دانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823Editor-in-chief’s Noteسخن سردبیر10861010.22059/jcep.2026.108610FAالههکولاییاستاد، گروه مطالعات منطقهای، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران0000-0001-9655-0995Journal Articlehttps://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_108610_bfac5383ff6eeb21a25128c4d3013847.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823Penetration in Target Areas: A Comparison of the Chinese and Russian Worldsنفوذ در مناطق هدف: مقایسۀ جهان چینی و روسی13210712010.22059/jcep.2026.389897.450300FAحمیداحمدی نژاداستادیار، گروه علوم سیاسی و روابط بینالملل، دانشکدۀ ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه لرستان، خرمآباد، ایران0000-0001-5859-0590Journal Article20250406Introduction: China and Russia, as key players in the evolving international system, are seeking to expand<strong> </strong>their influence by uniting against the current order. One of the most important forms of this expansion of influence is their influence in various regions to create coalitions and increase their ability to act. The aim of this study is to examine the nature of Chinese and Russian influence and the methods they use to achieve it. The research main question is: What forms of power and tools do China and Russia use to influence target regions? The research hypothesis is that differences in worldviews between China and Russia have led to different approaches to exerting influence. This difference is reflected in the different tools each country uses to expand its influence in target regions. The methodology of this qualitative research and its data include library sources. The findings suggest that China's influence is achieved primarily through a combination of structural and symbolic power. In line with this approach, Beijing uses a variety of tactics, including investment, normalization and institutional membership, to strenghten its influence. In contrast, Russia's influence is based on coercive power, exerted through military mechanisms, pressure, energy and media narratives.<br>Introduction: China and Russia, as two major global actors, seek to expand their spheres of influence based on a shared opposition to the Western-Centric international order. However, despite this convergence in strategic ambition, their underlying methods, tools and worldviews are fundamentally different. China’s approach to influence is rooted in its economic and cultural superiority, characterized by persuasion, institutional participation and long-term interdependence. In contrast, Russia continues to emphasize coercive power through military, political and energy-based means. Understanding the nature and mechanisms of their influence in target regions provides important insights into the reconfiguration of power in today's complex multipolar order. This study examines the nature of China's and Russia's influence strategies, identifying their underlying forms of power and the tools they employ to achieve influence.<br>Research question: The main question guiding this study is: on what forms of power and through which means is Chinese and Russian influence in the target regions based?<br>Research hypothesis: The study assumes that the divergence between the Chinese and Russian worldviews, rooted in their respective strategic cultures, has led to distinct manifestations of power and consequently, different sets of influence tools.<br>Methodology: Adopting a qualitative comparative approach, combining descriptive and explanatory analysis, this study examines the similarities and differences between Chinese and Russian influence strategies. Data were collected through extensive document analysis, including academic journals, policy articles, international reports and official documents in both digital and printed forms. The comparative method employed here goes beyond simple description; it identifies causal relationships between cultural perceptions of power and the choice of instruments in each country’s foreign policy.<br>Results and discussion: Influenced by the principles of Tianxia and Confucian harmony, China’s worldview promotes coexistence, mutual benefit and multilateral cooperation. It rejects rigid divisions between “us” and “them” and instead envisions a shared global future based on balance and reciprocity. On the other hand, Russia’s worldview is rooted in historical insecurity and shaped by a long-standing sense of confrontation with the West. Moscow’s strategic culture prioritizes power, control and deterrence, interpreting international politics as a zero-sum arena in which security can only be maintained through dominance and resistance. This divergence in worldview explains why China’s influence strategy relies on absorption and integration, while Russia’s relies on coercion and pressure. China extends its influence primarily through institutional engagement and normative appeal rather than military coercion. It promotes the “Chinese model” of governance, which combines economic development and political stability, as an alternative to Western liberal democracy. Beijing is shaping positive perceptions of itself by investing in education, culture and international aid, presenting its rise as peaceful and mutually beneficial. Structurally, China is building long-term influence through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the establishment of new financial institutions and leadership roles in multilateral organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). These mechanisms create enduring economic and political dependencies while embedding Chinese preferences within global norms. Together, these structural and symbolic strategies enable China to expand its sphere of influence not through dominance but through integration, legitimacy and institutional influence.<br>Russia’s approach is in stark contrast to this, relying heavily on hard and coercive means. The country’s use of military power is evident in its interventions in Ukraine, Syria and parts of Africa, where it seeks to maintain control and exert regional dominance. Energy serves as another key element of Moscow’s influence: Russia uses its oil and gas exports to exert political pressure on dependent countries by manipulating prices and controlling supply chains. In addition, Russia uses political and media operations as a means of influence, supporting sympathetic elites, exploiting internal divisions and spreading narratives through global outlets such as Sputnik. These channels challenge Western hegemony, justify Russian actions and present an image of Russia as a major player in a multipolar world. Collectively, these tools reveal a model of influence that focuses on control, deterrence and resistance, rather than persuasion or cooperation.<br>In comparison, several key distinctions emerge between the two strategies. In terms of the nature of power, China’s approach is developmental and participatory, while Russia’s is coercive and security-oriented. China operates with a long-term horizon, seeking to build gradual and sustained influence through economic and institutional engagement, while Russia seeks short-term geopolitical gains achieved through assertive or disruptive tactics. China promotes economic interdependence that connects others to its markets and infrastructure projects, while Russia enforces interdependence through security and energy mechanisms that maintain leverage over its partners.<br>Conclusion: China’s structural-symbolic model reflects a long-term, integrated strategy rooted in soft and institutional power. Its influence is enhanced through persuasion, economic interdependence and active participation in global governance. By embedding its values and standards in international institutions, China is gradually redefining the norms of the global order to align with its interests.<br>Russia’s instrumental model, by contrast, is shaped by an adversarial worldview and reliance on coercive means. Its influence depends on the projection of military power, the manipulation of energy markets and the construction of strategic narratives that challenge Western dominance. Ultimately, China seeks to reshape the global order from within through normalization and absorption, while Russia aims to challenge it from without through confrontation and resistance. These two paths - one participatory and structural, the other coercive and reactive - represent the dual trajectories of power in the emerging multipolar world. Understanding these dynamics is essential for anticipating future alignments and conflicts in an increasingly fragmented international landscape where power is no longer defined solely by force, but by the capacity to shape meaning, norms and institutions.چین و روسیه بهعنوان اصلیترین بازیگران نظام بینالملل درحال تغییر، براساس اشتراک در اصل تقابل با نظم کنونی بهدنبال گسترش نفوذ خود هستند. یکی از مهمترین شکلهای این گسترش نفوذ، رخنۀ آنها در مناطق هدف برای ایجاد جبههبندی و افزایش توان کنشگری است. در این نوشتار با هدف فهم سرشت نفوذ این دو کشور و ابزارهای آن بهدنبال پاسخ این پرسش هستیم که نفوذ چین و روسیه در مناطق هدف مبتنی بر کدام چهرۀ قدرت و ابزارها است؟ در پاسخ این فرضیه مطرح میشود که تفاوت میان جهانبینی چینی و روسی به قالبی متفاوت از قدرت نفوذ و در پی آن جدایی ابزارهای نفوذ دو کشور در مناطق هدف منجر شده است. یافتههای نوشتار با بهرهگیری از روش کیفیتطبیقی، مبتنی بر تحلیل اسناد نشان میدهد نفوذ چین درچارچوب شکل ساختاری- نمادین قدرت و در نتیجه، ابزارهای مبتنی بر قابلیتهای پکن مانند سرمایهگذاری، هنجارسازی و عضویت در نهادها است. در برابر شکل ابزاری نفوذ روسیه، سبب بهکارگرفتن سازوکارهایهای آشکارتر مانند نظامیگری، فشار، انرژی، روایتسازی رسانهای شده است.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_107120_763b9162dd0408964160a9c1ccf3590c.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823Afghanistan’s Electricity Power Policy (2003 - 2023)سیاستگذاری نیروی برق افغانستان (2003 تا 2023)336310816310.22059/jcep.2026.379843.450241FAروح اللهاسلامیدانشیار گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران0000-0001-7429-6105نبی اللهحسینیکارشناس ارشد، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران0009-0006-9983-8269Journal Article20240724Introduction: Electricity is a vital driver of economic, political and social development, and higher levels of electricity production and consumption are strongly linked to development outcomes. For developing societies, inadequate supply constrains economic growth and institutional performance. Afghanistan has significant potential to play a role as a regional energy transit hub that can create jobs, increase public revenues, and strengthen regional cooperation. Despite extensive international assistance between 2003 and 2023, this period did not result in a significant reduction in dependence on electricity imports.<br>Research question: Why has Afghanistan, despite its abundant energy resources and strategic geographical location, been unable to reduce its dependence on imported electricity and establish itself as a regional energy transit hub?<br>Research hypothesis: The study hypothesizes that external dependence, weak national institutions, and inadequate budget allocations have consistently contributed to the failure of electricity policymaking and the implementation of government energy programs in Afghanistan.<br>Research Methodology: The study adopts the systemic policy cycle as its theoretical framework, which includes agenda-setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. The research uses a qualitative design based on document analysis. Data are collected from national and international institutional reports and academic literature. This study aims to assess the strengths and weaknesses of electricity policymaking in Afghanistan and to explain the continued dependence on imported electricity.<br>Results and discussion: The findings show that electricity policymaking in Afghanistan involves multiple domestic actors, including political elites, ethnic groups, professional associations, and civil society actors. However, donors and international institutions have played a dominant role in setting the agenda due to their financial control over the sector. Policy adoption is characterized by continuity across successive governments and is supported by national frameworks such as the Constitution, development strategies, and the Electricity Master Plan (2032), all of which emphasize energy self-sufficiency and renewable energy development. Despite these policy priorities, their implementation has been limited by weak coordination, fragmented governance and internal political divisions. Although international funding enabled large regional projects (e.g., TAPI, TAP, TUTAP, CASA-1000), implementation delays were frequent. Limited progress has been observed in the development of private-sector renewable energy and small-scale thermal generation projects in selected provinces.<br>Conclusion: Afghanistan has significant potential in renewable and non-renewable energy. Prioritizing renewable energy, expanding private-sector participation, and leveraging international and government support can accelerate progress toward energy self-sufficiency. However, limited financial capacity and weak institutional structures continue to constrain electricity generation and distribution. The dominance of the Afghan national electricity company, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, further limits private sector competitiveness in the electricity market. The study concludes that strengthening institutions, improving financial capacity and promoting a more competitive electricity sector are essential for sustainable energy development in Afghanistan.سرانۀ تولید و مصرف برق از شاخصهای اصلی سنجش توسعۀ اقتصادی و جهتگیریهای سیاستی کشورها محسوب میشود. در افغانستان در سالهای 2003 تا 2023، با حمایتهای گستردۀ بینالمللی و برخورداری از ظرفیتهای شایان توجه انرژیهای تجدیدپذیر و فسیلی، زمینۀ مناسبی برای تحول ساختاری در بخش برق فراهم شد. انتظار میرفت این کشور با بهرهگرفتن از موقعیت ژئواستراتژیک خود، علاوه بر تأمین تقاضای داخلی، بهعنوان گذرگاه حملونقل انرژی میان آسیای مرکزی و جنوب آسیا نقش داشته باشد. در این نوشتار با هدف تحلیل دلایل تحققنیافتن این هدفها، بهدنبال پاسخ این پرسش هستیم که چرا افغانستان با وجود ظرفیتهای بالقوه، نتوانسته است وابستگی خود به واردات برق را کاهش دهد و جایگاه مسیر حملونقل بودن خود را تثبیت کند؟ در پاسخ این فرضیه مطرح میشود که وابستگی ساختاری به منابع خارجی، نبود ثبات در تأمین مالی و ضعف نهادی حکمرانی انرژی، از عوامل اصلی ناکامی سیاستگذاری در این حوزه بودهاند. این نوشتار با استفاده از چارچوب نظری «چرخۀ سیاستگذاری سیستمی» و روش تحلیل کیفی اسناد و گزارشهای نهادی انجام شده است. یافتهها نشان میدهد که فرایند سیاستگذاری در این دوره در تأثیر همزمان نخبگان سیاسی، شبکههای قومی، بخش خصوصی و نهادهای بینالمللی کمککننده بوده است. اگرچه اسناد بالادستی و سیاستی توسعهگرایانه و بلندپروازانه بودهاند، در مرحلۀ اجرا، ضعف نهادی و تعارض منافع، موجب شکاف میان طرح و اجرا شده و سرانجام به تداوم وابستگی انرژی افغانستان انجامیده است.https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_108163_b36ce441c0b7f6dd69b768546a2a0ce7.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823The Logic of Change and Continuity in Afghanistan's Neighborhood Policy toward Iranمنطق تغییر و تداوم سیاست همسایگی افغانستان در برابر ایران649110749010.22059/jcep.2026.409016.450390FAمحسناسلامیدانشیار، گروه روابط بینالملل، دانشکدة علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران.امان اللهواکمندانشجوی دکتری روابط بینالملل، دانشکدة علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران0009-0009-9588-1659Journal Article20251228Introduction: Afghanistan’s neighborhood policy is a central pillar of its foreign policy, shaped by its landlocked geography and its dependence on regional interactions. Among its neighbors, Iran holds a unique position because of deep historical, cultural, linguistic, and economic ties, as well as its geopolitical and geoeconomic importance, particularly through Afghanistan’s access to international markets via the Chabahar port. Despite this structural stability, Afghanistan’s policy toward Iran has changed significantly under different political regimes. During the Republic and the second Islamic Emirate, patterns of cooperation, competition, and confrontation emerged simultaneously. While existing perspectives often emphasize the fluctuations of bilateral relations, they tend to ignore the underlying logic that explains both change and continuity. This study addresses this gap by offering a comparative, theory-based analysis of Afghanistan’s neighborhood policy toward Iran.<br>Research question: To what extent has Afghanistan’s neighborhood policy toward Iran changed and persisted during the Republic period and the second Islamic Emirate, and what underlying logic explains these patterns? Existing studies have largely focused on descriptive narratives of political, economic, or security relations, while paying little attention to the deeper structural, internal, and ideological drivers that shape these policies. This study shifts the focus to identifying the logic behind political behavior across regimes.<br>Research hypothesis: Afghanistan’s neighborhood policy toward Iran evolves in three stages: a cooperative-interactive approach during the Hamid Karzai era, a cooperative-competitive approach during the Mohammad Ashraf Ghani era, and a cooperative-confrontational approach during the second Islamic Emirate era, while maintaining continuity in economic and trade relations.<br>Methodology and theoretical framework: This research applies a qualitative comparative-analytic approach based on document analysis and discourse analysis. Rather than relying on quantitative indicators, it focuses on interpreting behavioral patterns and underlying meanings across political periods. The analytical model is structured around six dimensions: political-diplomatic, security, economic-commercial, cultural-social, identity-ideological, and environmental-natural resources. The theoretical framework integrates liberal and neoliberal institutionalism to explain economic cooperation and interdependence, Neoclassical and defensive realism to analyze security dynamics and threat perceptions, and constructivism to interpret identity, discursive, and cultural factors. This multi-theoretical approach allows for a comprehensive explanation of continuity and change.<br>Results and discussion: The findings suggest that Afghanistan’s neighborhood policy toward Iran reflects a dynamic interplay between continuity and evolution, rather than a sudden shift. During the Karzai era, relations were characterized by cooperative-interactional dynamics, with strong diplomatic engagement, cultural convergence, and expanding economic ties. During the Ghani era, this policy shifted toward a cooperative-competitive pattern, in which economic cooperation continued, but political distrust, identity tensions, and security suspicions intensified. In the second Islamic Emirate, the policy evolved into an interactive-confrontational pattern, characterized by ongoing economic interaction alongside political tensions, border conflicts, and ideological divergence. In all periods, economic–commercial relations show the highest degree of continuity due to interdependence, while cultural, ideological, and environmental factors- especially water disputes- act as key drivers of change. The analysis also shows that different dimensions of politics are interconnected and that identity and environmental issues significantly influence political and security behavior.<br>Conclusion: Afghanistan’s neighborhood policy toward Iran is best understood as a multi-dimensional and evolving strategy shaped by both structural constraints and internal developments. While economic interdependence provides continuity, shifts in political leadership, identity perceptions, and regional dynamics drive change in other dimensions. The transition from cooperative-interactional patterns to interactive-competitive patterns and ultimately to interactive-confrontational patterns reflects the adaptive nature of Afghanistan’s foreign policy. This study suggests that a multi-theoretical framework is essential to understanding the complexity of neighborhood policy and highlights the importance of integrating economic, identity, and environmental factors in understanding regional relations.<span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">موقعیت ژئوپلیتیک، ژئواکونومیک و ژئواستراتژیک ایران و مسیر اتصال افغانستان از مسیر بندر چابهار به هند، جایگاه ایران را میان همسایگان افغانستان برجسته کرده است، اما مانع تغییر و تداوم سیاست همسایگی افغانستان در برابر ایران نشده است. در این نوشتار با هدف تبیین منطق تغییر و تداوم سیاست همسایگی افغانستان در برابر ایران، تحلیل تطبیقی دورۀ جمهوری و دورۀ دوم امارت اسلامی را ارائه میدهیم. پرسش اصلی این است که سیاست همسایگی افغانستان در این دو دوره چه تغییرها و تداومی داشته و از چه منطقی پیروی کرده است؟ در پاسخ، این فرضیه مطرح میشود که در دورۀ حامد کرزی سیاست همسایگی افغانستان در برابر ایران، تفاهمیتعاملی مبتنی بر مذاکره و گسترش روابط اقتصادی بوده است. در دورۀ محمد اشرف غنی، تعاملیرقابتی متکی بر توسعۀ روابط اقتصادی و رقابت فرهنگی، سیاسی و امنیتی بوده است. در دورۀ دوم امارت اسلامی، تعاملیتقابلی، در حوزۀ اقتصادیتجاری تعاملی و در مسائل مرزی و فرهنگی ایدئولوژیک تقابلی بوده است. تغییر و تداوم این سیاست در تأثیر پویاییهای سیاست داخلی، نیروهای سیاسی حاکم، روابط دوجانبه و نظام بینالملل بوده است. این نوشتار با استفاده از روش کیفی مبتنی بر تحلیل تطبیقیتبیینی، دادههای اسنادی و تحلیل گفتمان انجام شده است. یافتههای نوشتار نشان میدهد که هر دوره در تعامل با ایران ویژگیهای متمایزی دارد و متغیرهای داخلی و بینالمللی در شکلگیری منطق رفتاری نقش تعیینکنندهای داشتهاند.</span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_107490_7586857e661b374b9d5f4aaaa01ecaec.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823Measuring Iran's Trade Governance and Trade Facilitation with Central Eurasian Countriesسنجش حکمرانی تجاری و آسانسازی تجارت ایران با کشورهای اوراسیای مرکزی9212810788610.22059/jcep.2026.398886.450336FAسیدحسیناطهریدانشیار، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران.0000-0001-7332-4848ابوالقاسمشهریاریدکتری علوم سیاسی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران.0000-0002-3193-7344Journal Article20250803Introduction: Iran is one of the countries that, in addition to enjoying a geopolitical position on transit routes, also has numerous neighbors. However, international sanctions and dependence on crude oil exports have created difficulties for Iranian trade. For this reason, in addition to reducing dependence on crude oil exports, Iran also aims to expand regional trade, and it has worked to mitigate the impact of these restrictions through regional trade governance.<br>Accordingly, the Central Eurasian region appears to be a suitable environment for achieving Iran's goals for two reasons: first, most of its countries are energy exporters, and crude oil exports cannot make a significant contribution to Iran's exports; second, the current sanctions situation for Russia has created a suitable environment for barter or dollar-free transactions. For this reason, this study examines the level of Iran's trade with Eurasian countries and the feasibility of assessing the impact of trade governance on that trade.<br>Research question: What are the characteristics of Iran's trade with Eurasia, and how can trade governance tools facilitate the implementation of trade agreements?<br>Research hypothesis: Membership, as measured by trade governance, has improved Iran's trade relations.<br>Methodology and theoretical framework: This study uses a time-series approach to assess the feasibility of facilitating regional trade between Iran and Eurasian countries. A time series consists of data that record the progress of an issue and allow it to be examined over time. In other words, a time series is a set of observations arranged in time and obtained by observing the phenomenon over a specific period.<br>Regional trade governance encompasses two types of agreements: regional trade agreements and preferential trade agreements, both of which aim to facilitate regional trade. Regional trade facilitation through trade governance is a broad and multifaceted initiative. Trade governance through regional trade facilitation proposes a highly flexible, demand-driven approach that enables the target region to expand trade opportunities among countries by identifying the region's productive capabilities.<br>Results and discussion: In examining the time series of Iranian exports to Eurasian countries, several points can be noted:<br>- Apart from Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where Iran's best export performance occurs in the middle of the time series, in other countries, Iran's exports are best at the end of the time series, indicating an improvement in exports over the period under review.<br>- The growth coefficient also shows, by comparing the beginning and end of the period under review, that increases in Iranian exports to target countries in Central Eurasia are present in all countries and are very significant in some cases: exports to Georgia increased by more than 25 times, to Russia by more than 10 times, to Armenia and Kazakhstan by more than 5 times, to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan by about 4 times, to Azerbaijan by about 2 times, and to Kyrgyzstan recorded a 100% increase, indicating the existence of a continuous market for Iranian exports in the countries under study.<br>Also, the trend in Iran's imports from target countries in Eurasia shows that:<br>- Unlike the export trend, in which more countries were in the best position at the end of the time series, only imports from three countries (Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) were in a better position at the end of the time series, confirming the cyclical pattern in Iran's import trend.<br>- Contrary to the export trend, which was positive in all countries, the growth coefficient has negative values, confirming that in some countries the value of imports has even decreased compared to the beginning of the time series; this situation has been recorded in the three countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.<br>Conclusion: Sanctions, oil dependence, and a dollar-based economy are eroding Iran’s economic resilience. Strengthening resilience requires focusing on production and export capabilities, diversifying trade to reduce political risk, and adopting a regional approach to create synergies. Removing regional infrastructure and regulatory bottlenecks has proven effective globally. Given these trends, regional trade agreements with Eurasia (expanding from the current four countries to all Central Eurasian states) are strategically crucial. Empirical evidence shows that, despite sanctions, banking restrictions, and trade barriers, Iran’s exports to the region have increased, and imports have partially replaced Iran’s grain supply. Such agreements (bilateral or collective) would help Iran escape global isolation by gaining access to a regional market.<span lang="AR-SA">حکمران تجاری، نقشدولتها در توافقهای تجاری برای ارتقای سطح مبادلهها است. هدف این نوشتار، امکانسنجی آسانسازی مبادلههای تجاری ایران با ۹ کشور اوراسیای مرکزی بهوسیلۀ تحلیل روند مبادلهها و بررسی تأثیر ابزارهای حکمرانی تجاری است. در این نوشتار بهدنبال پاسخ این پرسش هستیم که روند مبادلههای تجاری ایران با کشورهای اوراسیای مرکزی چه ویژگیهایی دارد و چگونه میتوان با ابزارهای حکمرانی تجاری، زمینۀ اجرای توافقنامههای تجاری را فراهم کرد. با توجه به ماهیت اکتشافی پرسش، این نوشتار فرضیهآزما نیست و پاسخ پرسش براساس یافتههای تجربی بهدست میآید. چارچوب نظری نوشتار بر پایۀ مفهوم حکمرانی تجاری منطقهای استوار است که بر نقش دولتهای یک منطقه در کاهش مانعهای تجاری و ایجاد یکپارچگی بازار تأکید میکند. روش پژوهش تحلیل سری زمانی دادههای تجاری ایران با کشورهای هدف در سالهای ۲۰۰۰ تا ۲۰۲۳ است. برای سنجش اثر حکمرانی تجاری، تأثیر توافقنامۀ تجارت ترجیحی با اتحادیۀ اقتصادی اوراسیایی بهعنوان نمونهای از ابزارهای حکمرانی مورد آزمون قرار گرفته است. یافتهها نشان میدهند که صادرات ایران به کشورهای هدف، روندی افزایشی و باثبات داشته و سبد صادراتی تنوع مناسبی داشته است، بهطوری که سهم محصولات معدنی (از جمله نفت خام) فقط حدود 8 درصد است. از سویی، اگرچه واردات از برخی کشورها کاهش یافته است، در مجموع حجم مبادلهها افزایش داشته است. همچنین توافقنامۀ تجارت ترجیحی با اتحادیۀ اوراسیا</span><span lang="FA">یی</span> <span lang="AR-SA">بر افزایش صادرات ایران تأثیر مثبت و معناداری داشته است. در مجموع، این نوشتار نشان میدهد که برای بهکارگیری حکمرانی تجاری در قالب توافقنامههای تجاری ترجیحی یا آزاد با کشورهای اوراسیای مرکزی، زمینۀ مناسبی وجود دارد. این موضوع میتواند به آسانسازی تجارت منطقهای و افزایش تابآوری اقتصادی ایران بینجامد.</span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_107886_8535e3a1d2e336b13892247c461ce6a9.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823Hasbara 2: Israel's Public Diplomacy and Strategic Integration with the Republic of Azerbaijanهَسبارا 2: دیپلماسی عمومی اسرائیل و همگرایی راهبردی با جمهوری آذربایجان12915910814410.22059/jcep.2026.405295.450369FAسید روح اللهحاج زرگرباشیاستادیار، گروه روابط بینالملل، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامۀ طباطبایی، تهران، ایران0000-0003-2451-8624حمیدرضاجوادی قلعهکارشناسی ارشد مطالعات منطقهای، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران0009-0005-9851-4265Journal Article20251121Introduction: The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent shift in the global balance of power in favor of the United States, Israel’s most important strategic ally, created an exceptional opportunity for Israeli leaders to reorient their foreign policy priorities. This shift enabled Israel to refocus its strategic attention from the Arab sphere in West Asia to the central region of the world, positioning itself to benefit from the emerging “Great Game” and to leverage its geopolitical advantages to expand its regional influence. Although Israel established relations with all the republics of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, some countries, especially the Republic of Azerbaijan, became particularly important. This importance stemmed from several factors: Azerbaijan's significant energy resources, its strategic location near Iran’s borders, and the pro-Western orientation of the Azerbaijani leadership, which gave Israel considerable freedom of action. However, globalization, the emergence of complex interdependence, and the post-Cold War international environment diminished the importance of traditional diplomacy and paved the way for new dimensions, especially public diplomacy. This emerging form of diplomacy compensated for the limitations of classical models and played a pivotal role in the rise of soft power. In this context, Web 2.0 technologies and social media platforms significantly expanded opportunities for targeted, widespread engagement. These technological developments allowed Israeli public diplomacy to evolve from a reactive to a proactive model, offering vast opportunities to shape foreign public opinion.<br>Research question: This study examines the extent to which public diplomacy has contributed to convergence between Israel and the Republic of Azerbaijan.<br>Research hypothesis: Through a network-based public diplomacy strategy that includes diaspora mobilization, cultural engagement, and media outreach, Israel has fostered convergence and mutual trust with the Republic of Azerbaijan and helped deepen bilateral relations within the framework of "Hasbara 2."<br>Methodology: This qualitative study uses an analytical-explanatory approach within a deductive framework to understand and explain the network patterns of interaction between Israel and the Republic of Azerbaijan in public diplomacy, based on the previous theoretical framework. Because the phenomenon under study is complex, multi-layered, and meaning-driven, a qualitative approach offers the best opportunity to uncover hidden and interpretive relationships among components.<br>Results and discussion: Israel has played an important role in this convergence through a networked approach and by using its diplomatic tools in the areas of diaspora, culture, and media. Ongoing activities by Israeli cyber trolls, coordinated through the Israeli Foreign Ministry and its ambassador to Azerbaijan, along with a network of social media accounts, various media outlets, universities, cultural, scientific, and sports centers, as well as the presence of a significant Jewish population and the increasing flow of tourists between the two countries, have all contributed to this convergence.<br>Conclusion: While Israel's technical, military, agricultural, high-tech, cyber, medical, and other expertise has attracted Azerbaijan and strengthened bilateral cooperation in recent years, Israel has not been clearly reflected in Azerbaijani public opinion. This has created an image of a loyal partner in the minds of the Azerbaijani government and people. One of the main reasons for Azerbaijan’s increasing divergence from Iran in recent years is the influence of Israeli public diplomacy, which has successfully aligned Azerbaijani policymakers and, to some extent, the public with its interests. Another important achievement of this bilateral cooperation has been the transformation of long-standing narratives about Israel in Azerbaijan's educational textbooks. These texts now include more neutral and, in some cases, pro-Israeli depictions. For example, the actions of Palestinian resistance groups against Israel are described as "terrorist activities," while the concepts of the Holocaust and antisemitism are taught from an Israeli perspective.<span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">در بستر جهانیشدن، افزایش وابستگیهای متقابل و تحولات پساجنگ سرد، دیپلماسی سنتی دگرگون و دیپلماسی عمومی بهعنوان ابزاری مکمل برای تقویت قدرت نرم دولتها برجسته شده است. گسترش وب۲ و شبکههای اجتماعی نیز ظرفیتهای این حوزه را برای اثرگذاری بر افکار عمومی و شکلدادن به روابط بینالملل افزایش داده است. برایناساس، مسئلۀ اصلی نوشتار حاضر بررسی میزان تأثیر دیپلماسی عمومی بر افزایش همگرایی میان اسرائیل و جمهوری آذربایجان، فراتر از عوامل متعارف ژئوپلیتیکی، امنیتی و اقتصادی است. در این چارچوب، با تکیه بر مفهوم «هَسبارا» بهعنوان الگوی ویژۀ دیپلماسی عمومی اسرائیل، ابعاد نرم این همگرایی را واکاوی میکنیم. در این نوشتار کیفی، از روش تحلیل محتوای هدایتشده برای بررسی دادهها و پاسخ به پرسش اصلی بهره میبریم. دادهها را از منابع دست اول شامل سخنرانیها، بیانیهها، مصاحبهها و محتوای شبکههای اجتماعی و منابع دست دوم شامل مقالههای علمی، گزارشهای تحلیلی و منابع رسانهای گردآوری و در قالب سه موضوع دیپلماسی دیاسپورا، دیپلماسی فرهنگی و دیپلماسی رسانهای تحلیل کردهایم. یافتهها نشان میدهد که اسرائیل با بهرهگرفتن از </span><span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">دیپلماسی عمومی شبکهمحور</span><span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">، شامل فعالسازی دیاسپورا، تعاملهای فرهنگی و حضور رسانهای، توانسته است همگرایی و اعتماد متقابل با جمهوری آذربایجان را تقویت و در قالب «هسبارا ۲» به تعمیق روابط دوجانبه کمک کند.</span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_108144_c1fad731632be2e740f52592881dbee0.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823Russian Foreign Policy in the Persian Gulf after the Ukraine Crisisسیاست خارجی روسیه در خلیج فارس پس از بحران اوکراین16018610635410.22059/jcep.2026.395857.450329FAمحمد رضادهشیریاستاد گروه مطالعات منطقهای، دانشکدۀ روابط بینالملل وزارت امور خارجه، تهران، ایران.0000-0001-8223-3358سعیدواشقانی فراهانیکارشناس ارشد مطالعات منطقهای، دانشکدۀ روابط بینالملل وزارت امور خارجه، تهران، ایران.0009-0004-3352-7906Journal Article20250706Introduction: The Persian Gulf, historically known as the "Sea of Persia," is a prominent body of water in southwest Asia, north of the Arabian Peninsula and south of the Iranian plateau. In 2014, following Russia's annexation of Crimea, the international community imposed extensive sanctions against the country, a situation that intensified significantly in 2022 with the advent of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian War. These developments put economic pressure on Russia and increased its international isolation, including its expulsion from the Group of Seven (G7), which represents the world's largest developed economies. The annexation of Crimea exposed Russia to widespread and ongoing economic sanctions from Western countries and even led to its expulsion from the G7.<br>At the same time, Russia's economy depreciated substantially as oil prices fell. After becoming embroiled in the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia's leadership sought ways to counter its political isolation from the West. President Putin’s “pivot to the East” strategy has aimed to create new economic partnerships. As a result, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have become strategically vital to Russia in its efforts to reduce political and economic isolation. This research will examine how Russia has strategically shaped its foreign policy in the Persian Gulf, driven by converging interests in energy markets, significant investment by Gulf Cooperation Council member states, the need to escape political isolation, and the need to counter the Western maximum pressure campaign. It will also examine Russia’s strategies for managing existing challenges with regional states while expanding its economic and political ties with the Gulf monarchies. Furthermore, it acknowledges the existence of three perspectives – opportunity-based, threat-based, and gray-zone-based- on Russia’s active engagement in the Persian Gulf, particularly in matters that concern Iran’s national interests.<br>Research question: How has the Ukraine crisis influenced Russia's foreign policy in the Persian Gulf?<br>Research hypothesis: This research hypothesizes that the Ukrainian crisis, driven by Western economic sanctions, has led Russia to adopt a more active and participatory strategy in the Persian Gulf, integrating geoeconomic and geostrategic approaches.<br>Methodology and theoretical framework: This research used a qualitative approach drawing on library, internet, and interview sources. It applied Neo-Eurasianism to analyze Russian foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. Russian foreign policy has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union, shaped by the Kozyrev Doctrine, the Primakov Doctrine, and the Putin Doctrine. The Kozyrev Doctrine, adopted during Boris Yeltsin's first term, defined Russia's identity as a new liberal democracy and market economy aligned with a Western-oriented system. Andrei Kozyrev, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister under Yeltsin, emphasized that rejoining the West was a "return to civilization" to support Russia's transition to democracy and a free market economy. However, the so-called Atlantic orientation in foreign policy faced challenges in domestic politics. The shift toward Neo-Eurasianism was marked by the emergence of the Primakov Doctrine. Yevgeny Primakov became Russia's Foreign Minister in 1996 and served as Prime Minister from 1998 to 1999, until his successor, Vladimir Putin. The Primakov Doctrine represented a serious attempt to restore lost international prestige and standing while countering American unilateralism. This policy was consolidated when Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. Neo-Eurasianism has specific features in Russian foreign policy, including “nationalism,” “geopolitics,” and “realism.”<br>Results and discussion: 1. Tensions and conflicts between Russia and the United States, along with the Western bloc, are a major factor driving the Kremlin's interest in escalating its activities in the Persian Gulf region. Strong, constructive relations with the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and an active, participatory presence in the region help Russia avoid international isolation.<br>2. The effects of Western sanctions against Russia are among the main factors shaping Russia's presence and cooperation with the regional governments in the Persian Gulf.<br>3. Protecting the interests of Russian companies operating in the energy sector through close cooperation with major oil and gas exporters in the region.<br>Conclusion: The outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the widespread Western sanctions against Russia have had a significant impact on the country's foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region. In this context, Russia has sought to strengthen its relations with the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states and to develop a partnership-based strategy in the region. The Persian Gulf region is important to Russia because of its strategic geopolitical and economic location, especially in the energy sector. The country has sought to build closer ties with countries in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, to secure its economic and political interests. Changes in Russian foreign policy in the Persian Gulf include increased economic cooperation, joint investments, and security engagement. Russia is also seeking to strengthen its position as a key player in the global energy arena, and cooperation with oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf could help Russia achieve its main goal of managing energy markets. After examining and presenting the three existing perspectives on expanding relations between Russia and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, it seems necessary to strike a balance between these two approaches.<span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">روابط روسیه و کشورهای خلیج فارس تا پیش از فروپاشی شوروی بهدلیل گروهبندیهای قدرت و قرارداشتن این کشورها در گروه غرب، بیشتر در تأثیر عوامل ایدئولوژیک قرار داشت. با فروپاشی اتحاد شوروی، بهدلیل نوع دیدگاه حاکم بر سیاست خارجی روسیه، خلیج فارس از اولویت کمتری برخوردار بود. با رویکارآمدن پوتین در آغاز قرن بیستویکم، روابط روسیه با کشورهای منطقۀ خلیج فارس گسترش پیدا کرد؛ هرچند به دلایل مختلف از جمله حمایت شیخنشینهای خلیج فارس از گروههای سلفی مسلمان در منطقۀ قفقاز و آغاز ناآرامیهای عربی در سال 2011، تقابل روسیه با اعضای شورای همکاری خلیج [فارس] در سوریه و دیگر نقاط، موجب کاهش روابط و ایجاد تنش میان روسیه و آنها شد. آغاز بحران اوکراین و در ادامه، کاربست تحریمهای همهجانبه از سوی غرب به تغییر سیاست خارجی روسیه در منطقۀ خلیج فارس منجر شد. در این نوشتار میخواهیم با استفاده از روش کیفی ابزاری با بهرهگیری از منابع کتابخانهای، اینترنتی و مصاحبه، به این پرسش پاسخ دهیم که بحران اوکراین چگونه بر سیاست خارجی روسیه در خلیج فارس تأثیر گذاشته است؟ فرضیۀ این نوشتار این است که بحران اوکراین با توجه به تحریمهای اقتصادی غرب، موجب پیگیری راهبرد فعالانهتر و مشارکتگرایانۀ روسیه در خلیج فارس با رویکرد تلفیقیِ ژئواکونومیک و ژئواستراتژیک شده است. در مورد حضور فعالانه و مشارکتجویانۀ روسیه در خلیج فارس برای منافع ملی ایران سه دیدگاه وجود دارد که گروه نخست، آن را فرصت، گروه دوم آن را تهدید و گروه سوم، نسبت به آن دیدگاهی خاکستری دارند.</span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_106354_42b25a33bfce3f1f77b1861ea638bad7.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823Iranian Perspectives on Iran-Russia Relations: Political Science and IR Scholars’ Viewsدیدگاه ایرانی به روابط ایران و روسیه: آرای استادان علومسیاسی و روابط بینالملل18721710779510.22059/jcep.2026.400486.450346FAرضاذبیحیاستادیار روابط بینالملل، گروه مطالعات سیاستی ایرانشناختی، بنیاد ایرانشناسی، تهران، ایران.0009-0005-8903-442XJournal Article20250915Introduction: Iran-Russia relations are among the most important regional and international strategic interactions, with a major impact on geopolitical, security, and economic developments in the Eurasian region. Given the increasing complexity of the international system and ongoing changes in the global order, policymakers and international relations researchers need a detailed, comprehensive assessment of these relations. This issue requires a realistic, national-interest-centered approach to capture the complexities and multiple dimensions of this interaction within an analytical and scientific framework. The main goal of this research is to identify key aspects of Iran-Russia relations from the perspective of Iranian political science and international relations experts and to provide a qualitative, analytical framework to better understand and manage this strategic relationship effectively. This work becomes more important when we consider Russia’s pivotal role in regional and global political equations and its direct impact on Iran’s security and development. A deep understanding of this relationship can help shape a balanced and intelligent foreign policy and prevent one-dimensional dependence.<br>Research question: How do Iranian political science scholars interpret the structural pressures of the international system and translate them into patterns of Tehran-Moscow interaction?<br>Research hypothesis<span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">:</span> The pattern of Iran-Russia interaction is shaped not only by the structure of the international system, but also by the perceptions of foreign policy elites; therefore, without a historical, cultural, and political understanding of both sides, its analysis remains incomplete.<br>Methodology: This qualitative research uses content analysis to identify and examine key aspects of this relationship through interviews, lectures, and articles by prominent researchers. To validate the hypothesis, it draws on the perspectives of prominent Iranian political science and international relations professors in a comprehensive, integrated manner and evaluates the complex, multi-layered aspects of this relationship using qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis. The data used include a secondary collection of interviews, speeches, and articles by seven prominent experts in this field, all of whom have academic credibility and media recognition in international relations and have published numerous works on Iran's interactions with major powers. These scholars include: Elaheh Koolaee, Ebrahim Mottaghi, Mehdi Sanaei, Seyed Jalal Dehghani Firooz Abadi, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Seyed Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour, and Hossein Salimi.<br>To increase credibility, the extracted themes were compared with previous analyses and findings from similar studies. To increase reliability and reduce bias, the researcher also compared and integrated multiple researchers' opinions. This comparison enabled the researcher to identify commonalities and differences in perspectives and present a balanced, comprehensive picture. The use of triangulation, which evaluated at least three sources for each researcher, each including at least one article and one lecture, further ensured the validity of the data.<br>Results and discussion: The findings show that avoiding emotional and ideological statements and emphasizing a deep understanding of Russia’s history, culture, and political developments are essential for effective, strategic engagement. Geographical proximity and Russia’s instrumental role in regional dynamics make a strategic partnership necessary, but this cooperation should not lead to unilateral dependence. Challenges such as Russophobia in Iran and superficial perceptions of Iran in Russia require cognitive diplomacy and the removal of misunderstandings. Shared cultural and historical commonalities also provide a solid basis for balanced cooperation.<br>Furthermore, a comprehensive analysis of the findings shows that Iran-Russia relations are rooted in a turbulent history marked by bitter experiences, negative mentalities, and structural challenges within the international system. At the same time, this relationship has evolved within the framework of “neo-classical realism,” which emphasizes strategic independence, the balance of power, and consideration of geopolitical capacities. Cognitive challenges, such as Russophobia, limited understanding, and bipolar perceptions, are among the main obstacles to deepening sustainable relations. In contrast, opportunities for cooperation across various energy sectors and Iran’s geopolitical weight offer potential to expand bilateral relations and strengthen Iran’s position in the international system.<br>Conclusion: Iran's foreign policy should avoid the dualistic view of good and evil and instead be based on pragmatism and engagement with different powers to secure national interests. Cooperation with Russia in areas such as security and the economy, without complete dependence, can strengthen Iran's international position. Balancing relations with different powers and avoiding sacrifices in relations with the West or the East are essential requirements for a balanced foreign policy. Strategic cooperation with Russia will only be an opportunity when accompanied by deep understanding and realistic management that prioritizes Iran's national interests. Finally, amid complex and changing global developments, Iran-Russia relations require a forward-looking perspective and careful scenario planning. The scenarios that could propel this cooperation towards a sustainable strategic partnership or maintain tactical and temporary relations depend on several elements, including changes in the international system, domestic developments in both countries, and the smart management of challenges and opportunities. Therefore, Iranian policymakers must develop flexible and multidimensional strategies based on analytical data and realistic approaches that can respond to unexpected events and complexities that may arise and put Iran-Russia cooperation on the path of sustainable and effective development.<span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">تحلیل روابط ایران و روسیه مستلزم رویکردی واقعگرایانه و مبتنی بر منافع ملی است که بتواند پیچیدگیها و ابعاد مختلف این تعامل راهبردی را بهدرستی بازتاب دهد، بهطوری که پاسخگوی نیازها و تحولات ژئوپلیتیکی، امنیتی و اقتصادی روزافرون باشد. پرسش اصلی این نوشتار این است که دیدگاه استادان علوم سیاسی ایران چگونه فشارهای ساختاری نظام بینالملل را معناگذاری کرده و آن را به الگوی تعامل تهران و مسکو برمیگردانند؟ در پاسخ، این فرضیه مطرح میشود که الگوی تعامل ایران و روسیه، نتیجۀ مستقیم ساختار نظام بینالمللی نیست، بلکه با فیلترهای ادراکی نخبگان سیاست خارجی بازسازی میشود و بدون شناخت تاریخی، فرهنگی و سیاسی دوطرف، تحلیل این روابط ناقص خواهد بود. در این نوشتار با رویکردی کیفی و با استفاده از روشهای تحلیل محتوا و تحلیل مضمون مصاحبهها، سخنرانیها و مقالههای استادان برجسته، ابعاد اصلی این رابطه را شناسایی و بررسی میکنیم. یافتهها نشان میدهد چالشهایی مانند روسهراسی در ایران و درک سطحی از ایران در روسیه، نیازمند دیپلماسی شناختی و رفع سوءتفاهمهاست. اشتراکهای فرهنگی و تاریخی نیز بستر مناسبی برای گسترش همکاریهای متوازن فراهم میکند. سیاست خارجی ایران باید با پرهیز از دوگانگی خیر و شر، بر عمل گرایی و تعامل با قدرتهای مختلف برای تأمین منافع ملی استوار باشد. چنانکه ایجاد تعادل در روابط با قدرتها از الزامهای سیاست خارجی مبتنی بر منافع ملی و واقعگرایی است. مشارکت راهبردی با روسیه، زمانی فرصتساز خواهد بود که با شناخت عمیق و مدیریت واقعبینانه همراه باشد و منافع ملی ایران را در اولویت قرار دهد. </span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_107795_e1c8d71fb48352a25b874b3be08a5899.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823Russia’s Foreign Policy towards the Central African Republic: From Cooperation to Neo-Colonialismسیاست خارجی روسیه در برابر جمهوری آفریقای مرکزی: از همکاری تا استعمارنو21824610854910.22059/jcep.2026.407807.450386FAمجیدرسولیاستادیار، گروه ژئوپلیتیک، مرکز مطالعات آفریقا، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران0009-0002-2286-9893وحیدحسین زادهاستادیار، گروه روابط بینالملل، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران0000-0002-4320-8122Journal Article20251222Introduction: This study examines Russia’s expanding influence over the political, military, and diplomatic structures of the Central African Republic (CAR) since 2017 as an example of asymmetric relations in contemporary international politics. The trajectory of Moscow’s engagement with CAR signals the emergence of a new neo-colonial paradigm that moves away from traditional models of development assistance and ideological interventions. Instead, it introduces a form of security-for-economic-access trading that reconfigures regional geopolitical dynamics. Understanding how Russia has positioned itself as a decisive external actor in CAR provides broader insight into the changing architecture of influence and dependency across Africa. Furthermore, the case highlights how non-Western powers use alternative modes to fill governance and security vacuums in fragile states, thereby reshaping global competition in the Post-Cold War order.<br>Research question:<strong> </strong>How does Russia influence the domestic and foreign policy of the Central African Republic? <br>Research hypothesis:<strong> </strong>To answer this question, the research hypothesis is formulated as follows: In the Central African Republic, Russia offers a model of security for- economic-access, in which the transfer of military technology and a security presence serve as a means to reshape regional geopolitical norms. While challenging traditional powers in the region, this pattern represents a new form of neo-colonialism in which goals are pursued through proxy forces rather than direct state interventions.<br>Methodology and Theoretical Framework: This study employs a qualitative, descriptive-analytical methodology that draws primarily on documentary and library sources; however, its analytical strength lies in a theoretical framework grounded in neo-colonialism, neo-imperialism, state capture, and proxy relations. Over the past two centuries, external actors have profoundly shaped Africa, often through neo-colonial practices. Drawing on Kwame Nkrumah’s seminal formulation of neo-colonialism and subsequent research, this framework examines how external powers use political, economic, and security instruments to advance their interests in weaker states at the expense of local populations. In this view, neo-colonialism is understood as a system through which foreign actors deploy tools that enable domestic elites to maintain regimes aligned with foreign interests, facilitate resource extraction, and reinforce asymmetric dependence. Neo-imperialism, which operates through spheres of influence, complements this view by highlighting how major powers establish near-monopoly dominance over strategically important regions.<br>The framework also incorporates the concept of state capture, defined as a form of corruption in which powerful domestic or foreign actors manipulate legal, political, and economic systems to serve a narrow elite. Enabled by institutional fragility, this process creates environments highly vulnerable to external intervention. Finally, the analysis draws on theories of proxy relations, which explain how foreign states exert influence through third parties, including non-state military contractors, by providing security or resources in exchange for political and economic concessions. Taken together, these concepts provide a coherent analytical framework for assessing Russian strategies and their impacts on governance and sovereignty in the Central African Republic.<br><br>Results and Discussion: <span lang="EN">Since 2017, Russia has solidified its position as the Central African Republic's (CAR) primary security partner by deploying private military contractors, most notably the Wagner Group. Although this military support has contributed to short-term stability, it has also weakened democratic institutions by centralizing decision-making and suppressing political pluralism.</span><br><span lang="EN">Moscow’s influence extends beyond the security sector into the political sphere, where direct engagement with the president and lobbying for constitutional reforms have effectively reduced CAR’s sovereignty to a variable in Russia’s broader regional strategy. By providing security assistance without the political conditions typically imposed by Western actors, Russia has challenged France’s long-standing geopolitical monopoly and, through a combination of military, political, and intelligence operations, has positioned itself as an attractive alternative partner. This Russian approach exemplifies a form of neo-colonialism that, unlike classical colonial models, relies on proxy actors and transactional security arrangements to secure economic and geopolitical interests rather than direct rule. By embedding Russian interests in the Central African Republic’s state structures through military technology transfers and close ties with political elites, Moscow is establishing a long-term strategic foothold to exert influence through flexible, low-key means throughout the region.</span><br>Conclusion: The study concludes that Russia’s involvement in the Central African Republic represents a distinctive model of asymmetric power relations that combines security assistance, military technology transfer, and political intervention. This model has enabled Moscow to reshape CAR’s domestic political order, consolidate its regional presence, and challenge pre-existing French dominance. This case highlights a new mode of influence in international relations-one in which external powers use non-state military proxies and transactional security partnerships to rewrite regional geopolitical norms. The implications of this research extend beyond the Central African Republic. It underscores the importance of understanding how emerging powers deploy hybrid statecraft to extend their influence in fragile states. It also raises urgent questions about the long-term implications for governance, sovereignty, and stability in regions where security dependence becomes the basis of political alignment. Finally, the case of CAR shows that neo-colonial dynamics are evolving, with contemporary forms relying less on territorial control and more on strategically manipulating security vulnerabilities and domestic political processes.<span lang="AR-SA">این پژوهش به بررسی تأثیرگذاری روسیه بر ساختارهای سیاسی، نظامی و دیپلماتیک جمهوری آفریقای مرکزی از سال ۲۰۱۷ میپردازد و آن را نمونهای از روابط نامتوازن در نظام بینالملل تحلیل میکند. سیاستهای مسکو در مورد این کشور، نشاندهنده شکلگیری الگویی از استعمار نو است که مدلهای سنتی کمکهای توسعهای و مداخلههای ایدئولوژیک را به حاشیه رانده است. پرسش اصلی پژوهش این است که روسیه چگونه بر سیاست داخلی و خارجی جمهوری آفریقای مرکزی اثر میگذارد؟ فرضیه پژوهش بر این مبنا استوار است که روسیه در این کشور الگویی مبتنی بر «تبادل امنیت در برابر دسترسی اقتصادی» ارائه داده است؛ الگویی که در آن انتقال فناوری نظامی و حضور امنیتی، ابزاری برای بازتعریف هنجارهای ژئوپلیتیک است. این فرآیند ضمن به چالش کشیدن قدرتهای سنتی، فرانسه، نمونهای از استعمار نو را به نمایش میگذارد که در آن اهداف استراتژیک نه از راه مداخله، بلکه با بهرهگیری از نیروهای نیابتی دنبال میشود. این پژوهش با رویکرد کیفی، روش نمونهپژوهی و از راه گردآوری دادههای اسنادی-کتابخانهای انجام شده است. یافتهها نشان میدهد روسیه از سال ۲۰۱۷ با تبدیل شدن به شریک امنیتی اصلی، نفوذ خود را تثبیت کرده است. این حمایت، بهویژه توسط پیمانکاران امنیتی غیردولتی مانند واگنر، ضمن ایجاد ثباتی ساختاری، کارآمدی نهادهای دموکراتیک را تضعیف کرده است. تعاملهای مستقیم مسکو با هیئت حاکمه و لابیگری برای اصلاحات قانون اساسی، بیانگر نفوذ بر حاکمیت داخلی است. </span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_108549_05364757c1af38444636c29c12e89bf3.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823China’s Approach to the US-Israeli War against Iran: Based on the Role Theoryرویکرد چین در جنگ آمریکا–اسرائیل علیه ایران بر اساس نظریه نقش24727210855010.22059/jcep.2026.419366.450440FAبهارهسازمنددانشیار، گروه مطالعات منطقهای، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.0000-0003-4838-8430Journal Article20260725Introduction: The US-Israeli war against Iran placed the People’s Republic of China in a highly complex strategic environment that required balancing multiple and competing foreign policy objectives. On the one hand, Iran is an important strategic partner for China in energy security, regional connectivity, and cooperation in multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. On the other hand, China has extensive economic ties with the Persian Gulf states and significant trade relations with Israel, while also seeking to avoid direct strategic confrontation with the United States. This situation has created a fundamental dilemma for Beijing: how to maintain its strategic partnerships, protect its expanding global interests, and maintain its image as a responsible great power without engaging directly in military conflict.<br>This situation makes China’s response an important case for examining how emerging great powers define and execute their international roles amid systemic instability. This article explains China’s foreign policy behavior during the US-Israeli war against Iran through the analytical framework of Role Theory. This study argues that, rather than interpreting China's behavior solely through realist power calculations or constructivist approaches to identity, role theory offers a more comprehensive framework for explaining how national role concepts, external role expectations, role status, and role performance shape foreign policy behavior. Therefore, this study examines the relationship between China’s perceived international identity, the expectations of various international actors, and the foreign policy actions taken during this conflict. Specifically, it examines how Beijing reconciled its strategic partnership with Iran, its economic interdependence with Middle Eastern actors, and its long-term goal of avoiding confrontation with the United States, while simultaneously seeking to enhance its leadership credibility in the Global South.<br>Research question: How did China balance its competing strategic interests during the US-Israeli war against Iran, and what implications does this approach have for China’s international role and the evolving global order?<br>Research hypothesis: This paper assumes that China has adopted a strategic hedging strategy during the US-Israeli war against Iran.<br>Methodology: The study uses qualitative research and a process-tracing approach to investigate the causal mechanisms related to China’s national role concept, role expectations, role status, and role performance.<br>Results and discussion: The findings suggest that China’s behavior during the conflict cannot be fully explained by traditional realist assumptions about the balance of power or economic interdependence. Instead, its behavior reflects a coherent and consistent pattern of Strategic risk hedging within the context of an evolving concept of national role.<br>Beijing has consistently opposed military escalation, emphasized sovereignty and territorial integrity, called for a ceasefire, supported diplomatic negotiations, and criticized actions that could destabilize the region. At the same time, China avoided direct military intervention or explicit security commitments that could lead to confrontation with the United States.<br>This combination of diplomatic support, strategic restraint, and economic continuity represents a conscious effort to maintain strategic flexibility while enhancing China’s international legitimacy. Thus, China sought to maintain its strategic partnership with Iran without transforming it into a direct military commitment. The analysis also suggests that China’s behavior should not be interpreted simply as a short-term response to a regional crisis, but rather as part of a broader strategy aimed at expanding China’s normative influence, safeguarding energy security, protecting economic networks associated with the Belt and Road Initiative, and strengthening political partnerships across the Global South.<br>From the Role Theory perspective, China’s behavior reflects the interaction between its national role and external role expectations. Beijing’s self-concept as a responsible great power encouraged it to emphasize sovereignty, territorial integrity, diplomacy, and regional stability. At the same time, expectations from Iran, Arab countries, developing countries, and other international actors created competitive pressures that required China to carefully regulate its behavior.<br>China’s approach can therefore be seen as a form of role negotiation. Beijing sought to show it could help manage regional conflict and defend the principles of international order without shouldering the military burden or adopting the confrontational patterns traditionally associated with hegemonic leadership.<br>Through this approach, China is gradually seeking to redefine its international role from a primarily economic power to a responsible global actor capable of helping manage regional conflicts while maintaining its strategic independence. <br>Conclusion: The US-Israeli war against Iran is not only a regional military confrontation but also a key arena for the realignment of international legitimacy, power, and leadership in the evolving global order. China’s strategic hedging enabled Beijing to protect its national interests, maintain regional partnerships, enhance its diplomatic credibility among developing countries, and strengthen its role as an increasingly influential leader in the Global South.<br>The findings suggest that China sought to balance several competing goals: maintaining its strategic partnership with Iran, protecting economic and energy interests, sustaining relations with other regional players, avoiding confrontation with the United States, and enhancing its international legitimacy. More broadly, this study suggests that Role Theory offers a valuable analytical framework for understanding how emerging powers navigate systemic transition, competing role expectations, and intensifying geopolitical competition. China’s behavior during this conflict illustrates how an emerging great power can use strategic flexibility and role negotiation to pursue national interests while attempting to alter perceptions of its international role.<br>Ultimately, China’s approach to strategic hedging seeks to combine strategic pragmatism with an evolving concept of responsible global leadership. Its behavior during the conflict therefore offers important insights into the shifting patterns of power, diplomacy, and leadership in the emerging global order.<span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">جنگ آمریکا و اسرائیل علیه ایران چین را در برابر معمای راهبردی قرار داد. از یکسو، ایران شریک مهم چین در حوزۀ انرژی و عضو سازمان همکاری شانگهای و بریکس است. از سوی دیگر، چین با کشورهای عربی و حتی اسرائیل روابط اقتصادی گستردهای دارد. چین نمیخواهد درگیر تقابل مستقیم با آمریکا شود. هدف اصلی این نوشتار تحلیل رویکرد چین در جنگ آمریکا و اسرائیل علیه ایران و ارزیابی پیامدهای آن برای نظم درحال گذار جهانی و جایگاه چین در جنوب جهانی است. پرسش اصلی این است که چین چگونه میان این منافع متعارض موازنه برقرار کرده است و این رویکرد بر جایگاه آن در نظم بینالمللی چه تأثیری خواهد داشت؟ فرضیۀ نوشتار این است که چین در جنگ آمریکا و اسرائیل علیه ایران، رویکرد «مصونسازی راهبردی» را در پیش گرفت؛ بهگونهای که ضمن حمایت سیاسی از کاهش تنش و مخالفت با گسترش جنگ، از ورود مستقیم به رویارویی با آمریکا </span><span dir="RTL" lang="FA">پرهیز</span><span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA"> کرد تا هم امنیت انرژی و منافع اقتصادی خود را حفظ کند و هم جایگاهش را در نظم درحال گذار جهانی با محوریت جنوب جهانی تقویت کند. برای بررسی موضوع از نظریۀ نقش و روش پژوهش کیفی با رویکرد ردیابی فرایند استفاده میکنیم تا سازوکار علی میان برداشت ملی از نقش چین، انتظارهای نقش، مکانیابی نقش و ایفای نقش را در جنگ آمریکا و اسرائیل علیه ایران شناسایی و تحلیل کنیم. یافتههای این نوشتار نشان میدهد سیاست چین در این جنگ، فقط واکنشی دورهای نیست، بلکه بخشی از راهبرد کلان آن برای افزایش نفوذ هنجاری، حفظ منافع اقتصادی و تقویت ائتلافهای غیرغربی در برابر هژمونی لیبرال غربی محسوب میشود. </span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_108550_bbfb100346386efc5daef4e0769376b1.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823The Impact of the Russia–Ukraine War on the Turkish Economy (2022–2024)تأثیر جنگ اوکراین و روسیه بر اقتصاد ترکیه (2022-2024)27329510788510.22059/jcep.2026.388125.450296FAنوذرشفیعیدانشیار، گروه مطالعات منطقهای، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایرانداریوشعبدالهیدانشجوی دکتری روابط بینالملل، واحد تهران شمال، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران0009-0009-1251-9516Journal Article20250422Introduction: The Russia-Ukraine war has reshaped Eurasia's geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, with far-reaching implications for regional actors with strong economic interdependencies. Among these actors, Turkey holds a unique strategic position because of its extensive trade, energy, and financial ties with both Russia and Ukraine, as well as its active diplomatic role as a mediator. The outbreak of the conflict has exposed Turkey to significant economic vulnerabilities, including currency depreciation, rising energy and grain prices, and pressure on key sectors such as tourism. At the same time, the crisis has created new opportunities for Ankara to increase its economic connectivity, expand its transit and energy roles, and strengthen its geopolitical position. These developments highlight the need to systematically examine how Turkey manages wartime challenges while exploiting emerging opportunities. This study addresses this gap by analyzing Turkey’s multidimensional economic response through the lens of economic diplomacy from 2022 to 2024.<br>Research question: What opportunities and challenges has the Russia-Ukraine war created for the Turkish economy, and how has the country managed the economic consequences of the crisis?<br>Research hypothesis: Turkey's balanced and pragmatic response to the war in Ukraine enabled the country to mitigate initial economic shocks, including currency depreciation and rising energy and grain costs, and to turn some of these challenges into economic and geopolitical opportunities.<br>Methodology: This study combines quantitative and qualitative analyses within a descriptive-analytical framework to examine Turkey's economic response to the Russia-Ukraine war. The analysis draws on the conceptual framework of economic diplomacy, which treats economic instruments as strategic foreign policy tools to protect and advance national interests. Turkey’s response to the crisis is assessed as a structured process of mobilizing trade, energy, and financial mechanisms to mitigate risks and exploit emerging opportunities. The study systematically analyzes secondary data, including trade statistics, energy flows, investment patterns, and tourism indicators for 2022-2024. The assessment is guided by three analytical pillars: access to global markets, attraction of foreign capital and resources, and enhancement of geopolitical and geoeconomic positioning. These pillars organize empirical evidence, including Turkey’s mediation in the Black Sea Grain Corridor, the expansion of its transit function, and increased flows of Russian capital and tourists, highlighting the country’s strategic maneuvering in a complex geopolitical context.<br>Results and discussion: Analysis of Turkey’s economic performance from 2022 to 2024 shows that, despite severe shocks from the Russia-Ukraine war, Ankara has effectively mitigated these pressures and turned many of them into strategic advantages through balanced, pragmatic, and diplomacy-centered policies. Initially, Turkey’s interdependence with Russia and Ukraine heightened its vulnerability to external disruptions. Rising global energy and grain prices, coupled with a sharp depreciation of the Turkish lira, pushed inflation above 85 percent by late 2022. National energy import costs nearly doubled from pre-war levels, underscoring vulnerability to global price fluctuations. However, Turkey’s measured foreign policy enabled rapid adjustment. Bilateral trade with Russia remained stable, rising to a record $68 billion in 2022, driven by the diversion of Russian trade flows due to Western sanctions. This strengthened Turkey’s role in re-exports, energy transit, and logistics, while access to discounted Russian oil and coal supported domestic refineries and eased energy pressures.<br>The war also heightened the importance of Turkey’s geoenergy. Initiatives to position Turkey as a regional gas hub, along with expanded LNG capacity and new pipeline projects, have strengthened Ankara’s position in Europe’s reshaped energy landscape. In agriculture, although dependence on Russian and Ukrainian wheat initially raised concerns, participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative has stabilized domestic markets and provided essential supplies. Tourism has recovered rapidly, as a surge in Russian and Ukrainian visitors offset a decline in European arrivals, generating a record $46 billion in revenue in 2022. At the same time, Russian capital inflows through real estate, joint ventures, and financial transactions have eased pressure on foreign exchange reserves and stimulated investment in construction, petrochemicals, steel, and logistics.<br>Regionally, the conflict accelerated strategic infrastructure projects, including the Middle Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, and strengthened Turkey’s East-West transit role. Diplomatically, Ankara’s mediation efforts, as seen in the Istanbul talks and management of the Grain Corridor, enhanced the country’s international standing and highlighted the strategic value of economic diplomacy. Overall, the findings suggest that Turkey has effectively transformed wartime pressures into sustainable economic and geostrategic gains through adaptive policymaking and multidimensional economic diplomacy.<br>Conclusion: The Russia-Ukraine war created a strategic opportunity for Turkey to strengthen its regional and international position by effectively leveraging its economic, energy, and diplomatic capabilities. The findings show that Turkey’s response to the crisis was not purely security-based but reflected a pragmatic, structured approach grounded in economic diplomacy. This strategy enabled Turkey to reduce crisis-related pressures while exploiting emerging opportunities. Turkey consolidated its role as a regional transit hub by facilitating Ukrainian grain exports, managing alternative transit routes for Russian energy and goods, and expanding re-export activities to third countries. In addition, relatively low-cost energy imports from Russia, coupled with increased foreign investment and tourism from Russia and Ukraine, helped bolster foreign exchange reserves, ease domestic economic pressures, and diversify Turkey’s external economic relations.<br>At the geopolitical and geoeconomic levels, Turkey’s mediation efforts in the Ukraine crisis, its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and its continued investment in energy and transportation infrastructure have elevated its standing within Eurasian energy and economic networks. Extensive cooperation with Central Asian and South Caucasus countries further demonstrates Turkey’s effective use of geopolitical leverage to expand its economic influence. Overall, by integrating soft power tools with hard power assets, Turkey has developed an economically oriented hybrid power, turning crisis-related challenges into strategic opportunities.<span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">جنگ روسیه و اوکراین در بستری ژئوپلیتیک و ژئواکونومیک شکل گرفت و بر ترکیه بهعنوان کشوری میانجی و عضو فعال در اقتصاد منطقهای و جهانی، تأثیر قابل توجهی گذاشت. با توجه به روابط گستردۀ اقتصادی، تجاری و انرژی ترکیه با هر دو طرف درگیر، پرسش اصلی نوشتار این است که</span> <span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">این جنگ برای اقتصاد ترکیه چه فرصتها و چالشهایی ایجاد کرده و این کشور در برابر پیامدهای آن چگونه واکنش نشان داده است؟ در پاسخ این فرضیه مطرح میشود که با وجود فشارهای اولیۀ جنگ شامل کاهش ارزش لیر، افزایش قیمت انرژی، غلات و کاهش درآمدهای گردشگری، ترکیه با کاربست رویکرد عملگرایانه و سیاستهای متوازن توانسته است نهتنها پیامدهای منفی را کاهش دهد، بلکه بخشی از تهدیدها را به فرصتهای اقتصادی و ژئوپلیتیکی تبدیل کند. این نوشتار با روش ترکیبی (کمی و کیفی) و با رویکرد توصیفیتحلیلی انجام شده است. یافتهها نشان میدهد که سیاستهای متوازن آنکارا، از همکاری امنیتی با اوکراین تا حفظ روابط انرژی با روسیه و داشتن نقش میانجی دیپلماتیک، جایگاه ویژهای برای ترکیه در بحران به وجود آورده و همزمان امکان بهرهبرداری از فرصتها را ایجاد کرده است. نتایج نوشتار بر اهمیت سیاست خارجی چندسوگرا، انعطافپذیر و فرصتمحور ترکیه در مدیریت پیامدهای اقتصادی و ژئوپلیتیکی بحرانها تأکید دارد</span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_107885_81a87cdcaa2c06092f45026ab31b2753.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy and Its Impact on Its Economic Developmentتاثیر سیاست خارجی چندبرداری قزاقستان بر توسعۀ اقتصادی آن29632410843210.22059/jcep.2026.402329.450356FAمایاکاپانادزهدانشیار، گروه تاریخ، دانشکدۀ علوم اجتماعی و انسانی، دانشگاه بینالمللی قفقاز، تفلیس، گرجستانعابدنوروزی زرمهریدکتری مطالعات منطقهای، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران0009-0002-1439-0129Journal Article20250913Introduction: After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Kazakhstan emerged as an independent state in the heart of Eurasia, facing the dual challenge of defining its place in the international system while pursuing economic development. Kazakhstan’s geopolitical location between Russia and China, vast energy resources, and landlocked status made adopting a balanced foreign policy a strategic imperative. Under Nursultan Nazarbayev's leadership, Kazakhstan adopted a “multi-vector foreign policy” to maintain balanced relations with major powers while maximizing economic opportunities through engagement with diverse international actors. Over time, this policy became a central pillar of the country’s economic development, playing a significant role in attracting foreign investment, expanding trade, and fostering international economic integration.
Research question: What impact has Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy had on the country’s economic development? This question matters because Kazakhstan has achieved greater economic success than most Central Asian republics and has significantly improved its well-being and development indicators over the past three decades.
Research hypothesis: This study hypothesizes that Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, grounded in non-ideological realism and the prioritization of economic interests, has facilitated economic growth and development by expanding international cooperation, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), and promoting foreign trade. By avoiding excessive dependence on any single power, this strategy has enabled Kazakhstan to benefit simultaneously from the economic capacities of Russia, China, the United States, the European Union, and other international partners.
Methodology: The study employed descriptive statistics and data on Kazakhstan's foreign trade, foreign direct investment, and economic cooperation. The conceptual framework is grounded in the geopolitics of middle powers within a great-power competition.
From this perspective, Kazakhstan's geographic location has prompted the great powers to adopt a multi-vector foreign policy.<span dir="RTL"> </span>The model indicates that Kazakhstan has leveraged its geopolitical position and pragmatic foreign policy to create numerous international economic opportunities.
Results and discussion:<span dir="RTL"> </span>The findings show that Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy has played a significant role in the country’s economic success. While maintaining close relations with Russia, Kazakhstan has also established extensive economic cooperation with China, the European Union, and the United States. Key results of this approach include major international energy companies, the development of oil and gas fields, and the transfer of modern technologies. Kazakhstan has expanded its economic infrastructure and become one of Central Asia's main investment destinations by attracting hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign investment. The energy sector, especially oil and gas, has been the main focus of these investments. American, European, Russian, and Chinese companies have participated in major energy projects, and this diverse partnership has helped avoid excessive economic dependence on any single external actor.
In foreign trade, the multi-vector policy has helped diversify Kazakhstan’s economic partnerships. Russia and China remain among the country’s most important trading partners. In contrast, the European Union, Türkiye, India, and the South Caucasus countries also play significant roles in Kazakhstan’s foreign trade relations. The development of export pipelines to China and Europe, along with participation in international transit and connectivity initiatives, has improved the country’s access to global markets. At the same time, Kazakhstan has sought to strengthen its sovereignty and independence by actively participating in regional and international organizations. Membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and other international institutions is an important part of its strategy to maintain a balanced foreign-relations posture. However, recent developments in the international system have created new challenges for this policy. The war in Ukraine, intensifying competition between Russia and the West, the expansion of China’s economic influence, and changing global trade patterns have limited Kazakhstan’s room for maneuver. In response, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's government has sought to maintain strategic ties with Russia while expanding cooperation with China, the European Union, Türkiye, and countries in the South Caucasus. The development of the Middle Corridor and alternative transport and energy routes fits within this broader strategic framework.
Conclusion: The findings of this study indicate that the multi-vector foreign policy has been one of the most important drivers of Kazakhstan’s economic success in the post-independence era. By balancing great powers, attracting foreign investment, expanding trade, and diversifying export routes, this policy has created favorable conditions for economic growth and improved living standards. Kazakhstan has successfully turned its geopolitical position into a strategic advantage and, while avoiding dependence on any single power, has established extensive economic relations with a wide range of international actors. Despite these remarkable achievements, emerging geopolitical developments suggest that sustaining these gains will require continued adaptation of the multi-vector strategy to the evolving international environment. Maintaining a balance among great powers, developing alternative transit corridors, and pursuing active economic diplomacy will be essential to Kazakhstan’s continued economic development in the years to come.<span lang="AR-SA">قزاقستان پس از استقلال در سال ۱۹۹۱ بهدلیل موقعیت ژئوپلیتیکی ویژۀ خود در میان روسیه و چین و برخورداری از منابع گستردۀ انرژی، راهبرد سیاست خارجی چندبرداری را برای حفظ توازن در روابط خارجی و تأمین منافع ملی برگزید. این سیاست بهتدریج به یکی از ابزارهای اصلی توسعۀ اقتصادی کشور تبدیل شد</span><span dir="LTR">.</span> <span lang="AR-SA">پرسش اصلی نوشتار این است که سیاست خارجی چندبرداری قزاقستان بر توسعۀ اقتصادی این کشور چه تأثیری داشته است؟ در پاسخ، این فرضیه مطرح میشود که سیاست خارجی چندبرداری با تکیه بر واقعگرایی غیرایدئولوژیک و اولویتدادن به منافع اقتصادی، با گسترش همکاریهای بینالمللی، جذب سرمایهگذاری خارجی و توسعۀ تجارت، به رشد و توسعۀ اقتصادی قزاقستان کمک کرده است</span><span dir="LTR">.</span> <span lang="AR-SA">این نوشتار با روش آمار توصیفی و استفاده از دادههای مربوط به تجارت خارجی و سرمایهگذاری مستقیم خارجی انجام شده است. چارچوب مفهومی بر ژئوپلیتیک قدرتهای میانی استوار است که در آن موقعیت جغرافیایی قزاقستان، زمینهساز کاربست سیاست خارجی چندبرداری و دیپلماسی اقتصادی براورد میشود</span><span dir="LTR">.</span> <span lang="AR-SA">یافتهها نشان میدهد که قزاقستان با ایجاد روابط متوازن با روسیه، چین، ایالات متحد و اتحادیۀ اروپا توانسته است سرمایهگذاری خارجی گستردهای جذب کند و تجارت خارجی خود را گسترش دهد. متنوعکردن شریکهای اقتصادی، مسیرهای صادرات انرژی و مشارکت در ابتکارهای مسیرهای حملونقل منطقهای از مهمترین دستاوردهای این سیاست بوده است</span><span dir="LTR">.</span> <span lang="AR-SA">سیاست خارجی چندبرداری در توسعۀ اقتصادی قزاقستان نقش مهمی داشته است و زمینۀ جذب سرمایه، توسعۀ تجارت و تقویت جایگاه بینالمللی کشور را فراهم کرده است. با اینحال، تداوم موفقیت این راهبرد در گرو برابری آن با تحولهای جدید ژئوپلیتیکی و حفظ توازن میان قدرتهای بزرگ است</span><span dir="LTR">.</span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_108432_f804c0e7331d4fc5f90054d9b06ec4b5.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823Modeling the Areas of Conflict Expansion and Escalation in the South Caucasus Regionالگوسازی زمینههای گسترش و افزایش درگیری در منطقۀ قفقاز جنوبی32535210695810.22059/jcep.2026.390263.450302FAافشینکرمیاستادیار، گروه جغرافیا، دانشکدۀ ادبیات و علومانسانی، دانشگاه شهید چمران اهواز، اهواز، ایران0000-0003-0077-595XJournal Article20250409Introduction: The South Caucasus has long attracted the attention of regional and trans-regional powers because of its unique geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic location. The geographical location of this region and its location at the crossroads of roads leading to the Black Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, as well as the connection and linkage of Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East through the Caucasus, have all contributed to the strategic importance of this region and attracted various actors. For more than three decades, the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis has become one of the main challenges to the security and stability of the South Caucasus region. Accordingly, the South Caucasus security complex, previously known as a security zone under Russian influence, has become a chaotic security entity in recent decades due to a set of external and internal factors. The war marked a significant shift, altering the traditional balance of power and reducing Russia's historical dominance in favor of new actors like Turkey and Israel. Since late 2019, a set of factors, including shifts in the military balance, the intervention of external actors, and the weakening of state institutional structures, have influenced the spread and escalation of conflict. This study aims to model these fundamental contexts by developing and applying a four-dimensional analytical framework to the case of Azerbaijan and Armenia.<br>Research question: What factors are influencing the spread and escalation of the conflict between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia in the South Caucasus region?<br>Research hypothesis: The spread and escalation of the conflict are influenced by four interconnected factors: 1) the weakening of state institutional structures, 2) changes in the balance of power, 3) the role of regional and international actors, and 4) the degree of convergence in the global system.<br>Methodology and theoretical framework: This qualitative study uses thematic analysis with an exploratory-analytical approach and relies on documented data (reliable articles, books, and reports). The theoretical framework integrates several theories: fragile/failed state theory (for model 1), realist perspectives on the balance of power (for model 2), theories of foreign intervention and alliance politics (for model 3), and theories of complex interdependence and globalization (for model 4). Data analysis followed a systematic six-step thematic analysis process, generating initial codes that were organized into subthemes and ultimately into the four main thematic models. To ensure the validity and accuracy of the findings, the authors used careful peer review, clear process documentation, and consistent reference to evidence. The study develops a four-dimensional model to analyze the dynamics of this conflict.<br>Results and discussion: The findings confirm the hypotheses of all four models and reveal their interrelation in a vicious cycle of escalating tensions. Model 1 (Weakening of State Institutional Structures): A sharp asymmetry emerged between institutional strengthening in Azerbaijan (driven by energy revenues and centralized state-building) and institutional weakening in Armenia (marked by political instability, corruption, and governance challenges after 2018). This imbalance severely weakened Armenia's conflict-management capacity, exposed its vulnerability, and encouraged Azerbaijan's military action in 2020. Model 2 (shifts in the Balance of Power): Azerbaijan's sustained economic growth enabled a comprehensive military modernization program, particularly in drone warfare, with Turkish and Israeli support. This created a decisive qualitative military advantage and fundamentally altered the traditional balance of power. Armenia, struggling with economic constraints, failed to respond adequately, making a forceful territorial seizure a viable option for Azerbaijan. Model 3 (Role of Regional/International Actors): Asymmetric external support played a pivotal role. Azerbaijan benefited from strong, multilateral support (military, diplomatic, technological) from Turkey and Israel. In contrast, Armenia received only limited and inconsistent support from its traditional ally, Russia, which sought to balance its interests. This asymmetric empowerment reduced the feasibility of diplomatic solutions and increased the incentive for military action. Model 4 (Degree of Convergence in the Global System): Divergent levels of global and regional integration exacerbated perceived inequalities rather than reducing tensions. Azerbaijan has successfully integrated into global energy corridors and strategic partnerships, increasing its resources and international standing. Armenia faced relative isolation and economic dependence, mainly on Russia. This gap in systemic integration deepened strategic differences and fueled competing narratives. The discussion emphasizes that these models operate interactively. For example, external support (Model 3) directly increased Azerbaijan's power (Model 2), which in turn exploited Armenia's institutional weaknesses (Model 1), all within a context shaped by differential global integration (Model 4).<br>Conclusion: This study models the contexts of the spread and escalation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict using a robust four-dimensional framework. The analysis shows that the interaction of fragile domestic institutions, decisive shifts in the balance of power, asymmetric intervention by external actors, and divergent paths of global integration has created a self-reinforcing cycle of conflict escalation. The 2020 war was a definitive manifestation of this interaction. The conclusions emphasize that achieving lasting peace requires a comprehensive, multi-level approach that addresses all four dimensions: strengthening democratic institutions and governance (especially in Armenia), managing and balancing external interventions, creating mechanisms for collective security to adjust the balance of power, and promoting inclusive regional economic cooperation that benefits all parties. The proposed four-dimensional model provides a powerful analytical tool not only for understanding the South Caucasus conflict but also for examining the dynamics of interstate conflicts in other peripheral regions of the international system, where the complex interplay of domestic vulnerabilities, regional power shifts, and global linkages often exacerbates conflict.<span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">منطقۀ قفقاز جنوبی بهدلیل موقعیت ژئوپلیتیک منحصربهفرد خود همواره عرصۀ رقابت قدرتهای منطقهای و فرامنطقهای بوده و درگیری دیرپای قرهباغ میان جمهوری آذربایجان و ارمنستان در دهه اخیر با تشدید بیسابقهای روبهرو شده است. پرسش اصلی نوشتار این است که چه عواملی بر گسترش و تشدید این درگیری تأثیرگذار است؟ فرضیه آن است که گسترش و تشدید درگیری تحت تأثیر تعامل چهار عامل بههمپیوسته است: تضعیف یا تقویت ساختارهای نهادی دولت، تغییر در موازنۀ قوا، نقش بازیگران خارجی، و میزان همگرایی در نظام جهانی. این نوشتار با روش کیفی و رویکرد اکتشافی‑تحلیلی و با استفاده از تحلیل مضمون دادههای اسنادی انجام شده است. یافتهها نشان میدهد: نخست، تضعیف ساختارهای دولتی در ارمنستان در برابر تقویت نهادی دولت در جمهوری آذربایجان به توازن نداشتن ظرفیتهای مدیریت درگیری منجر شده است. دوم، الگوی نقش بازیگران خارجی نشانگر حمایت نامتقارن ترکیه و اسرائیل از جمهوری آذربایجان در برابر حمایت محدود روسیه از ارمنستان است که راهحلهای دیپلماتیک را کاهش داده است. سوم، الگوی تغییر توازن قوا نشاندهندۀ برتری نظامی و اقتصادی جمهوری آذربایجان و دگرگونی موازنۀ سنتی قدرت است. چهارم، الگوی همگرایی اقتصادی و فرهنگی نشان میدهد شکاف در یکپارچهسازی دو کشور در نظامهای جهانی و منطقهای به تشدید نابرابریهای ادراکی دامن زده است.</span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_106958_8d98430453a6f82afc36a2d22bc991ef.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823The Impact of Silk in the Iranian Khanates of the Caucasus (1747-1828)نقش ابریشم در خاننشینهای ایرانی قفقاز (۱۱۶۰-۱۲۴۴ق/۱۷۴۷-۱۸۲۸م)35338410768210.22059/jcep.2026.398913.450337FAسیدعلیمزینانیاستادیار، گروه تاریخ، دانشکدۀ ادبیات فارسی و زبانهای خارجی، دانشگاه علامۀ طباطبائی، تهران، ایران0000-0002-6919-4339Journal Article20250810Introduction: Since the establishment of the Safavid dynasty in the South Caucasus, after the overthrow of the regional Iranian dynasty of the Shirvanshahs, silk has been a decisive factor in the conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and Iran for control of the Caucasus. After Nader Shah's assassination, Iranian authority in the region gradually declined, leading to the emergence of numerous khanates. These khanates, largely modeled on Iranian statecraft, survived for at least six decades until the 1810s, when Russia began military intervention in the South Caucasus. During this long period of autonomy, silk significantly shaped social, economic, political, and bureaucratic life in ways that have not yet been fully explored<span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">.</span><br>Research question: This article examines the position of silk in the Iranian khanates and how they strengthened their independence among three neighboring powers.<br>Research hypothesis: Silk and sericulture were key to the establishment and survival of the Iranian khanates in the South Caucasus.<br>Methodology: Using a descriptive approach, this study presents the geographical distribution of silk production centers, the quantity and value of silk produced, the taxes and duties imposed on silk, and silk's role in the Khanates' social structure.<br>Results and discussion: Geographically, silk production was concentrated in the western parts of the Shirvan Khanate, the eastern half, and the southernmost territories of the Shakki Khanate. Ordubad was another silk production center in the region. Other centers, such as Qubostan Mahal in Shirvan Khandom and Dizakh and the Zangzur Mahals in Gharabagh, were less important for silk production. With 107 silk-producing villages, the total value of production reached 53,893 silver rubles. It is not surprising that silk was the main source of four major taxes in the region: mal-va-zhat, daroughgi, tojih, and sursat. In addition, high production levels led to specific silk-based taxes. In the Khanate of Shakki, taxes such as Din-ipiki, Bazarlik, and Dastgahbashi were collected in this way, while in the Khanate of Shirvan, the Sha'rban was imposed. In Nakhjavan, the Kolek tax included silk, and officials taxed each mulberry tree separately.<br>In all khanabads, silk played a vital role in organizing the residential and agricultural landscapes; in some villages, all four components of silk production-mulberry orchards, silk embroidery workshops, silk weaving workshops, and dyeing workshops-existed simultaneously. The silk fields were cultivated by sharecroppers (landless sharecroppers) who received half of the harvest as their salary. Some fabrics were woven in villages such as Mov, Dari, and Kasan, and sometimes the Khan asked villagers to hand over silk clothes, tablecloths, or nightgowns as part of their fee. However, the quality of these fabrics could not compete with that of Yazd or Kashan.<br>In the silk production process, elite women were not merely tax farmers; some oversaw their own silk enterprises, including the silk production centers in the village of Al-Khas in Sedenrud, a district of the Shirvan Khanate. Different Khanates often granted silk-producing villages to their favored nobles or assigned them to nobles, mirzas, and nokars in exchange for their debts. Finally, the silk harvest season, at the end of September, was an important time in the lives of rural serfs in the Khanates. Silk in the Caucasus functioned as a time-space organizer that, alongside other aspects of life, strengthened the region's political, social, and economic life.<br>Conclusion: This article provides a broad overview of the importance of silk in the Iranian Khanates, based on available data. In this regard, the text begins with a brief overview of the history of silk production and trade. Then, rarely, the text maps the geographical distribution of silk production centers to help the audience visualize the discussion. As the maps show, it is not surprising that silk played a role similar to that of oil in some modern monocrop countries for the Khanate. In this context, silk was a common element in the economic and social life of the nobility and the common people in the South Caucasus. Ten of fifty taxes in the region were levied partly or entirely on silk; approximately 11% of the region’s economic volume was derived from silk; and silk, along with geographical and religious factors, was a powerful force in organizing the time-space of local communities. The silk industry often transcended gender divisions, and women's participation was not uncommon.<span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">همیشه جنوب قفقاز از جهت تنوع ویژگیهای جغرافیایی، قومی، زبانی و غنای منابع برای خودگردانی استعداد زیادی داشته است. یکی از آن منابع غنی ابریشم بود. با سقوط حکومت افشاریه و پیدایش خلأ سیاسی در جنوب قفقاز، ابریشم به یکی از تکیهگاههای خانها و مدعیان محلی برای پیشبرد برنامههای سیاسی خودشان تبدیل شد. مسئلۀ اصلی این نوشتار بررسی ابعاد مختلف نقشآفرینی ابریشم در حیات سیاسی، اقتصادی و اجتماعی خاننشینهای نُه گانه در جنوب قفقاز است. فرضۀ اصلی این است که ابریشم در تشکیل و تداوم خاننشینها نقش اصلی را داشته است. برای بررسی این</span> <span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">مسئله در این نوشتار از روش کیفی و رهیافت توصیفیتحلیلی بهره میبریم. یافتههای این بررسی نشان میدهد که نهتنها ابریشم</span> <span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">دستکم 11 درصد از کل ارزش اقتصاد خاننشینها را تشکیل میداده است، بلکه از میان 50 نوع مالیات رایج در این قلمروها 4 مالیات اصلی اتکای چشمگیری به ابریشم داشتهاند و 4 مالیات فرعی نیز بهشکل اختصاصی بر مبنای ابریشم تعریف شده بوده است. از نظر جغرافیایی مهمترین کانون انباشت تولید ابریشم مرزهای شرقی، خاننشین شکی و مرزهای غربی، خاننشین شیروان بوده است. از نظر جنسیتی زنان اشراف در سازماندهی برداشت و فرآوری و بافت پارچۀ ابریشمی سهم پررنگی داشتهاند. از نظر سازماندهی زمان و فضا، فرآوری ابریشم، بافت پارچۀ ابریشمی و رنگآمیزی آن در کنار ایجاد باغ درخت توت و همچنین زمان برداشت محصول ابریشم و موعد پرداخت مالیات آن، الگوی زندگی غالب را در برخی روستاها شکل میداد</span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_107682_a9ade2b5e7319e5b79162f2e0e5ef440.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823Iran's Threat Perception from Türkiye: From the Second Karabakh War to the Fall of Bashar al-Assadادراک تهدید ایران از ترکیه: از جنگ دوم قرهباغ تا سقوط بشار اسد38541110654710.22059/jcep.2026.397452.450332FAامیرنیاکوییاستاد، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکدۀ ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه گیلان، رشت، ایران0000-0001-8865-8824امیررهامشجاعیدانشجوی دکتری روابط بینالملل، دانشکدۀ ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه گیلان، رشت، ایران0009-0001-8788-2522Journal Article20250626Introduction: Measuring actors' perceptions of threat from one another is a complex, multi-layered issue, and a comprehensive examination of its dimensions faces many obstacles. However, actors' behavior clearly signals when they feel threatened by one another, including a wide range of elite positions on the threat and reciprocal actions taken in response to the threatening actor. Iran and Türkiye, as two neighboring actors with a common border, are considered rivals with opposing interests in regions including the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, despite establishing an acceptable level of political and diplomatic relations and sharing some security concerns over the past few decades. Türkiye's unwavering support for Azerbaijan, the spread of threats of Pan-Turkism, its growing influence in Central Asia, as seen in cases such as the Organization of Turkic-Speaking States, and the serious conflict of interests between these two actors in Syria and Iraq are just some of the areas of conflict between these two regional powers. Because threat perception is one of the most important factors shaping countries' foreign policy and a basis for policymaking, this article explains the evolution of Iran's threat perception of Türkiye by presenting a conceptual model and identifying the factors that shape this process.<br>Research question: What impact did the series of events and trends from the Second Karabakh War to the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government have on the increased sense of threat to Iran from Türkiye, and in what abstract form can these changes be explained?<br>Research hypothesis: This article shows that a series of events and trends in regions including the South Caucasus, Iraq, and Syria, particularly the fall of Assad as Iran’s regional ally, have increased Iran’s perception of Türkiye as a threatening state.<br>Methodology: The authors present an innovative theoretical model that includes the threat perception mechanism of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a process-tracking method. Threat perception motivates a wide range of behaviors, from cooperation to conflict, and has been central to theories of war, alliances, and conflict resolution. Threat perception in each country is shaped by various internal and external variables.<br>Results and discussion: The Second Karabakh War altered the equations of the South Caucasus near the Iranian borders and shifted the balance of power in favor of Baku. Baku's victory in this war was initially widely welcomed by Iranian officials. However, Israel's role in the Republic of Azerbaijan, its influence on the region's dynamics, and the presence of a third actor, Türkiye, in the Israel-Azerbaijan-Türkiye triangle gradually heightened Iran's sensitivity toward this axis, including Türkiye. The Gaza War further increased Iran's perception of the Turkish threat. The Gaza War and continued economic cooperation between Israel and Türkiye also heightened Iranian elites' perception of the threat and sensitivity toward Türkiye, intensifying the atmosphere of distrust toward Türkiye.<br>The most important event in Iran’s threat perception of Türkiye during 2020-2024 was the fall of Assad and the rise of Turkish-backed forces. This, along with the reduction of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s geopolitical influence in the region, led to the representation of Türkiye as a cooperative actor and partner centered on the US-Israeli (as the most prominent enemies in the Islamic Republic of Iran's threat perception system). The increased perception of the Iranian threat to Türkiye, together with the existing grounds and areas of disagreement between these two actors, makes it all the more necessary to adopt mechanisms and approaches to anticipate, prevent, and manage future tensions, especially in relation to the South Caucasus, Syria, and Iraq. This is especially so because, as explained in this article, if current trends continue, the likelihood of direct and indirect military confrontation between the two actors in the conflict zones has significantly increased.<br>Conclusion: The Islamic Republic of Iran's threat-perception system centers on portraying the United States and Israel as the primary enemies, and accordingly, threats from other actors are also categorized. Explaining and analyzing Iran's perception of the Turkish threat is a specific and complex case study. Undoubtedly, factors such as Türkiye's membership in NATO, the proximity and shared border between the two countries, historical challenges, cultural and linguistic affinities, regional geopolitical rivalries, and differing perceptions of political Islam have always shaped how each actor perceives the other's threat. However, according to the research's conceptual model, Türkiye’s perception of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran should be examined in the context of this actor’s relationship with the United States and Israel, as well as Iran’s perception of the issue. This is clearly evident in explaining the change in Iran’s perception of the Turkish threat from the Second Karabakh War to the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.<span lang="AR-SA">در این نوشتار بهدنبال تبیین و تحلیل سیر تحول ادراک تهدید ایران از ترکیه در دورۀ زمانی پس از جنگ دوم قرهباغ (2020) تا سقوط بشار اسد (2024) هستیم. پرسش اصلی این است که مجموعۀ رویدادها و روندها از جنگ دوم قرهباغ تا سقوط بشار اسد، چه تأثیری بر افزایش ادراک تهدید ایران از ترکیه داشته و این مسئله در چه قالب مفهومی تبیینپذیر است؟ فرضیۀ نوشتار این است که مجموعهای از رویدادها و روندها در چند سال اخیر در مناطقی از جمله قفقاز جنوبی، عراق و سوریه، ادراک تهدید جمهوری اسلامی ایران از ترکیه را افزایش دادهاند. این مسئله بهویژه پس از سقوط اسد بهعنوان متحد منطقهای ایران که همواره در راهبردهای سیاست خارجی جمهوری اسلامی ایران در قالب گفتمان مقاومت بخشی بسیار مهم بوده است، موجب عمومیت یافتن و افزایش ادراک تهدید از ترکیه در میان نخبگان سیاسی و فضای رسانهای ایران شده است. به نظر میرسد این مسئله، بر سیاستگذاریهای امنیتی ایران در آینده و ترتیبات امنیتی منطقه تأثیر بگذارد. برای سنجش فرضیه، مدل ابتکاری نظری در رابطه با سازوکار ادراک تهدید جمهوری اسلامی ایران را ارائه میدهیم و با روش کیفی و رویکرد توصیفیتحلیلی و استفاده از روش ردیابی فرایند، در پی پاسخ به پرسش و آزمون فرضیه هستیم. </span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_106547_0af3e9a754718b5d920adf25b5a11ae6.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823The Role of Anti-Security Coercion of Sanctions in Economic Ties between Iran and Russiaنقش جبر ضدامنیتی تحریم در پیوندهای اقتصادی ایران و روسیه41243710733210.22059/jcep.2024.378252.450228FAاکبرولی زادهاستادیار، گروه مطالعات منطقهای، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران0000-0003-2482-5034فردینافتخاریدانشجوی دکتری مطالعات منطقهای، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران0009-0006-4135-0244Journal Article20240815Introduction: Iran and Russia prioritize security, defense, and intelligence cooperation in their operational and substantive joint foreign policy, aiming to protect both sides’ stringent national security agendas and maintain regional order on the periphery. Meanwhile, the implementation and promotion of comprehensive sanctions against Russia, along with the freezing of its strategic assets, have intensified the perceptual alignment between Russian and Iranian leaders. They believe, among other things, that the West is untrustworthy and continues to seek hegemonic dominance, thereby posing an existential threat to them. From this perspective, economic and financial blows and severe sanctions aimed at weakening and harming Iran and Russia as target actors essentially pursue political and security goals, ranging from changing behaviors and decisions to altering regional and domestic systems, and ultimately regime change and overthrow from within.<br>Research question: How have Iran and Russia's evolving views on sanctions affected their economic relations since the war in Ukraine?<br>Research hypothesis: Iran’s and Russia’s security-oriented view of sanctions as a weapon for domestic subversion has led to bilateral economic interactions that address strategic economic security vulnerabilities through the selective development of economic relations.<br>Methodology: This study tests the hypothesis using causal process tracing and a conceptual framework of sanctions and regime change. This method identifies the causal mechanisms that drive the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable's outcome. The goal of causal process analysis is to evaluate the hypothesis and identify connections assumed to be part of the invisible ontological depth at the core of processes, yet still exist in reality. Mechanisms are process elements, each with its own logic and function in the sequence of events in the overall process.<br>Results and discussion: Since 1979, American foreign policy has sought to change the Iranian regime from within. The regime-change campaign began with sanctions, as seen in the U.S. imposition of secondary restrictions on Iran’s energy industry during the Bill Clinton administration in the 1990s. The campaign gained prominence after the regime change in Iraq, when some in the George W. Bush administration supported a military attack on Iran, while others preferred negotiations. Meanwhile, regime change from within was presented as a third, middle option between military force and diplomacy, meaning support for the Iranian regime's political opponents. As the international community became more united against Iran's nuclear program and the UN Security Council passed numerous sanctions resolutions, the United States and the European Union gradually shifted from targeted to comprehensive sanctions during the Obama administration.<br>As sanctions against Iran intensified and became more consolidated in volume and structure, Russian leaders gradually reached an agreement with Iranian elites and openly supported Iran's narrative about the ultimate goals of the sanctions. Amid the 2014 Ukraine crisis and the subsequent imposition of Western sanctions against Russia, Kremlin officials took a consistent stance, stating that the sanctions were not intended to change Russia's behavior but to overthrow the current Russian political system. Therefore, sanctions are seen as a common threat to the political stability of Iran and Russia, which, by reducing the assets and resources available to the governments, destabilize the economic pillars of political stability, leading to the emergence and spread of dissatisfaction in the social structures of the two countries, as well as reducing the ability to resist the illegitimate demands of the sanctioning countries. They have committed to creating an economic cooperation framework that protects strategically important regions from sanctions, aiming to counter the aforementioned consequences. Three major components shape this cooperation framework. First, the relationship between securing budget resources and covering the country's public expenses by maintaining profits from energy exports must be maintained. Second, the geo-economic space and corridors needed for trade and transport development must be protected; third, financial and economic transactions must avoid Western platforms, thereby reducing the dollar's harmful power.<br>Conclusion: The combined strategic deprivations from sanctions have a similar impact on political and security stability, even though Iran's and Russia's economies depend on oil revenues and do not appear complementary. However, the parties' willingness to mitigate these impacts creates joint added value that does not necessarily translate into a sharp improvement in economic relations or higher trade figures. This framework aims to create alternatives to Western deprivations in the minds and perceptions of citizens in both countries. Both Iran and Russia want to show that, while pursuing a hostile geopolitical strategy toward the West, each can rely on new partners and allies to counter the strategic effects of exclusion, offset sanctions, and build more sustainable alternatives to Western models.<span lang="AR-SA">تحریم به ابزاری ویرانگر در سیاست خارجی غرب علیه دشمنان و رقیبان آن تبدیل شده است که برای پیگیری گروهی از هدفها در شکلهای متنوع به کار گرفته میشود. از جمله این هدفها تغییر رژیم و براندازی است که در مورد ایران پیاده شده است و خود را در قالب تهدید امنیت ملی در بیش از سه دهه نشان داده است. با تشکیل کارزار تحریمی گستردۀ غرب علیه روسیه، این کشور با توجه به روند و هدفهای تحریمهای ایران بهعنوان یکی از شریکان اقتصادی خود، به این درک مشابه با ایران رسید. این نوشتار با تشریح بستر مفهومی این نگاه مشترک به ابزار تحریم، به این پرسش پاسخ میدهد که تحول نگاه ایران و روسیه به تحریم، روابط اقتصادی آنها را بعد از شروع جنگ اوکراین چگونه هدایت کرده است؟ فرضیۀ مورد بررسی با اتکا به روش فرآیندیابی علی، این است که درک امنیتی ایران و روسیه از تحریم بهعنوان ابزار براندازی از درون، روابط اقتصادی دوجانبۀ آنها را بهسوی رفع نقاط آسیبپذیر امنیت اقتصادی راهبردی، از راه سازوکار توسعۀ گزینشی روابط اقتصادی هدایت کرده است. در نتیجه، دو کشور رویارویی با انزوا از راهگذرهای ارتباطی از راه توسعۀ مسیرهای ترانزیتی جایگزین مانند راهگذر شمالجنوب، تضمین صادرات انرژی با کاربست روشهای ناهمتراز مانند ناوگان کشتیهای ناشناس موسوم به «ناوگان ارواح» و متنوعکردن ارزهای مبادلاتی با توسعۀ سازوکارهای پرداخت مبتنی بر ارزهای ملی را بهعنوان دستورکار راهبردی به کار گرفتهاند.</span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_107332_d8dda79582b3de3e7ee1f3f92af93ea5.pdfدانشگاه تهرانمطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی2008-086719120260823The Impact of New Trends in the Geo-Economy of Central Eurasia on the Formation of Greater Central Asiaتأثیر گرایههای جدید در ژئواکونومی اوراسیای مرکزی بر شکلگیری آسیای مرکزی بزرگ43846410788710.22059/jcep.2026.393834.450315FAمهدیهدایتی شهیدانیدانشیار، گروه علوم سیاسی و روابط بینالملل، دانشکدۀ ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه گیلان، رشت، ایران0000-0002-5145-8885امیدرحیمیدکتری روابط بینالملل، دانشکدۀ ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه گیلان، رشت، ایران0009-0005-0234-2017Journal Article20250506Introduction: The geo-economy of Central Eurasia is one of the most contested geo-economic spaces in the world. Because of its rich energy resources, strategic minerals, and important role in global supply chains, Central Eurasia plays a decisive role in major global geo-economic initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the war in Ukraine, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus have shifted the region's geo-economic landscape by introducing new trends. This situation has had a more profound impact on landlocked Central Asia, exacerbating its geo-economic constraints. Accordingly, the region is experiencing new geo-economic approaches that could redefine the geo-economic interests of various actors.<br>Research question: How do emerging trends in Central Eurasia's geo-economy affect the prospects for Greater Central Asia?<br>Research hypothesis: New trends in the geo-economy of Central Eurasia, such as the redefinition of the transit network and the rebalancing of energy resource distribution, have led to the expansion of the geo-economy of Central Asia, connecting this region inter-regionally with South Asia to the south and the South Caucasus to the west.<br>Methodology and theoretical framework: Process tracing is the main method used in this paper. This method is often used for qualitative case studies. More precisely, process tracing involves analyzing evidence related to processes, sequences, and linkages in a case study, or to developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that may explain the phenomenon. Process tracing aims to develop a cumulative theory in the social sciences and to explain individual cases theoretically. The theoretical framework combines two concepts: geo-economy and inter-regional linkages. In this combined understanding, it has been concluded that the foreign policy behavior pattern of countries with geo-economic constraints, such as being landlocked, emerges as geo-economic expansion, which strengthens regional integration and develops inter-regional ties.<br>Results and discussion: The geo-economy of Central Eurasia has experienced various developments in the decade of 2014–2024. The Russia-Ukraine war, which led to sanctions against Russia’s geo-economy; geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh war since 2020; the withdrawal of international coalition forces from Afghanistan; the rise of the Taliban; and, finally, developments in Russia's Arctic policy are among the important factors. These developments have led to new Central Eurasian trends. The first trend is the redefinition of Central Eurasia's transit network. This process occurred in four practical directions: first, sanctions-related restrictions on Russian, Central Eurasian, and international supply chains; second, the development of southern routes by defining new initiatives for Afghanistan and the South Caucasus; third, the creation of alternatives to East-West routes centered on the Middle Corridor; and fourth, the transformation of North-South routes (North-South Corridor to the Arctic).<br>The second trend is “rebalancing of energy resources distribution,” which has taken three forms: first, Russia’s strategic shift in energy export routes to the south and east; second, Europe’s focus on securing energy from non-Russian Central Eurasian sources; and third, the diversification of Central Eurasian energy export routes to reduce dependence on Russia. These trends have shaped Greater Central Asia's evolution in three general directions. The first is geo-economic expansion southward, with a focus on connectivity to South Asia. This expansion has been advanced through projects such as TRACECA, the Trans-Afghan corridor, the TAPI pipeline, the CASA-1000 power transmission project, and the development of the Afghan railway network.<br>The second path is Central Asia's westward geo-economic expansion and its connection to the South Caucasus. This idea is currently being developed through the Middle Corridor, the construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, and the rerouting of Kazakh oil exports through the BTC pipeline. The third path is eastward geo-economic expansion, which is less developed than the other two. This idea, known as CAMCA, envisages a geo-economic connection among Central Asia, Mongolia, the South Caucasus, and Afghanistan through an inter-regional mechanism. Although these three paths are conceptually separate, in practice and in the behavioral model of the Central Asian countries, they are pursued in parallel but in an unbalanced manner.<br>Conclusion: Central Asia's geo-economic expansion has gained more supporters within global supply chains, including China and Europe, and has also formed an interactive mechanism with peripheral regions. On another level, the interests of regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, India, and Pakistan are affected by these geo-economic trends and, in some cases, will significantly shape the prospects of Greater Central Asia. In such circumstances, the impact of the strategic interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which borders Central Asia and Central Eurasia, is inevitable. The dynamics of interaction and conflict mean that, in some regions, Iran's geo-economic interests are undermined and ignored, which can even have geopolitical consequences for Iran; in other areas, they create new capabilities and opportunities. <br>In this framework, Iran, as a neighbor with inescapable historical, infrastructural, and geographical ties to Central Asia and Central Eurasia, should be an effective actor in this geo-economic evolution. This influence will be possible through the development of inter-regional linkages focused on energy, transit, and trade, leading to enhanced geo-economic interdependence. At the same time, Iran can define an independent initiative alongside or in contrast to existing initiatives for the transformation of Greater Central Asia pursued by major powers. Accordingly, Iran has strong capacity to play an important role in geo-economic expansion to the south and can even define strategic interests along eastern routes. However, the geo-economic expansion of Greater Central Asia to the west, centered on Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus, is not compatible with Iran's interests and could create future geopolitical challenges due to inter-regional geo-economic linkages. These inter-regional geo-economic linkages could also change patterns of friendship and hostility and create new political mechanisms.<span lang="AR-SA">منطقۀ اوراسیای مرکزی بهدلیل تحولات مختلف ژئواکونومیک در محیط داخلی و پیرامونیاش در طول یک دهۀ اخیر زیر تأثیر موضوعهای متعددی قرار گرفته است. این تحولات بهطور مشخص در نتیجۀ تحولات در اوکراین، افغانستان، قفقاز جنوبی و قطب شمال شکل گرفته و سبب شکلگرفتن گرایه</span><span dir="LTR"></span><span lang="AR-SA">های جدید در ژئواکونومی اوراسیای مرکزی شدهاند. این گرایهها در چارچوب پویاییهای تعاملی، رفتارهای دولتهای زیرسیستمهای منطقهای اوراسیای مرکزی مانند آسیای مرکزی را در تأثیر قرار دادهاند و بهطور مشخص در زمینۀ پیوندهای ژئواکونومیکی میانمنطقهای بهعنوان گشودگی ژئواکونومیک تأثیرهای عمیقی را برجای گذاشتهاند. ازاینرو در این نوشتار در پی پاسخ به این پرسش هستیم که گرایه</span><span dir="LTR"></span><span lang="AR-SA">های جدید در ژئواکونومی اوراسیای مرکزی چگونه بر چشمانداز شکلگیری آسیای مرکزی بزرگ تأثیر میگذارند؟ در پاسخ این فرضیه مطرح میشود که روندهای جدید در ژئواکونومی اوراسیای مرکزی مانند بازتعریف شبکۀ حملونقل و متوازنسازی توزیع منابع انرژی، به گشودگی ژئواکونومیک آسیای مرکزی منجر شده است که در قالب اتصال میانمنطقهای به آسیای جنوبی در جنوب و قفقاز جنوبی در غرب متصل میشود. اثبات فرضیه با روش ردیابی فرایند مبتنی بر چارچوب مفهومی ژئواکونومی و پیوند میانمنطقهای انجام میشود. یافتههای نوشتار نشان میدهد که گرایه</span><span dir="LTR"></span><span lang="AR-SA">های جدید در ژئواکونومی اوراسیای مرکزی، پیوندهای میانمنطقهای آسیای مرکزی در سه جهت جنوبی، غربی و شرقی را تقویت کرده و مبتنی بر پویاییهای تعاملی و تعارضی میان قدرتهای بزرگ و مبتنی بر بازیگری و منافع قدرتهای منطقهای، چشمانداز شکلگیری آسیای مرکزی بزرگ را زیر تأثیر قرار میدهند. </span>https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_107887_77e79e1a1385b629cd81d019efa13764.pdf