اجتماعی چگونه بر سیاست خارجی فدراسیون روسیه تأثیر میگذارد و دلیل انجام این کنشها چیست؟ در پاسخ، این فرضیه مطرح میشود که انجام کنشهای اجتماعی سبب تضمین امنیت هویتی روسیه خواهد شد. این نوشتار توصیفی ـ تحلیلی و روش جمعآوری اطلاعات، بهرهگیری از مدارک و اسناد اینترنتی و کتابخانهای است. نتایج نوشتار نشان میدهد، اگرچه کنش اخلاقی و بشردوستانه پرهزینه و خلاف منافع راهبردی روسیه و کنش شرافتی خطرناک است و میتواند در راستای تضعیف امنیت فیزیکی آن باشد، اما با انجام آن کنشها امنیت هویتی خود را تضمین میکند. اقدامهایی همچون یاریرساندن به آمریکا در جنگ افغانستان و اجازۀ تأسیس پایگاههای نظامی در کشورهای همسود از کنشهای اخلاقی و بشردوستانه برای نشاندادن حسن همکاری برای از میانبردن تروریسم بود، اما نتیجهای معکوس را برای دولت روسیه به همراه داشت. در واقع، روسیه با فرستادن نیروهای نظامی به تاجیکستان، مخالفت با حضور نظامی آمریکا در عراق، جنگ گرجستان و استقلال اوستیای جنوبی و آبخازیا، پیوستن کریمه و حضور در جنگ سوریه، با انجام کنش شرافتی از امنیت هستیشناختی خود محافظت کرده است.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77880_d8bb1a8db4db0ef3be082fa1f1260386.pdfدانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسیمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086713120200320Effective Components within Iran-Russia Security Cooperation in Central Asiaمؤلفههای تأثیرگذار بر همکاری امنیتی ایران و روسیه در آسیای مرکزی2993237788110.22059/jcep.2020.295455.449889FAاکبرولی زادهاستادیار مطالعات منطقهای، دانشگاه تهرانمحمد رضاصالحیدانشجوی دکتری مطالعات آسیای مرکزی و قفقاز، دانشگاه تهرانJournal Article20200106Regional security in Central Asia has been of strategic importance for both Iran and Russia. Russia has sought to play a key role in Central Asia’s security sphere and as far as it can, it will not allow other powers to play a role in this region. However factors such as the expansion of security relations between Iran and Russia in recent years, especially after experiencing successful cooperation in the Syrian crisis, raises the question of whether the security cooperation between Iran and Russia in Central Asia will be a continuation of the past trend, or it can be predicted as a new era of such cooperation. In addition, can we discuss a change in the pattern of Iran-Russia security relations in Central Asia? A development that has made the weight of cooperation and convergence heavier than the weight of divergence? The hypothesis of the article is that the pattern of relations between the two countries in Central Asia is shifting from a pattern of competition and cooperation to a model of cooperation, and the common threats in this region for both countries can overshadow the competing aspects of the interests and increase security cooperation between the two countries. In order to illustrate the hypothesis of the article and explain the determining factors in the field of Iran-Russia security cooperation in Central Asia, it is necessary to point out the developments that have taken place both within these two countries, especially in the direction of Russian foreign policy. Also, the consequences of the change in the structure of international system in regional systems and in this particular case in the structure of regional system in Central Asia should be considered. Therefore, in the first part of the article, the possibility of Iran-Russia security cooperation in Central Asia from the perspective of regional security complex theory and then in the context of changing the dominant approach in Russian foreign policy is examined. It is noted that the weight of cooperation and convergence has increased, and while in the three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the pattern of competition and cooperation has dominated the relations between the two countries; With the recent developments at the domestic, regional and international levels, we are witnessing a decrease in the aspect of competition in these relations and an increase in cooperation. <br />In order to study the relations between Iran and Russia and the cooperation of these two countries in Central Asia, it is necessary to examine the interests of these two countries in the region and how they interact with each other to achieve their national interests. In this regard, national interests should be categorized in terms of parallel-common and conflicting interests. The question now is whether it is possible to vote for a shift in the balance of divergent and convergent interests in Iran-Russia relations, and whether, in fact, there has been a turning point in Iran-Russia relations in Central Asia. In this regard, we should mention the geopolitical convergence against the geo-economic divergence of Iran and Russia in Central Asia; In other words, these two seemingly conflicting factors in Iran-Russia relations have always existed in the post-Soviet period. <br />Regarding Iran-Russia relations in Central Asia, it can be said that although the two countries have common interests in the field of geopolitics with the aim of maintaining stability in this region, in the field of geo-economics, they are considered rivals and Moscow has tried to prevent Iran’s economic influence in the region as much as possible. This pattern of competition and cooperation is changing; As a result of Western pressures and hostile US policies, Iran has pursued the policy of “looking the east”, and therefore, in the field of geo-economics, has turned to increase cooperation and convergence with Russia. Cooperation through platform of the North-South international corridor and Iran’s desire to join the Eurasian Economic Union has been among the most important developments in this field, which has led to a pattern of cooperation. <br />Russia-Iran security cooperation in Central Asia can be analyzed in terms of Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East. Russia is well aware that Iran, as a rising regional power, can also play a major role in the stability or instability of Central Asian region, and therefore cooperation with Iran can be a way to maintain the direction of regional policy in favor of its own stability. Thus, maintaining regional order in Central Asia with Iran can give Moscow more confidence to maintain its interests. <br />Iran and Russia are in a new era of security cooperation with each other in Central Asia and beyond, which is different from previous periods in several ways. On the one hand, the structure of the regional system in Central Asia has changed in such a way that Russia in the geopolitical and China in the geo-economics spheres have become the two dominant powers in the region, and thus the regional security complex in Central Asia has become dominated by the two great powers, and as a result, there is less room for the West to exert influence in the region including the United States. This development should be placed alongside the concept of “looking the east” in Iran’s foreign policy, which, under the influence of US hostile policies and sanctions, has strengthened the option of turning to Russia and China. <br />Iran has proven to consider Russia’s interests in the region, and unlike the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and the republics of Central Asia’s perception toward Iran as a threat to the stability of the region has softened. On the other hand, Russia, driven from the West, has sought to establish an independent identity as a Eurasian state, and therefore cooperation with Iran, as an influential regional power in Central Asia, has become particularly important in establishing its regional dominance. In general, it can be said that the pattern of Iran-Russia relations in Central Asia is changing from a pattern of simultaneous competition and cooperation to more of a pattern of cooperation and convergence. In the new model, we see that the two countries, unlike in the past, while maintaining geopolitical harmony in the region, have also tended toward geo-economic cooperation. <br /> گسترش روابط امنیتی ایران و روسیه در سالهای اخیر و بهویژه پس از تجربۀ همکاری موفق در بحران سوریه، مورد توجه صاحبنظران سیاسی است. با توجه به این مسئله و اهمیتی که وضعیت امنیتی آسیای مرکزی برای روسیه و ایران دارد، این پرسش مطرح میشود که همکاری امنیتی ایران و روسیه در این منطقه ادامۀ روند گذشته خواهد بود، یا اینکه میتوانیم پیشبینی کنیم، شاهد دورۀ نوینی از این نوع همکاری باشیم؟ به علاوه، آیا میتوان از تحول در الگوی روابط امنیتی ایران و روسیه در آسیای مرکزی سخن گفت؛ تحولی که وزنۀ همکاری و همگرایی را بر وزنۀ واگرایی سنگینتر کرده است؟ فرضیۀ نوشتار این است که الگوی روابط دو کشور از الگوی رقابت و همکاری بهسوی الگوی همکاری در حال تغییر است. در واقع، منافع ایران و روسیه در حوزۀ امنیتی آسیای مرکزی، وجوه جدایی و پیوند دارد. با این وجود، تهدیدهای مشترک در این منطقه برای هر دو کشور، میتواند بر جنبههای متعارض و رقابتی منافع سایه بیندازد و افزایش همکاری امنیتی میان دو طرف را منجر شود. با هدف تبیین فرضیۀ این نوشتار، ابتدا ساختار نظام منطقهای در آسیای مرکزی از دیدگاه نظریۀ مجموعۀ امنیتی منطقهای را بیان میکنیم؛ سپس به تغییر در نگرش سیاست خارجی روسیه از اروآتلانتیکگرایی به اوراسیاگرایی اشاره میکنیم. سرانجام، بحث روابط و همکاری امنیتی ایران و روسیه در قالب منافع متقابل دو کشور در آسیای مرکزی را بررسی میکنیم.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_77881_8d5e2289589d3e66d35a63312a6c3de5.pdf