https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/ Central Eurasia Studies en daily 1 Wed, 21 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0330 Wed, 21 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0330 https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_106117.html https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_105685.html Introduction: In the twenty-first century, information has emerged as an autonomous domain of conflict, functioning as a strategic battlefield rather than merely a supplementary instrument for political or military action. Russia’s confrontation with the West, particularly the United States and NATO, illustrates this transformation clearly. The dominant Western narrative depicts Russia as an aggressive actor employing propaganda, cyberattacks, troll networks, and disinformation to undermine democratic institutions, exploit social divisions, and expand geopolitical influence. From this standpoint, Moscow’s actions appear as coordinated assaults on the liberal international order. Yet such interpretations often overlook the strategic logic shaping Russian behavior. From the Kremlin’s perspective, many asymmetric intelligence and information activities constitute defensive responses to perceived existential threats. NATO enlargement, “color revolutions” and the securitization of the Euro-Atlantic environment reinforce a deeply embedded sense of encirclement within Russian strategic culture. Cold War legacies-particularly Soviet “active measures” and the concept of “reflexive control”-continue to frame information operations as tools for protecting sovereignty and identity rather than instruments of pure aggression. This study challenges prevailing Western assumptions by tracing the historical, doctrinal, and strategic foundations of Russian information warfare and arguing that these campaigns often operate as defensive counter-narratives.Research question: The main question asks to what extent Russia’s information warfare can be interpreted as a defensive counter-narrative responding to Western policies and discourses, rather than as unprovoked aggression. Existing literature focuses predominantly on how Russia conducts cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and media manipulation, while paying limited attention to the underlying motivations. This study shifts the focus toward the doctrinal foundations, security perceptions, and cultural-historical roots that shape Moscow’s information strategy.Research hypothesis: Russian information warfare reflects a defensive, asymmetric strategy rooted in a siege mentality and post–Cold War insecurity, employing defensive, reflexive control, cyber, and narrative tools to deter threats and offset weaknesses.Methodology and theoretical framework: This research employs qualitative narrative analysis to examine how Russian intelligence and information activities are interpreted, justified, and normalized. Unlike quantitative approaches that emphasize frequency, scale, or network metrics, narrative analysis reveals meaning, structure, and function in texts produced by state and non-state actors. The corpus includes doctrines, official statements, analytical reports, and policy documents on Russian information operations from 2014 to 2025, alongside Western responses. Data collection relies on documentary and library-based sources. The theoretical framework integrates strategic culture theory, particularly Snyder’s emphasis on historical vulnerability, distrust of the West, and the “besieged fortress” mindset, with Jervis’s security dilemma, explaining how defensive actions may be misinterpreted as offensive, thereby generating escalation.Results and discussion: The findings indicate that Russian information warfare constitutes a coherent and historically embedded strategy rather than opportunistic aggression. It operates across three interrelated dimensions: historical continuity, doctrinal evolution, and operational practice. Historically, Russia has long regarded information as central to statecraft; Soviet-era institutions normalized manipulation as a permanent feature of conflict. Experiences such as the Chechen wars reinforced the importance of narrative dominance, demonstrating how military success could be undermined by hostile framing. Doctrinal evolution after Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) formalized information as a critical battlefield, emphasizing reflexive control and cognitive targeting. The doctrine of “active defense” legitimizes preventive measures abroad as homeland protection, explaining why actions perceived as aggressive in the West are understood in Moscow as deterrence. Operationally, Russia employs a dense ecosystem of state agencies, intelligence services, media outlets, online platforms, and cyber units, using techniques such as information preemption, narrative flooding, hacking, and exploitation of frozen conflicts. These practices are anchored in a strategic narrative portraying Russia as a victim of Western encirclement. The analysis reveals a self-reinforcing dynamic: each side views its own behavior as defensive while interpreting the other as hostile, deepening mistrust and sustaining escalation.Conclusion: Russia’s information warfare is best understood as a defensive counter-narrative rooted in historical vulnerability, siege culture, and asymmetric adaptation. Although tactics such as cyber operations and disinformation often appear offensive, they are framed as mechanisms to preserve sovereignty and deter perceived threats. Paradoxically, this defensive logic reproduces the security dilemma it seeks to escape, as mutual suspicion entrenches escalation. By integrating strategic culture and narrative analysis, this study moves beyond simplistic offensive–defensive binaries and underscores the importance of addressing narrative dynamics in efforts toward de-escalation. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_104375.html Introduction: The theoretical approach governing the organization of data and the conclusion of analyses is neo-realism, based on the components of Kent Waltz, which emphasizes the use of a system theory based on outside-in explanation to analyze trends. We also use the qualitative analysis and explanation method, which involves an approach to studying the content of data and the perceptions of experts on the topic under discussion. To examine the hypothesis, we first outline the background of the research, presenting existing analyses in this field. Then, theoretical foundations based on neo-realism are proposed. Next, Russia's role in the West Asian region and its strategic dimensions will be examined. And finally, we will discuss the strategic implications of this situation and conclude the discussions.West Asia has long been a scene of great powers' competition, but the dynamics of regional order have undergone a significant transformation in the post-Arab revolutions era. As the United States reassesses its long-standing security commitments, a vacuum has emerged vacuum increasingly filled by a rising Russia. From military intervention in Syria to sophisticated diplomatic moves to balance regional rivalries, Moscow has transformed its role from an external observer to a central power broker. This article examines how Russia's strategic actions have contributed to the formation of a new sub-regional order characterized by multipolarity, fluid alliances, and transactional partnerships. Through a comprehensive analysis of Russia's bilateral and multilateral interactions, this study aims to illuminate the drivers and constraints shaping the geopolitical landscape of West Asia.In the post-Cold War era and the era of globalization, the transition towards emerging regional and transregional levels has increased. The complexity of cooperation and interactions among actors, as well as the multi-dimensionality of the international actors, has led to the formation of such regional arrangements. Understanding regional campaigns is one of the most crucial needs in analyzing global politics within the current international system, because it is through these campaigns that interactions at the broader international level are strengthened and, as a result, the foreign policy strategies of each actor are defined. Therefore, the main issue addressed in this article is the developments that have occurred after the Arab revolutions and the Syrian civil war, where we are no longer faced with a unilateral order from the United States, and Russia is also seeking to impose and regulate an order in which it considers itself a partner.Research question: What is Russia's role in the emergence of a new sub-regional order in West Asia?Research hypothesis: Russia's role in the West Asia region is due to the requirements of the system, which has inevitably placed the country's foreign policy strategy on a path of influencing and playing a role in the region, thereby taking the initiative in other regions.Methodology and Theoretical Framework: Neo-Realism accepts concepts used in classical realism, such as anarchy, power, national interests, and the distinction between domestic and international politics. However, the most important criticism of this theory is that it is reductionist. Therefore, structural realism employs the level of analysis of the international system rather than the national level of analysis to understand international politics. Waltz states that theories of international politics focus on individual or national causes, but theories that focus on international causes are systemic theories. Unlike classical realists, he separates international politics from economics, national politics, and other factors, and assigns an independent role to the international structure. The dominant paradigm of international relations is the balance of power. Therefore, a good theory of international relations explains the balance of power in all events.Results and discussion: Given the expansion of Russia's power in recent years, the country is seeking to expand its influence using political, military, and economic tools in the West Asian region. Russia does not recognize the idea of a rules-based order promoted by the United States and the West, because the West seeks to create rules and impose them on the global community. By rejecting the post-Soviet international system and regional arrangements, Russia has sought a return to the post-World War II order. As a result, Russia finds itself caught between the powers that determine the fate of the world. They compete with each other, and mutual respect for interests and spheres of influence is the only factor that prevents this competition. This role, envisioned by the Russian leader, aims to establish a new order in West Asia that incorporates aspects of Russia's foreign policies and strategies.Conclusion: An examination of the contexts, dimensions, and consequences of the strategic competition between Russia and the United States reveals that Russia's view of the international system is geopolitical, security, and realistic, which has turned international relations into a dangerous and unreliable environment. Despite such a tense, critical, and militarized atmosphere, Russia, due to systemic pressures, seeks to play a role in important regions such as West Asia based on the Waltzian realism envisioned by Kent Waltz. Because the strategic wisdom of the Russian elite is well aware of the dimensions of the West Asia region's capacity and position in shaping the international system and its influence in this region, which can affect the policies of actors in other regions. In fact, the attempt to maximize the power of Waltzian realism is evident in Russia's foreign policy strategy towards the region. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_104725.html Introduction: The Ukrainian war in 2022 has become a protracted geopolitical crisis with far-reaching political and economic consequences for regional and global orders. The Eurasian Economic Union, as a regional bloc deeply intertwined with Russia, has faced unprecedented challenges in the wake of the conflict. Using a three-level analytical framework (national, regional, and international), this article examines the multifaceted impacts of the Ukrainian crisis on the Eurasian Economic Union. Politically, the war has exacerbated internal asymmetries and strategic divergences among member states, particularly in foreign policy alignments and their perceptions of sovereignty. Economically, the crisis has disrupted intra-union trade, weakened investment flows, and exposed vulnerabilities in food security, energy supply, and financial connectivity. Furthermore, this study assesses the adaptive strategies adopted by the Eurasian Economic Union, such as the establishment of the Eurasian Reinsurance Company and efforts to diversify economic partnerships to ensure institutional resilience and maintain the momentum of integration.Research question: What political and economic consequences has the Ukrainian crisis had for the Eurasian Economic Union and what adaptive strategies has the Union adopted to achieve economic and institutional integration in the Eurasian region?Research hypothesis: The Ukrainian war has significantly disrupted the political and economic dynamics of the Eurasian Economic Union and exposed structural asymmetries rooted in the varying degrees of dependence of member states on Russia. Despite these challenges, the Union has implemented adaptive strategies aimed at increasing intra-union trade, strengthening institutional initiatives, and improving economic coordination. These measures seek not only to maintain cohesion but also to facilitate long-term integration, resilience to external shocks, and the capacity to balance divergent national interests while promoting regional stability and sustainable development.Methodology and theoretical framework: This study uses a historical-comparative approach combined with the institutionalist framework of international relations. This approach allows us to examine how institutions shape state behavior and foster cooperation over time. Focusing on the Eurasian Economic Union, institutionalism helps analyze the union's capacities and limitations in responding to the Ukrainian crisis, maintaining regional cohesion, and facilitating coordinated political action among member states.Results and discussion: The Ukrainian crisis poses a major challenge to the Eurasian Economic Union, exposing structural and systemic issues that hinder deeper integration among member states. Politically, Russia’s dominant position creates asymmetries that force countries such as Kazakhstan and Belarus to adjust their policies, thereby straining cohesion within the union. Divergent approaches, including Belarus’s outspoken support for Russia in contrast to the more cautious positions of other members, highlight the ongoing tension between political trust and economic integration. In response, member states have increasingly diversified their foreign policies, reduced dependence on Moscow, and engaged with external powers to secure strategic autonomy and maintain balanced regional relations. Economically, the conflict has disrupted global supply chains, fueled food insecurity, and caused sharp increases in energy costs, which in turn have reduced competitiveness and slowed industrial growth. Companies closely tied to Russian trade have faced difficulties in accessing alternative markets and sourcing critical inputs. The Eurasian Economic Union has implemented comprehensive strategies to mitigate the effects of sanctions, such as parallel import mechanisms, settlements in national currencies, cooperation with BRICS countries to circumvent SWIFT restrictions, and reforms in customs and tariffs. In addition, the establishment of the Eurasian Insurance Company, investment in logistics infrastructure, and development of strong domestic food security frameworks strengthened the economic resilience of the union. In addition, coordinated policies to support small and medium-sized enterprises, diversification of energy sources, and increased regional financial cooperation have helped reduce vulnerabilities. Taken together, these measures not only support “Sustainable Development Goals” but also strengthen functional integration, enabling the Eurasian Economic Union to weather ongoing geopolitical fluctuations while maintaining regional economic cohesion, stability, and long-term strategic coordination.Conclusion: The Ukrainian crisis has posed significant challenges to the cohesion and strategic direction of the Eurasian Economic Union, exposing fundamental political differences among member states and exacerbating external pressures from Western sanctions and geopolitical tensions. Despite these obstacles, the Union has demonstrated remarkable economic resilience, supported by the growth of intra-union trade, the diversification of foreign policy strategies, and the changing strategic position of members such as Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan as emerging logistical and economic hubs within the region. The Union’s capacity to maintain integrity and functional cooperation will largely depend on its ability to balance divergent national interests, further strengthen economic and institutional cooperation, and enhance policy coordination mechanisms. In addition, proactive investment in infrastructure, the development of robust supply chains, and regional financial collaboration will be crucial to reducing vulnerabilities and ensuring long-term stability. Continuous adjustment to internal asymmetries and external shocks will determine the success of the Eurasian Economic Union in consolidating regional cohesion, fostering sustainable economic growth, and strengthening its strategic relevance in an increasingly complex global environment. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_104868.html Introduction: The quest for an optimal development model has been a central and enduring theme throughout Russian history. From the Westernizing ambitions of the Romanov Tsars in the 16th century to the centralized five-year plans of the Soviet era, the country's economic strategy has continually evolved in response to domestic ambitions and external pressures. The post-Soviet transition to a market economy, and then the era of state capitalism under Vladimir Putin from 2000 onwards, marked more significant changes. However, the profound political and economic turmoil of the past decade, marked by rising tensions with the West since 2014 and culminating in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, has potentially led to the most rapid and strategic shift in Russian economic policies to date. This period of exogenous shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and severe international sanctions, has exposed significant vulnerabilities, challenged the coherence between official strategic documents and operational plans, and shifted the national economic discourse decisively towards a "resistance economy" (anti-sanctions economy) model. This research is based on the theoretical perspective of systems theory, which provides a robust framework for analyzing this development. In this framework, the Russian political economy is conceptualized as a complex system operating within the broader metasystem of the international environment. External shocks- such as pandemics, war, and sanctions - are analyzed as disruptive inputs that destabilize the equilibrium of the system. In response, the system produces policy outputs - new economic strategies and development programs, adaptive mechanisms to restore stability and ensure its survival. This perspective allows us to understand the evolution of the Russian development model not as a linear progression but as a dynamic, iterative process of systemic adaptation to intense external pressures. As a result, the transformation of the structure of the economic model structure in the Russian Federation has emerged as a complex and vital issue that requires in-depth research. By examining official Russian development documents, this study aims to systematically extract and analyze the pattern of changing perspectives of the Russian government.Research question: The main question that arises is how unforeseen crises have caused the development outlook in Russia to shift towards a resistance economy model.Research hypothesis: The hypothesis is that under the unforeseen crises of recent years, Russian policymakers have defined the country's ideal development model as one aligned with the principles of a resistance economy.Methodology and theoretical framework: This qualitative study, using systematic content analysis, examines policy documents, strategic roadmaps, and government reports related to economic development published on the official website of the Government of the Russian Federation. This research covers three distinct and crucial time periods: the pre-pandemic period (2018-2019), the pandemic crisis (2020-2021), and the period after the invasion of Ukraine (2022-2023). The collected textual data are carefully coded and thematically analyzed using ATLAS.ti software, facilitating structured and repeatable identification of emerging patterns and changes in policy discourse. The analysis is conceptually guided by the framework of systems theory. This perspective assumes that profound external shocks-such as a global pandemic, geopolitical conflict, and international sanctions-act as disruptive inputs that destabilize the existing system, Russia's established model of economic governance.Results and discussion: The findings of this analysis show that the Russian Federation has gradually adopted a set of adaptive and flexible policy approaches in direct response to the successive crises it has faced. A clear evolutionary path is evident over three distinct periods. In the pre-pandemic era (2018-2019), policy discourse was largely focused on fostering broad-based economic growth and deepening international engagement, with an emphasis on global value chain integration and foreign investment as key drivers of development. However, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021) acted as a critical juncture and prompted a significant rethink. The policy has shifted significantly from purely growth-oriented criteria to addressing acute domestic social vulnerabilities. Key themes that emerged included reducing social inequality, ensuring public health security, and strengthening sustainable domestic supply chains for essential goods. This period marked a nascent stage of resilience-building, where the government began to prioritize domestic social stability as a prerequisite for long-term economic security. This evolutionary path definitively reached its peak in the period following the invasion of Ukraine (2022-2023). Faced with unprecedented external pressure from comprehensive international sanctions, the policy framework shifted definitively towards an explicit “resistance economy” model. Analysis of government documents from this phase reveals a clear emphasis on strategic self-sufficiency, a sharp acceleration of import substitution programs in critical sectors (such as technology, manufacturing, and agriculture), and a systematic policy of reducing dependence on foreign financial systems and markets. The vocabulary of official strategy became saturated with terms such as "economic sovereignty", "technological independence", and "structural adaptation". Discussion of these findings strongly supports the research hypothesis. The evidence suggests that each exogenous crisis-the pandemic and then the war has acted as a powerful catalyst, successively exposing specific and increasing systemic vulnerabilities. The pandemic exposed the fragility of social structures and just-in-time supply chains, while war and sanctions exposed the profound dangers of deep integration into Western-dominated economic and financial systems. In response, Russian policymakers have been forced to continually redefine the country’s economic priorities.Conclusion: The study concludes that a series of unforeseen crises acted as the main catalyst, leading to the rapid evolution of Russia's economic development model away from globalized liberal patterns and towards a distinct doctrine of resistance economy. This profound shift underscores the growing strategic priority of resilience-based frameworks, which are increasingly seen as essential for sovereign states to maintain systemic stability and operational autonomy in the face of intensifying external shocks. The case of Russia provides a compelling and timely example of the core tenets of this model. In practice, this has manifested itself as a strategic prioritization of strengthening critical domestic infrastructure - particularly in energy, logistics, and finance - to reduce single points of failure. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_105453.html Introduction: The late 16th and early 17th centuries witnessed intense military conflicts between the Safavid Empire and the Ottoman Empire, which transformed the political and social dynamics of the northwestern border regions of Iran. One of the key regions affected was Karabakh, a strategically important province located at the crossroads of imperial rivalries. This period witnessed a unique and complex phenomenon known as "Dönük," which referred to specific tribal groups that switched their allegiances from the Safavid state to the Ottoman Empire during the Ottoman occupation from approximately 1587 to 1605. This concept gained special importance after the reconquest of the region by the Safavids in 1605, and in official narratives, it was accompanied by severe punishments such as execution, forced exile, and confiscation of property. Such accounts are frequently found in the works of Safavid historians, including Junabadi, Mulla Jalal Munajjim, and Iskandar Beg Turkman, who described these punishments in detail. Among these narratives are accounts of the massacre of all inhabitants of Ganja by royal decree and the exile of the Dönük tribes to Farahabad in Mazandaran and the forced migration of certain tribes to Sujas (Zanjan) and Darabjird (Fars). However, these narratives raise serious questions about the uniformity and intensity of such reprisals.Research question: The main question of this study is whether all Dönük groups actually betrayed the Safavids, whether harsh punishments were applied uniformly, and whether this phenomenon reflected complex and diverse local reactions or a simplified narrative of betrayal found in official Safavid sources.Research hypothesis: This study hypothesizes that the Dönük phenomenon in Karabakh was not a uniform act of treachery but a survival strategy with local conditions. It also assumes that Safavid responses were selective and pragmatic, with violent reprisals targeting only a small, irreconcilable faction.Methodology: This research uses a comparative historical methodology designed to distinguish between central court narratives and localized administrative accounts. The main collection includes Iskandar Beg Turkman’s Alam-ara-ye Abbasi, which represents the official Safavid perspective shaped by geographical and temporal distance from Karabakh, and Fazli Beg Khuzani Isfahani’s Afzal al-Tavarikh, whose proximity to local elites and administrative structures provides detailed insights into regional social dynamics. These texts are supplemented with additional chronicles such as Junabadi’s Rawzat al-Safaviyya and historical notes of Mulla Jalal Munajjim. The method proceeds through a critique of sources, cross-referencing parallel accounts, and identifying discrepancies in reported punishments, tribal behavior, and administrative actions. By examining this information, this study reconstructs the diverse reactions of the Donak tribes and assesses the extent to which official narratives about the reprisals are exaggerated for ideological or propaganda purposes.Results and discussion: The findings suggest that Safavid retaliation during the reconquest of Karabakh was much more selective and limited than official accounts suggest. Only a small group of Dönük tribes that consistently maintained their loyalty to the Ottomans and resisted Safavid advances faced violent retaliation. These cases, while notable, are the exceptions rather than the rule. Most tribes that temporarily accepted Ottoman rule did so under immediate pressures-security, livelihood, and political calculations. When Safavid forces returned to retake the region in the early eleventh century AH, most Dönük groups aligned with the Safavids and actively participated in military operations. Local sources emphasize that these tribes were not subjected to the harsh punishments-execution, forced migration, and confiscation-that are prominently mentioned in the central chronicles. This study suggests that reported mass migrations to Farahabad, Sujas, and Darabjird were either symbolic or exaggerated or were never implemented and remained merely as nominal programs. On the other hand, several emirs associated with Dönük tribes received renewed authority, new land, or administrative positions as part of a broader Safavid strategy aimed at stabilizing the border through compromise rather than coercion. An important finding concerns the distortion of some deaths. Events described in Alam-ara-ye Abbasi chronicles as punitive executions were, according to Afzal al-Tavarikh, the results of inter-tribal conflicts, personal vendettas, or struggles for leadership. These discrepancies indicate that the court historian's distance from local events contributed to simplified and ideological depictions of tribal behavior. The comparative evidence, therefore, rejects the notion of a homogeneous betrayal. Instead, it shows the phenomenon of Dönük as a flexible, situational strategy shaped by the uncertainties of Ottoman occupation and the evolving power of the Safavids. Similarly, Safavid policy seems to have been influenced by frontier pragmatism, prioritizing tribal reintegration and regional stability over pervasive revenge.Conclusion: This research concludes that the Dönük phenomenon in Karabakh was a multi-layered response to imperial conflicts, rather than a single act of disloyalty. While the small group that maintained their unwavering loyalty to the Ottomans faced severe punishment, the vast majority of Dönüks were reintegrated without severe reprisals and, in several cases, even promoted in the administrative hierarchy. The contrast between central and local sources suggests that official Safavid historiography exaggerated punitive measures for political or ideological purposes, while local narratives present a more accurate picture that emphasizes negotiation, selective amnesty, and strategic cooptation. By re-evaluating these differing narratives, this study highlights a Safavid border policy that was guided not by a rigid ideology of revenge but by practical compromise aimed at stabilizing a volatile border region. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_106062.html Introduction: Kazakhstan, as a landlocked country at the heart of Eurasia, uses its distinct geopolitical position to actively engage with diverse international partners on transit and infrastructure projects in Central Asia. The country has made significant investments in its logistics infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s priorities for sustainable transport development focus on modernizing the road network, expanding railway capacity, and increasing regional connectivity.China’s Belt and Road Initiative, whose investments are aligned with the Kazakh government's development programs in energy, industry, transport, and agriculture, has positioned Kazakhstan as a strategic gateway to its major economic corridors. On the other hand, India is expanding its presence in the Eurasian region through the North–South International Transport Corridor. This corridor offers the shortest transit routes between the Eurasian Economic Union and key regions such as South Asia and is of significant strategic value for Kazakhstan. Overall, Kazakhstan aims to establish itself as a vital Eurasian transit hub by leading the great power competition and maintaining strategic balance through diverse partnerships. Indeed, as the largest and most economically important country in Central Asia, Kazakhstan is at the heart of the strategic competition between the emerging powers of India and China, acting as the intersection of their competing transit corridors.Research question: What approach has Kazakhstan taken towards the infrastructure diplomacy and transit corridor initiatives of the two rival powers?Research hypothesis: Kazakhstan's foreign policy towards India and China’s transit strategies is guided by a hedging strategy to reduce vulnerability, prevent the dominance of any single power, preserve national independence, and shift the country’s position from a region of competition to a hub of regional connectivity and cooperation.Methodology: Using a qualitative methodology and relying on the conceptual frameworks of “multi-vector policy and hedging strategy,” this research analyzes the substantive evidence related to Kazakhstan’s hedging policy towards the competition between India and China. The data were collected through library and documentary sources.Results and discussion: Kazakhstan is combining its traditional “multi-vector” foreign policy with a more sophisticated hedging strategy to navigate a challenging international environment characterized by sanctions, infrastructure risks, and great power competition. Moving beyond mere neutrality, Kazakhstan focuses on diversifying vulnerabilities and sources of gain through three defined policy paths that are systematically measured through policy instruments, tangible outcomes, and formal agreements.Kazakhstan’s engagement with China and India is an example of this complex hedging, whereby the country insulates itself from risks without changing geopolitical alignments through institutional, procedural, and infrastructural hedging. As part of its institutional hedging, Kazakhstan joined the World Trade Organization in 2015, adopted international standards for cross-border cargo, and leveraged the unified legal framework of the Eurasian Economic Union to attract Chinese investment while gaining greater regulatory control over its transit relations.Moreover, by formally aligning China’s Belt and Road Initiative with its national development agenda, Kazakhstan has actively channeled China’s capital and geopolitical mobility toward financing its strategic infrastructure priorities. This synergy has been a conscious move to de-risk development costs, build independent transit assets, and transform from a potential ally into an indispensable logistical partner in relations with great powers.In the area of ​​infrastructure hedging, Kazakhstan has invested heavily in building a multimodal and diversified transit network, including the Northern, Middle (Trans-Caspian), Southern, and Europe-China corridors. This route diversity reduces dependence on any single partner or route and strengthens the country’s position as a Eurasian logistics hub. In the area of ​​procedural, institutional, and infrastructure risk hedging, Astana is diversifying its financial resources by attracting capital from multilateral development banks such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and advancing projects within the framework of transparent international rules to prevent the monopolistic influence of major powers.Conclusion: Kazakhstan serves as a strategic arena for China-India competition in Eurasia. China is using it as a pivot for its Belt and Road Initiative, deepening Kazakhstan's economic dependence through massive infrastructure investments and trade linkages. India is countering this through the North-South International Transport Corridor and multilateral cooperation, appealing to shared multipolar principles. Kazakhstan is not a passive actor; it is consciously employing a sophisticated hedging strategy within the framework of multi-vectorism. By simultaneously engaging with the India-China communication corridors, Astana avoids exclusive dependence on any single power. This balanced policy has enabled Astana to gain economic benefits from both rivals, become a vital transportation hub, reduce vulnerability to unilateral dependence, and strengthen its political leverage. Thus, Kazakhstan has turned great-power competition into an opportunity to strengthen its sovereignty, strategic connectivity, and capacity to create an independent balance in the region https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_105684.html Introduction: Recent years have witnessed changes in the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape of the South Caucasus and West Asia, which have led to fundamental changes in the dynamics of cooperation between the countries of these regions. The historical relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have made significant progress since 2020, evolving towards strategic cooperation in economic, security, and political aspects. The geographical and political positions of these countries, along with regional changes following events such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the signing of the Abraham Accords, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, have created a favorable environment for changes in their interactions. These developments have strengthened bilateral relations and highlighted the pivotal role of these actors in the geopolitical equations of two vital regions. Examining this relationship is crucial for a deeper understanding of how regional and global developments affect foreign policies and international cooperation.Research question: How and through what stages have the Republic of Azerbaijan and the UAE relations advanced from friendly relations to a strategic partnership after 2020? In addition, which regional developments have acted as facilitators, obstacles, and opportunity creators?Research hypothesis: The developments in West Asia and the South Caucasus after 2020, through a three-stage process including facilitating, barrier-breaking, and opportunity-creating developments, have reduced political and geopolitical barriers between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the UAE and paved the way for a sustainable strategic partnership.Methodology and theoretical framework: This is a qualitative study based on a descriptive-analytical approach. The data are compiled and analyzed in the form of an innovative conceptual model including three categories of developments: "facilitators, barrier-breakers, and opportunity-creators." This model aims to reveal the strategic dimensions and dynamics of the relations between the two countries after 2020.- Facilitating developments:This pillar of the model looks at developments that create the initial energy and psychological, political, and geopolitical context necessary to enhance relations. However, due to structural barriers or regional tensions, they are unable to create sustainable strategic cooperation.- Barrier-breaking developments:The second pillar of this model includes events and mechanisms that facilitate the practical path and political will to deepen cooperation. Removing obstacles refers to the removal or reduction of political, diplomatic, and security barriers that previously hindered the development of positive relations.- Opportunity-creating developments:The third pillar of the conceptual model focuses on events and conditions that facilitate the realization of extensive and effective cooperation. In simpler terms, it involves changes in structure and conditions that create new opportunities for collaboration and relationship development. Joint projects are defined and initiated to create opportunities for sustainable exploitation of existing capacities.These three categories operate in a chain and are interdependent:Facilitating creates the initial context for rapprochement.Barrier-breakers make this context practical and achievable.Opportunity-creation elevates cooperation from a potential level to an actual and sustainable level. Thus, the process of forming cooperation between the UAE and the Republic of Azerbaijan is not the result of sporadic events, but continuous and staged. This model shows how independent developments, in a meaningful chain, change the structure of relations. Results and discussion: The main developments can be divided into three general categories based on their role in deepening cooperation.- The Facilitators:The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 changed the Republic of Azerbaijan’s geopolitical and military position, increasing its power and solidifying its position as a key player in the region. This attracted the attention of trans-regional actors, including the UAE. In addition, the signing of the Abraham Accords between the UAE, Israel, and Bahrain created a new diplomatic and security framework, removing obstacles and paving the way for strategic cooperation.- The Barrier Breakers:The improvement of diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and the UAE played an important role in removing obstacles to cooperation between the UAE and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Turkey, a strategic ally of the Republic of Azerbaijan, was essential in facilitating the reconciliation process between the two countries. By reducing conflicts and increasing cooperation, a favorable environment was created for deepening bilateral relations.- The Opportunity Creators:The war between Russia and Ukraine since 2022 has changed the balance of power and the European energy market. The Republic of Azerbaijan, with its energy resources and strategic location, has become an important partner for providing reliable energy to European markets. The UAE has made significant investments in clean energy and the development of the Republic of Azerbaijan's electricity and gas infrastructure, and has increased its cooperation with the country. The decline in Russian influence in the South Caucasus has also paved the way for the UAE to increase its political and economic influence in Azerbaijan.Analysis of these categories shows that the closeness of relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the UAE is not the result of a single event, but rather the culmination of structural, security, and economic factors that, through interaction and mutual influence, have formed a framework for long-term cooperation.Conclusion: The deepening of strategic relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the UAE is the result of a complex, multi-layered, and phased process that has been achieved through structural changes, the removal of political obstacles, and the exploitation of geopolitical opportunities. The Neo-realist framework has been an effective tool for analyzing these dynamics. The relationship between the two countries is an example of smart regional action. They have achieved sustainable and effective cooperation by leveraging diverse capacities and opportunities while overcoming challenges. This analytical model can serve as a guide for understanding complex regional interactions and identifying opportunities to transform crises into cooperation.  https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_105631.html Introduction: The history of Iran's view of the East can be traced back to the slogan of the Islamic Revolution, "Neither East, Nor West". The idea was not consistent with the dominant pattern of behavior in the international system during the Cold War. After Iran separated from the Western bloc, it did not join the Eastern bloc. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of American unilateralism, the arrowhead of the Islamic Republic's confrontational policy was mainly pointed towards the West. Iran did not gain reliable experience in cooperation with the West, and this increased tensions and deepened differences between them. The signing of the JCPOA agreement, which was violated by Trump and its subsequent failure, is a turning point in Iran's strategic distance from the United States and its Western allies. In such circumstances, Iran has turned more seriously to a balancing foreign policy to counter Western pressures.The Look East policy found a different basis and logic and was placed on the strategic agenda. In such a way, the Presidents of Iran and Russia signed the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" treaty in Moscow on January 17, 2025, to upgrade the level of relations. Looking to the East, with various geographical issues, has chosen Russia as a pillar of balance, which, like the Islamic Republic, is engaged in structural confrontation with the United States and Europe and has been the target of Western sanctions policies. On the other hand, Russia is a neighbor with significant strategic, military, and even economic capabilities that, under the environmental economic pressures resulting from the war, need cooperation with Iran to advance its goals.Research question: What are the foundations of balancing in Iran's Look East policy? What impact has this had on Russia's political position?Research hypothesis: Balancing in Iran's Look East policy has been based on competitive foundations, which have led to the elevation of Russia's position to the level of a strategic and geopolitical alliance.Methodology and theoretical framework: This article aims to explain Russia’s position in the Look East policy and thus provide a critical reading of the results of deepening bilateral relations. The methodological framework for achieving this goal is based on the mixed levels of analysis approach and the Event-Based Trend Impact Analysis method. Inferring trends from important events that are considered turning points is the basis of this method. The events are the raw data, and the researcher focuses on finding connections between them in order to identify specific trends. Trends are considered the results of related events. Successive historical and current influential events (independent variable) are analyzed within the framework of a specific theory, and the relationship between them is examined to explain and formulate foreign policy trends (dependent variables). The method advances research in three layers: describing the current situation, mapping the most likely future trends, and prescribing relevant policy strategies. Therefore, the events considered turning points in Iran's Look East policy and Russia's foreign policy are explained at two levels of analysis: macro (structural changes in the international system) and meso (foreign policymaking in response to systemic changes). This method is used in the theoretical framework of competitive balancing as a foreign policy model.Results and discussion: The geographical scope of Iran's Look East policy varies. This diversity has led some experts to define the East as the main target of this approach. Russia is not geographically limited to the East in its Look East policy, but it has an Eastern and Asian identity. What is considered the basic logic of the Look East policy is the rise of Asia and the decline of the United States. The evolution of Iranian foreign policy, which gradually showed Tehran’s greater divergence from the West and the United States, provided a new definition of the Look East approach, in a way that led it to prioritize emerging powers, including Russia. On the other hand, Russian leaders who think independently of interests in the light of the Eurasianist approach have adopted a strategy of balancing against the United States.In this strategic framework, Russia becomes one of the main centers of the Look East policy, based on situational variables (as a great strategic power) and policy-making variables (counter-hegemonic confrontation). Necessities in various areas have driven the Look East policy towards Russia. The most important strategic imperatives include balancing the United States' international and regional standings in West Asia. The most important geopolitical imperatives include participation in managing regional security crises, peaceful nuclear interactions, and defense-arms exchanges. Finally, the most important geo-economic imperatives include lifting sanctions, transit cooperation, and Eurasianism.Conclusion: The Russian pillar of the Look East policy is both a necessity and a strategic choice. Deepening relations with Russia is a strategic necessity for Iran, primarily to counter the hegemony of the West led by the United States. On the one hand, the focus of the Look East policy on Russia as a strategic choice is because it is both a great power in the East and a neighbor of Iran. Based on the international structural changes (the process of transition from the West to the East), Iran has tried to strengthen its relations with emerging powers that participate in the alternative international structure.Also, given Russia's foreign policy approach, which is military-security in nature, and its role and intervention in West Asian affairs, this country is at the center of the strategic and military orientation of the Look East policy. As a result, the two countries' efforts to achieve their common goals are determined by creating a balance in foreign policy. The trend of international structural changes indicates a redistribution of power rather than a transfer of power, and this trend requires that the Look East policy be balanced with orientations in other geographical regions to expand the diversity of Iran's foreign relations. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_105452.html Introduction: After the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, and the emergence of a liberal post-Cold War environment, it was expected that non-democratic regimes in Central Asia would transition to democracy. But the political situation turned out to be different. After independence, all five Central Asian leaders, who shared a communist background, adopted presidential systems and all of them, to varying degrees, exhibited various authoritarian traits. In these regimes, protesters and dissidents were suppressed or nearly eliminated; civil and political rights were minimized, and the emphasis was on providing economic and social goods and maintaining stability. This took precedence over political freedoms. Two years after the independence, the ruling elites succeeded in suppressing or absorbing political opponents. Key opposition leaders were arrested, exiled or joined the ruling governments. For a decade (1991-2001), all Central Asian regimes had a score between 5.5 and 7 on the Freedom Index (a combination of political rights and civil liberties), a situation that has persisted to this day.After independence, Central Asian regimes adopted democratic processes such as elections, but their true nature remained authoritarian. Indeed, through the interplay of domestic dynamics and international norms, different types of authoritarian regimes emerged in each of these countries. According to the Freedom House report, all five Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, are known as authoritarian regimes. When it comes to the secret of the persistence of political regimes, two factors are usually cited: democratic legitimacy and efficiency. However, despite their lack of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness, Central Asian political regimes have maintained power for years, successfully suppressing their opponents and eliminating their critics. Their stability and continuity have now become a complex issue. The present study focuses on identifying the mechanisms of persistence of ineffective non-democratic regimes in Central Asia.Research question: The research question is: What strategies do these regimes use to continue their survival?Research hypothesis: The stability of these regimes is not accidental, but the product of rational elite design at two levels. The first level is internal, such as repression, hereditary networks, symbolic elections and personality cult. The second level is external, such as security and political alliances, presence in regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and cooperation with major powers such as China and Russia.Methodology and theoretical framework: In this article, based on the rational choice theory of new institutionalism, the strategies for the survival of ineffective undemocratic regimes in Central Asia are discussed. Rational choice, as one of the most important branches of new-institutionalism theory, can help clarify how structures emerge, evolve, and persist. The theoretical model of this research shows that political decision-makers in this region, based on the intensity of the political threat and the amount of financial resources, always choose a strategy that allows them to maintain their power at the lowest cost. Exploratory and comparative methods have been used in the specific content analysis. Data have been collected through library sources, official reports, and the World Bank Website.Results and discussion: Inefficient and undemocratic regimes in Central Asia ensure their survival by relying on hard and soft strategies. The research findings show that the ruling elites in this region, by calculating the costs and benefits of political actions, use strategies such as repression, propaganda, rent distribution, symbolic elections, protectionism, and regional and international coalition building. They use these strategies in a way that secures the interests of the ruling regime and ensures loyalty to themselves.Conclusion: Persistence is not only the product of repression, but also the result of conscious, calculated, and purposeful choices by political actors to maximize their own interests. Coercion, repression, propaganda, media control, personality cults, symbolic elections, and financial support allow Asian non-democratic regimes to maintain their power at home and prevent the formation of opposition coalitions abroad. Regionalism and cooperation with great powers provide the basis for the support of foreign powers. The country's rulers intimidate opponents with a strategy of repression. They reduce discontent with propaganda. They create and maintain their power with a cult of personality, and they maintain the appearance of popular rule by holding elections. They ensure the loyalty of domestic and foreign elites by paying rent. Even in conditions of economic inefficiency, this model allows non-democratic regimes to survive. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_105981.html Introduction: The sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union against the Russian Federation following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 are considered one of the most extensive sanctions regimes in modern history. However, the effectiveness of these sanctions in playing a decisive role in ending the aforementioned crisis remains a subject of scientific and political debate. The Ukrainian crisis– which culminated in the 2022 invasion– is not simply a military conflict, but a multidimensional and complex phenomenon rooted in historical, geopolitical, security, and economic factors. The crisis has presented the international order with one of its greatest challenges since the end of the Cold War and has provoked a response from the Western community, led by the United States and the European Union. The central part of this response has been the imposition of an unprecedented set of economic, financial, and political sanctions against Russia, designed to alter the Kremlin’s strategic calculations, undermine the economic foundations supporting the war, and increase the costs of continuing the conflict. Therefore, examining the place of these sanctions in the intertwined network of causes and factors of the Ukrainian crisis is essential to understanding the dimensions of this conflict and to assessing the effectiveness of economic pressure tools in international relations.Research question: What is the position of the European Union and United States sanctions against Russia within the context of the variables shaping and perpetuating the Ukrainian crisis, and what scenarios can be drawn for the future?Research hypothesis: The present study is not a hypothesis test, but rather seeks to discover the variables and drivers that affect the sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States against Russia in the Ukraine crisis.Methodology: The present study is a quantitative study in terms of trend research, and its overall quality is based on the scenario writing process. In this study, the general scenario-based planning model was used. This model is one of the most common and accepted approaches to scenario writing and has wide application and relevance, including in the field of international issues. The aforementioned model begins with explaining the problem and identifying the components, and ends with analyzing the driving forces and existing uncertainties, developing and describing scenarios, and proposing strategic options.Results and discussion: Based on the structural analysis using Miqmac software, this system has a complex power structure and variable dependencies, which are classified into four main quadrants. This analysis is based on the logic of structural analysis and complex systems theory, which is manifested in the MicMac method. The software output shows that out of the fifteen selected variables, one variable was identified in the group of influential variables (textural or determinant), seven variables in the group of dichotomous variables (four risk variables, three variables as target variables), one variable in the group of influenced variables and five variables in the group of independent (or lever) variables. Finally, this system has a monitoring variable called “Russian fiscal flexibility,” and it is the only factor that has the greatest impact on the other variables. Among the 15 key variables identified, “Russian technology spin-off” was identified as the main influential variable, and “Russian fiscal flexibility” as the key moderating variable. Also, “China’s response to secondary sanctions” is a bimodal variable with high potential to create breaking points in the system. Among the two-state variables and the adjustment variable, two variables have been selected as the focus of the scenarios because they play the greatest role in the uncertainty and future of the system: One is the variable “China’s reaction to secondary sanctions” (a binary variable), which determines whether the pressure of sanctions on Russia is intensified or neutralized. The other is the variable "Russian fiscal flexibility" (adjustment variable), which is the result and at the same time determines the effectiveness of the other variables. Russia's ability to withstand shocks is key to its survival in this economic war. Based on these two pivotal variables, four possible scenarios were drawn: “perfect storm”, “strategic deadlock”, “new bipolar world”, and “collapse and chaos”.Conclusion: The conclusion is that the effectiveness of sanctions is highly dependent on their interaction with domestic (e.g., Russian economic resilience) and external (e.g., Chinese position) factors and cannot be analyzed in isolation. This research shows that Ukraine's crisis management requires a systemic understanding of these interrelationships. These scenarios show how China’s response as an external determinant and Russia’s fiscal flexibility as an internal determinant could shape the future of this complex system. The MicMac analysis confirms that these two variables are the key factors with the greatest impact and uncertainty and are therefore the best choice for designing Wizard scenarios. The future will likely be a combination of elements of these scenarios, but each of these paths has very different implications for global security and stability. This research clearly shows that univariate, linear analyses of the complex Ukrainian crisis are inadequate and misleading. Only by considering the interconnected network of variables and their dynamic interaction can a realistic understanding of the dimensions of the crisis be achieved. Sanctions, while powerful and unprecedented, are not a magic weapon. Their effectiveness depends on the interaction of other factors, some of which (such as China’s reaction) are even beyond the West's control. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_105009.html Introduction: This extensive study examines the evolution of the Doctrine of State Immunity under domestic law in selected Eurasian countries: Türkiye, China, Russia, Ukraine, and Iran. The countries were chosen for inclusion because they represent a wide variety of legal traditions. They are important players within the Eurasian region, both geopolitically and having experienced accelerated growth recently through new laws regarding sovereign immunity, and are among the most important countries for regional economic and political cooperation within Eurasia today.State immunity, which stems from the principle of sovereign equality, has been recognized as a customary and binding rule of international law since before the existence of nation-states. In recent years, there has been a significant trend among states moving from absolute immunity to limited immunity, driven by emerging concepts such as human rights, violations of peremptory norms, and the distinction between imperial and administrative legal acts (acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis). Accordingly, this research will examine how these developments have occurred.Research question: In this regard, the research answers the following fundamental question: In what ways has the concept of state immunity developed in domestic law and judicial application in these countries, and what similarities and differences do countries show in their approaches to the concept of immunity?Research hypothesis: This study assumes that, despite cultural and legal differences, they are gradually changing along similar paths away from absolute immunity to restrictive immunity, although the pace and form of implementation differ.Methodology: The methodological approach of this research is comparative-analytical, and the required data have been collected through library and documentary studies of relevant laws, judicial procedures, and cases of the countries under study. This approach will conduct a preliminary systematic analysis of domestic laws, court decisions, and international conventions.Results and discussion: These findings point to the evolving complexity of state immunity in the relevant jurisdictions studied. State immunity in Türkiye has gradually developed through legislation and judicial interpretation, especially after the Private International Law and International Civil Procedure Code of 1982. Turkish Courts have increasingly recognized exceptions to immunity, especially in commercial activities, while also showing a willingness to challenge immunity in counter-terrorism contexts. In China, this development has been marked by the passage of the Foreign Government Immunities Law in 2023, which formally adopted the doctrine of restrictive immunity in relation to commercial activities. This is in stark contrast to China’s traditional position of absolute immunity, although it has remained conservative on human rights exceptions and universal jurisdiction.Russia’s path is set by the 2015 Federal Law on Jurisdictional Immunities, which includes the principle of reciprocity and is a step towards limited immunity, particularly for commercial matters. However, like China, Russia has remained conservative when it comes to addressing immunity exceptions to human rights violations. The Ukrainian experience represents a significant development, as the 2022 decision of the country’s Supreme Court to reject the Russian Federation’s immunity in cases arising from military aggression demonstrates how egregious violations of international law can overwhelm traditional protections of immunity.Iran’s approach has always been that of reciprocity in all its interactions, as rightly stated in the 2012 Iranian Jurisdiction Law. However, it is more evident that this influence is expanding in Iran's legal, diplomatic, and economic relations with Eurasian countries, especially in strategic areas such as trade, investment, and energy cooperation.Conclusion: The study concludes that although legal traditions and cultural contexts for the countries we studied vary, there is a general trend towards restrictive immunity across all locations, but that movement is occurring at different speeds. This convergence reflects the broader evolution of international law itself, which seeks to find a balance between traditional state immunity and the protection of international trade or human rights.Our comparative-analytical study highlights the different paths toward the new status quo: China and Russia have adopted laws (laws of 2023 and 2015, respectively) showing hesitant approaches to human rights exceptions; Türkiye has limited its immunity mainly through judicial interpretation, while recently introducing limited exceptions to combat terrorism; the Ukrainian Supreme Court decision in 2022 is likely to be seen as a turning point for denying Russia immunity as a consequence of military aggression; and Iran's reciprocity practice, which affects its relations with Eurasian partners. Taken together, the above studies show that the evolution of state immunity represents a clear redefinition of sovereignty, or at least a shift away from concepts of absolute immunity, in which human rights protection and trade facilitation gradually replace the protection of state immunity. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_104376.html Introduction: One of the important tools used within the framework of international pressure against Russia after its aggression against Ukraine is economic sanctions, which were the reaction of many Western countries and the Western world in general, as a form of punishment for actions that consider Russia an aggressor. One related issue still under debate is the effectiveness of the sanctions regime against Russia. Therefore, this research aims to understand, describe, and measure the effectiveness of economic sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine from February 2022 to November 2023. The importance of the issue lies in examining economic sanctions in the context of Russia's attack on Ukraine, which can help clarify the extent of the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia. Therefore, the necessity of this research stems from the fact that previous researchers have examined this event from different perspectives. Through their research, it was found that there is no single, comprehensive study that focuses solely on the effectiveness of economic sanctions against Russia (2022-2023). Previous research has used a quantitative or qualitative approach, often using a case study research method, and has focused on various issues, including the legal dimension of sanctions effectiveness, trade relations, and sanctions packages of different actors.Research question: This article seeks to answer the question, “To what extent have EU economic sanctions against Russia been effective in its invasion of Ukraine (2022-2023)?"Research hypothesis: The hypothesis of this research is based on the claim that the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union against Russia in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from 2022 to 2023 have varying degrees of effectiveness and will have a significant impact from the perspective of compliance, international and domestic symbolism.Methodology and theoretical framework: Drawing on Lindsay's theory of sanctions effectiveness, this study assesses the effectiveness of economic sanctions in relation to five separate objectives: compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, and domestic symbolism. The present study uses a mixed-methods study and considers a sequential exploratory design appropriate for its approach. This method begins with the collection and analysis of qualitative data, followed by the collection and analysis of quantitative data, and finally leads to interpretation. Therefore, data were collected through documentary, library, and virtual sources. Then, with the help of Lindsey's theory, a semi-structured questionnaire was developed by the researcher and distributed to 44 identified experts, including university professors and individuals in the fields of sanctions and international political economy. This study adopts a purposive non-probability sampling design, employing the fuzzy delphi method to elicit expert judgments.Results and discussion: Since this research aimed to examine the effectiveness of the European Union's economic sanctions against Russia, the data were evaluated based on five objectives and criteria (compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, and domestic symbolism) and using the fuzzy delphi method. The results of this analysis are as follows; The average level of agreement in the compliance criterion is 0.441 and in the subversion criterion, 0.347 and deterrence, 0.631 in international symbolism and 0.636 in domestic symbolism, meaning that the effectiveness of the EU sanctions regime against Russia from 2022 to 2023 in compliance objectives, international symbolism and domestic symbolism is 63%, and from the perspective of compliance and subversion, 44 percent and 34 percent, respectively. Cronbach's alpha was calculated using SPSS 25 software andits value was 0.725, indicating acceptable reliability of this questionnaire.Conclusion: There is a consensus that the effectiveness of economic sanctions is linked to the goals of the sending governments. If economic sanctions fail to achieve their officially stated goals, they may still serve various and unclear agendas, unclear programs with their own effectiveness, which explains why sanctions remain a popular tool in foreign policy. Therefore, for this purpose, this research has used Lindsay's five-dimensional framework to assess the effectiveness of sanctions in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The results show that the European Union sanctions regime against Russia during Russia's invasion of Ukraine (2022-2023) was effective and successful in terms of adapting to international and domestic symbolism but was not significantly effective in terms of adaptation and subversion.According to the analysis, it can be admitted that they have not been successful. This level of effectiveness suggests that the EU sanctions regime has been considered relatively effective in terms of deterrence against specific targeted actions (Russia) as well as in conveying a symbolic message at the international and domestic levels, but in terms of compliance, it is clear that the sanctions regime has a relatively weaker impact on the implementation or compliance of measures imposed by the target (Russia) or other relevant actors. This indicates less success in achieving desired compliance with the imposed sanctions.Finally, regarding the effectiveness of subversion, this study also shows that the sanctions regime has been less effective in terms of subversion and has faced challenges. While the sanctions regime has shown moderate effectiveness in deterrence and symbolization, it has faced limitations in achieving compliance and subversion. Finally, this assessment demonstrates the complexity of the impact and effectiveness of sanctions in countering the consequences of the invasion of Ukraine, emphasizes the multifaceted nature of assessing the impact of sanctions and argues that the effectiveness of the sanction’s regime against Russia, despite numerous gaps and widespread criticism, is still used, which indicates the dominance of this concept in international political economy. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_104543.html Introduction: Since Pakistan's independence in 1947, it has shown a persistent sensitivity to the security and stability of Afghanistan, a concern deeply rooted in its perception of India as a regional threat. This concern has been a cornerstone of Pakistan’s "Strategic Depth" doctrine, a framework for foreign policy designed to use Afghanistan as a buffer zone to balance Indian influence and enhance Pakistan’s defensive capabilities. Over the decades, this doctrine has undergone significant evolution, reflecting changes in geopolitical realities, regional dynamics, and domestic pressures. These changes are particularly evident in three distinct historical phases: the Cold War period (1950s–1980s), the post-Cold War era of the 1990s, and the contemporary period after 2015, with a notable turning point after the Taliban returned to power in 2021. Understanding the evolution of this policy is critical not only for analyzing Pakistan’s foreign relations but also for understanding the broader security and geostrategic complexities of South and Southwest Asia. The interaction of historical rivalries, such as the enduring tensions with India over Kashmir and the dispute over the Durand Line with Afghanistan, alongside the emerging economic imperatives and international pressures, has continually changed Pakistan’s strategic approach towards its western neighbor.Research question: How has Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan, centered on the Strategic Depth doctrine, changed from the 1950s to 2025?Research hypothesis: This study proposes a hypothesis that outlines three evolutionary stages of this doctrine: Pakistan’s Strategic Depth policy was geopolitically driven during the Cold War, focusing on countering Soviet influence and Indian presence; in the 1990s, it combined geopolitics with ideology by supporting the Taliban to secure a friendly regime in Kabul and after the Taliban’s resurgence in 2021, it shifted towards a geoeconomic orientation, prioritizing economic cooperation and regional stability over military and ideological dominance. This hypothesis suggests that the adaptations of this doctrine reflect Pakistan’s responses to changing internal and external circumstances, including security challenges, economic imperatives, and the emergence of new strategic partnerships.Methodology and theoretical framework: This research uses an explanatory methodology to test the proposed hypothesis. This approach integrates historical analysis with contemporary policy assessment, drawing on primary and secondary sources. Historical data from the Cold War era and the 1990s are examined to trace the geopolitical and ideological foundations of the Strategic Depth doctrine. Developments since 2015, especially after 2021, are analyzed to assess the shift towards geoeconomic priorities. The study uses qualitative methods, including content analysis of policy documents, official statements, and scholarly literature, to identify patterns of change in Pakistan’s strategic behavior. Furthermore, the research contextualizes these developments within broader regional and international dynamics, such as NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, China’s growing influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, and India’s expanding role in Afghan affairs. This multifaceted methodology ensures a comprehensive understanding of how and why Pakistan’s foreign policy has evolved over the time period covered.Results and discussion: This analysis shows that Pakistan's strategic depth doctrine has undergone a fundamental transformation, influenced by a combination of internal vulnerabilities and external pressures. During the Cold War, this policy was rooted in geopolitical imperatives, as Pakistan aligned itself with Western powers to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan while using the country as a defensive buffer zone against India. In the 1990s, the doctrine became a combination of geopolitics and ideology, as Pakistan supported the Taliban to establish a pro-Islamabad regime in Kabul, to secure its western borders and limit India’s regional position. However, this had significant negative consequences, including increased domestic extremism, instability in tribal areas, and international isolation. After 2015 and especially after the resurgence of the Taliban in 2021, the doctrine shifted towards a geoeconomic focus. Key findings suggest that factors such as the destabilizing effects of protracted militancy, economic crises, global diplomatic pressures, and the emergence of China as a strategic partner have forced Pakistan to reconsider its approach. The withdrawal of NATO and the return of the Taliban were a turning point in testing this shift, making a move away from traditional security-oriented strategies toward fostering economic interdependence and regional stability. Evidence of this shift includes a reduction in military support for proxy forces, an increased emphasis on trade and connectivity projects with Afghanistan, and a pragmatic acceptance of India’s legitimate interests in the region, provided that these interests do not directly undermine Pakistan’s security.Conclusion: The study concludes that although the concept of strategic depth remains rooted in Pakistan's strategic culture, its implementation has changed in a way that prioritizes economic cooperation over ideological or military hegemony, representing a nuanced response to contemporary geopolitical and economic realities https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_105747.html Introduction: Throughout the Cold War, Türkiye’s Kemalist geopolitical outlook necessitated an alliance with the West and fostered a comparatively passive approach to regional developments, particularly within West Asia. The ascent of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power, however, underscored the imperative to re-evaluate the country’s geopolitical definition. According to the new elite, Türkiye needed to extricate itself from dependency on the West and its Western interests. Instead, the focus shifted towards pursuing an assertive foreign policy in its immediate neighborhood with a particular emphasis on West Asia. The primary objective of this study is to explain the transition toward this new geopolitical posture and, by extension, the resultant shift in Türkiye’s foreign policy. This transformation is particularly significant for both regional politics and the broader landscape of international relations.Research question: How did the transformation of Türkiye’s geopolitical view of West Asia become possible between 2003 and 2025?Hypothesis: The core argument presented here is that the redefinition of national identity from a Pro-Western stance to a Neo-Ottomanist one and the subsequent evolution of understandings of national interests enabled the changes in Türkiye’s geopolitical perspective on West Asia.Methodology and theoretical framework: The theoretical underpinings of this study are firmly rooted in Constructivism. From this perspective, alterations in foreign policy, encompassing geopolitical understandings and positions, are attributable to shifts in identity. In this context, the insights of scholars such as Ted Hopf and Michael Barnett, who emphasize the significance of domestic influences and, critically, the processes in which identities are formed, re-formed, and transformed, are instrumental in explaining Türkiye’s foreign policy evolution. Hopf, in particular, views the domestic social environment as a crucible for the redefinition by elites and decision-makers. Barnett complements this by underscoring the significance and agency of domestic identity resources, taking into account the identity debates within countries and the political philosophies of ruling elites.The methodology employed in this article focuses on clarifying the causal mechanisms inherent in the process of change. Consequently, process tracing in this study involves an examination of the causal pathways connecting shifts in identity to transformations in foreign policy.Results and discussion: Kemalism led to a detachment from the Middle East/West Asia, the Islamic world, and the Arab world. The Kemalist discourse or ideology, however, was progressively challenged by intellectual currents that lauded and reinterpreted the Ottoman past, advocating for a return to its core values. Among the most influential thinkers in this intellectual milieu was Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904–1983), who proposed a revisionist historical interpretation of the Ottoman era as a counter-narrative to Kemalism. In his framework, Sunni Islam was posited as the primary source of national identity, Western cultural influences were largely eschewed and the perceived superiority of Islamic culture was emphasized. In this re-evaluation of Ottomanism, often termed Neo-Ottomanism, Kısakürek’s Islamism also integrated Turkish nationalism.Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has, on numerous occasions, articulated his intellectual and theoretical affinity for Kısakürek. The emergent generation of Islamists, including Erdoğan, have largley rejected integration with the West, advocating instead for robust relations with neighboring and predominantly Muslim countries. The Justice and Development Party, under Erdoğan's leadership, has redefined Türkiye’s national identity through the incorporation of Neo-Ottomanist tenets. The influence of Neo-Ottomanist policies has extended beyond the external realm to spread throughout Turkish society and national consciousness over the past two decades. From a foreign policy perspective, the fusion of Turkish and Islamic elements within Neo-Ottomanism has become the dominant paradigm in reshaping the country’s geopolitical outlook. Within this paradigm, AKP elites, by presenting a new interpretation of national identity and redefining national interests, have strategically pivoted Türkiye's geopolitical focus towards its neighboring states and significant regional state and non-state actors in West Asia.Following Erdogan's critical remarks in 2008, the “lower chair crisis”, the Mavi Marmara incident, Turkish policies concerning Iran's nuclear program became evident in its opposition alongside Brazil and Iran, in the interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear program in 2010. Post-Arab Spring, Erdoğan's administration demonstrated opposition to the ouster of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt and provided substantial support to Qatar during its blockade in 2017. Beyond Erdoğan's extensive engagement with Hamas leadership, Türkiye severed diplomatic ties with Israel in May 2024. During this period, a significant point of contention between Ankara and Washington involved Türkiye's alleged role in facilitating sanctions circumvention for Iran and its cooperation with Iranian businessman Reza Zarrab.  Furthermore, Türkiye has undertaken extensive involvement in the Syrian crisis, participating in the “Astana Process” in conjunction with Russia and Iran. Ultimately, by December 2024, Türkiye emerged as a pivotal factor in regime change in the Syrian regime change dynamics, marking the inception of a competitive and conflictual relationship with Israel within that country.Conclusion: Over the past two decades, as Türkiye has pursued a more independent foreign policy orientation, its sense of responsibility towards Western issues has demonstrably waned. Erdogan's political philosophy represents a natural and predictable evolution from Kemalism, the moderate Neo-Ottomanism of Turgut Özal, and the more radical Islamism of Necmettin Erbakan. A salient observation is the inherent identity and civilizational divergence between Türkiye and the West. In contrast to the top-down authoritarian attempts under Kemalism to deny, conceal, or at least diminish this difference, the Justice and Development Party has successfully integrated national and state identity through a pragmatic Islamist approach. This dynamic illustrates the dialectical interplay between domestic ideational forces and foreign policy outcomes. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_104820.html Introduction: The defense of human rights, especially the children’s rights in Afghanistan, was repeatedly raised by the United States during the Presidency of George W. Bush and international organizations as one of the main justifications for the 2001 military intervention and the two decades of international presence that followed. Children were symbolically seen as both victims of long-term conflicts and as the foundations of a peaceful and sustainable future. Accordingly, extensive resources were allocated, international experts were deployed, and numerous child-focused programs were implemented between 2001 and 2021, ranging from education and health initiatives to broader frameworks for child protection and well-being. Despite this extensive engagement, Afghan children continued to face chronic vulnerabilities, including poverty, exposure to violence, lack of access to education, and persistent insecurity.Research question: The main question, therefore, is whether international efforts over the last two decades have been successful in providing sustainable support for children's rights in Afghanistan and what obstacles have prevented the establishment of a sustainable framework for such support.Research hypothesis: The hypothesis is that this failure has not been primarily due to a lack of funding or a lack of activities, but rather to a structural and contextual mismatch between international strategies and Afghan realities. This mismatch has manifested itself in the form of a persistent “adaptation gap,” that is, a disconnect between the ambitious commitments of international actors and the limited impact of their interventions on the ground.Methodology and theoretical framework: This study applies a qualitative research design with a descriptive-analytical approach. The methodology combines document and text analysis of official reports, legal documents, policy statements, and statistical data from international organizations, non-state actors, and Afghan government institutions. The descriptive dimension reconstructs the situation of Afghan children in relation to education, health, social welfare, and protection from violence. The analytical dimension critically assesses the effectiveness of international interventions, highlights structural and cultural barriers, and examines why declared commitments have not been translated into sustainable results.Results and discussion: The findings show that international organizations and their interventions suffer from a profound and persistent lack of legitimacy, which significantly undermines their ability to bring about lasting change. Several interrelated factors explain these results:Cultural and religious norms: deeply rooted patriarchal structures and rigid social expectations resisted the liberal rights discourse promoted by international actors and prevented the acceptance of externally designed child protection frameworks.Corruption in government institutions: widespread mismanagement and diversion of aid resources have undermined transparency and fair service delivery, further reducing public trust.Weakness of civil society: Afghanistan lacked strong and independent civil society organizations that could ensure local ownership and continuity. International projects often remained externally led, dependent on donor funding, and unsustainable after the departure of foreign actors.Neglect of peace-building: Many child-focused programs have been introduced without parallel efforts to secure stability and peace. Such initiatives cannot produce sustainable results in situations where conflict and insecurity persist.Insufficient integration of rights-based approaches: Instead of embedding reforms in Afghan national institutions and promoting local legitimacy, international organizations have often ignored or marginalized state structures, leaving reforms fragile and disconnected from Afghan governance.Conclusion: Taken together, these factors created what this study calls an “Adaptation Gap.” This gap was not simply a result of poor implementation, but was the product of deeper structural misalignments between global strategies and the political, cultural, and institutional realities of Afghanistan. International commitments were ambitious and often convincing on the surface, but they failed to resonate with local actors, institutions, and communities, producing temporary and externally dependent outcomes.The study concludes that the shortcomings in protecting children's rights in Afghanistan during 2001-2021 were rooted less in a lack of resources than more in flawed assumptions, structural barriers, and the lack of legitimacy. International actors were unable to bridge the gap between their stated commitments and the needs and expectations of Afghan society. Thus, the hypothesis is confirmed: the disconnect between global strategies and Afghan realities created an adaptation gap that limited international interventions to short-term relief rather than systemic change.The case of Afghanistan highlights a larger lesson for international support for children's rights in post-conflict societies. Sustainable protection cannot be achieved through humanitarian rhetoric, funding, or externally imposed frameworks alone. This requires legitimacy that comes from local trust, strengthened national institutions, the active participation of an independent civil society, and peace as the foundation for rights-based development. Without these conditions, even large-scale international interventions are insufficient to provide sustainable protection for vulnerable children. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_106094.html Introduction: The European Union concluded accession negotiations with ten new countries between 2003 and 2005. In 2009, the European Union and its six Eastern partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus) launched the Eastern Partnership initiative, based on a commitment to fundamental values, market economy, sustainable development, and good governance.As can be seen in the framework of the Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership Initiative, the European Union places great emphasis on practices and norms based on European values ​​in its external relations. The emphasis and focus on European norms has been a serious concern of the European Union founders since its inception. It was in this context that the concept of normative power was introduced by Jan Manners. Manners believed that the European Union, as a “normative power”, aims in its foreign policy to shape, instill, disseminate – and thus “normalize” – rules and values ​​in international affairs through non-coercive measures.One of the main areas that can show how the normative power of the EU affects the Eastern Partnership initiative is the identity orientation of the EU's foreign policy. In order to better and more accurately examine the impact of normative power on the identity orientation of the European Union's foreign policy in the Eastern Partnership initiative, the two countries of Belarus and Moldova have been selected as the two case studies in this article. Moldova is one of the successful examples, and Belarus is one of the less successful examples in the field of European normative power influence, and studying these two countries can help to better understand the issue.Research question: This article seeks to answer the main question: How has the normative power of the European Union affected the identity dimension of its foreign policy in the Eastern Partnership initiative, with an emphasis on Belarus and Moldova?Research hypothesis: In response to the main question of this article, it can be hypothesized that the European Union's emphasis on democratic norms, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, based on the logic of proportionality, has led to the prominence of European identity and the deepening of the European-Russian identity and cultural gap in the identity dimension of the European Union's foreign policy. The examination of the two case studies in this article, namely Belarus and Moldova, clearly shows how normative power affects the identity dimension of the EU’s foreign policy.Methodology: The method chosen for this article is a case study and process tracing method. The data collection method in this article is also a documentary method. Basically, the case study research method is used when our questions are of the how and why type, we have no control over the phenomena under study, and the phenomenon under study belongs to the present. Accordingly, and in order to apply the case study method, we have selected two member countries of the Eastern Partnership Initiative, Belarus and Moldova, as two case studies.We also use the theory of Europeanization, based on Schimmelfenning Theory, to test the hypothesis. According to Schimmelfennig, Europeanization refers to the mechanisms through which European sovereignty influences states and their policies. Schimmelfennig’s framework distinguishes the mechanisms of Europeanization by their institutional logic: the “logic of consequence” or the “logic of proportionality.” While the logic of consequence assumes that actors choose the behavioral option that maximizes their utility in the circumstances, the logic of proportionality stipulates that actors choose the behavior that is appropriate given their social role and the social norms in a given situation.When we talk about European identity and culture, it is obvious that we are dealing with the logic of proportionality. The logic of proportionality stipulates that actors choose the appropriate behavior given their social role and the social norms in a given situation. Accordingly, the socialization process (or social learning model) based on the logic of proportionality involves teaching EU policies, ideas, and norms to non-member countries and convincing them of the appropriateness of these policies and, consequently, motivating them to adopt these policies.Findings and results: After briefly mentioning the identity dimension of the Eastern Partnership initiative and the various dimensions of the identity conflict between the European Union and Russia in this region, to examine the effects of Europe's normative power on the identity dimension of the European Union's foreign policy in the Eastern Partnership initiative, we have examined the EU's foreign policy in terms of three main indicators: cultural and educational cooperation, support for civil society and people-to-people contacts.In the case of Belarus, the EU has tried to strengthen the European identity in the country by deepening cultural and educational cooperation, supporting civil society, and expanding people-to-people contacts. However, the existence of an authoritarian and pro-Russian political system led by Lukashenko for the past three decades has created a major obstacle for the EU in this direction and has had a negative impact on the country's integration process into the EU.In the case of Moldova, the European Union has acted within the framework of the three identity indicators in its foreign policy. Unlike Belarus, the positive approach of the ruling governments in Moldova to the process of European integration has resulted in a better situation in strengthening European identity and exercising European normative power.In short, it can be said that the European Union's emphasis on the three main norms of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, within the framework of exercising normative power, has led the Union's foreign policy, whether in the form of the Neighborhood Policy or the Eastern Partnership Initiative, towards the prominence of European identity on the one hand and the deepening of the European-Russian identity and cultural gap on the other. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_106354.html Introduction: The Persian Gulf, historically known as the "Sea of Persia," is a prominent body of water situated in southwest Asia, north of the Arabian Peninsula and south of the Iranian plateau. In 2014, following Russia's annexation of Crimea, the international community imposed extensive sanctions against the country, a situation that intensified significantly in 2022 with the advent of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian War. These developments led to economic pressure on Russia and increased international isolation, including its expulsion from the Group of Seven (G7), which represents the world's largest developed economies. The annexation of Crimea exposed Russia to widespread and ongoing economic sanctions from Western countries and even led to its expulsion from the G7. Concurrently, Russia's economy experienced substantial depreciation due to declining oil prices. After becoming embroiled in the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia's leadership sought ways to counter its political isolation from the West. President Putin’s approach to the “pivot to the East” strategy has been aimed at creating new economic partnerships. As a result, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have emerged as strategically vital countries for Russia in its efforts to reduce its political and economic isolation. This research will examine how Russia has strategically shaped its foreign policy in the Persian Gulf, driven by converging interests in energy markets, significant investment by Gulf Cooperation Council member states, the need to escape political isolation, and the need to counter the Western maximum pressure campaign. It will also examine Russia’s strategies for managing existing challenges with regional states while simultaneously expanding its economic and political ties with the Gulf monarchies. Furthermore, it acknowledges the existence of three different perspectives – opportunity-based, threat-based, and gray-zone perspectives – on Russia’s active engagement in the Persian Gulf, particularly in matters that concern Iran’s national interests. Research question: How has the Ukraine crisis influenced Russia's foreign policy in the Persian Gulf? Research hypothesis: The hypothesis of this research states that the Ukrainian crisis, due to Western economic sanctions, has led to Russia adopting a more active and participatory strategy in the Persian Gulf with a combined geoeconomic and geostrategic approach. Methodology and theoretical framework: This research was conducted with a qualitative method using library, internet, and interview resources. In this research, the theory of Neo-Eurasianism was used to analyze Russian foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. Russian foreign policy has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union based on the Kozyrev Doctrine, the Primakov Doctrine, and the Putin Doctrine. The Kozyrev Doctrine, adopted during Boris Yeltsin's first term, defined Russia's identity as a new liberal democracy and market economy aligned with a Western-oriented system. Andrei Kozyrev, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister under Yeltsin, emphasized that rejoining the West was a "return to civilization" to support Russia's transition to democracy and a free market economy. However, the so-called Atlantic orientation in foreign policy faced challenges in domestic politics. The shift towards Neo-Eurasianism was marked by the emergence of the Primakov Doctrine. Yevgeny Primakov became Russia's Foreign Minister in 1996 and served as Prime Minister from 1998 to 1999 until his successor, Vladimir Putin. The Primakov Doctrine represented a serious attempt to restore lost international prestige and standing while countering American unilateralism. This policy was consolidated when Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. Neo-Eurasianism has specific features in Russian foreign policy, including “nationalism,” “geopolitics,” and “realism.” Results and discussion:1. Tensions and conflicts between Russia and the United States, along with the Western bloc, are a major factor in the Kremlin's interest in escalating its activities in the Persian Gulf region. Strong and constructive relations with the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and an active participatory presence in the region help Russia escape international isolation. The effects of Western sanctions against Russia are among the main factors influencing Russia's presence and cooperation with the regional governments in the Persian Gulf. Protecting the interests of Russian companies operating in the energy sector through close cooperation with major oil and gas exporters located in the region. Conclusion: The outbreak of the Ukrainian war and the widespread Western sanctions against Russia have had a wide impact on the country's foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region. In this context, Russia has sought to strengthen its relations with the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states and develop a partnership-based strategy in the region. The Persian Gulf region is of great importance to Russia due to its special geopolitical and economic location, especially in the energy sector. The country has tried to establish closer relations with the countries of the region, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, and thereby secure its economic and political interests. Changes in Russian foreign policy in the Persian Gulf include increased economic cooperation, joint investments, and security engagement. Russia is also seeking to strengthen its position as a key player in the global energy arena, and cooperation with oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf could help Russia achieve its main goal of managing energy markets. After examining and presenting the three existing perspectives on the expansion of relations between Russia and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, it seems necessary to strike a balance between these two approaches. https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_106547.html Introduction: Measuring actors' perceptions of threat from each other is a very complex and multi-layered issue, and a comprehensive examination and analysis of its various dimensions faces many obstacles. However, there are clear signs in the behavior of actors when they feel threatened by each other, including a wide range of elite positions on the threat to reciprocal practical actions in the face of the threat agent. Iran and Türkiye, as two neighboring actors with a common border, are considered two rivals with opposing interests in regions including the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, despite establishing an acceptable level of political and diplomatic relations and having some common security concerns over the past few decades. Türkiye's unwavering support for Azerbaijan and the spread of threats of Pan-Turkism, its growing influence in Central Asia, which can be seen in cases such as the Organization of Turkic-Speaking States, and the serious conflict of interests between these two actors in Syria and Iraq, are just some of the areas of conflict between these two regional powers. Since threat perception is one of the most important factors shaping countries' foreign policy and a basis for policymaking, in this article, we explain the evolution of Iran's threat perception of Türkiye by presenting a conceptual model and identifying the factors that affect this process. Research question: The main question of the research is: What impact did the series of events and trends from the Second Karabakh War to the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government have on the increased sense of threat to Iran from Türkiye, and in what abstract form can these changes be explained? Research hypothesis: This article shows that a series of events and trends in regions including the South Caucasus, Iraq, and Syria, particularly the fall of Assad as Iran’s regional ally, have increased Iran’s perception of Türkiye as a threatening state. Methodology: The authors present an innovative theoretical model including the threat perception mechanism of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a process tracking method. Threat perception motivates a wide range of behaviors, from cooperation to conflict, and has been central to theories of war, alliances, and conflict resolution. The threat perception process in each country is influenced by various internal and external variables and factors. Results and discussion: The Second Karabakh War led to changes in the equations of the South Caucasus near the Iranian borders and shifted the balance of power in favor of Baku. Baku's victory in this war was initially widely welcomed by Iranian officials. However, Israel's role in the Republic of Azerbaijan and its influence on the equations of this region and the presence of a third actor, Türkiye, in the Israel-Azerbaijan-Türkiye triangle, gradually increased Iran's sensitivity towards this axis, including Türkiye. The next event that increased Iran's perception of the Turkish threat was the Gaza War. The Gaza War and continued economic cooperation between Israel and Türkiye also increased the perception of the threat and sensitivity of Iranian elites towards Türkiye by intensifying the atmosphere of distrust towards Türkiye. The most important event in the process of Iran’s threat perception of Türkiye in the period 2020-2024 was the fall of Assad and the rise to power of Turkish-backed forces. This, along with the reduction of the geopolitical influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region, led to the representation of Türkiye as a cooperative actor and partner centered on the US-Israeli (as the most prominent enemies in the Islamic Republic of Iran's threat perception system). The increased perception of the Iranian threat to Türkiye and the existence of the grounds and areas of disagreement that still exist between these two actors make it all the more necessary to adopt mechanisms and approaches to anticipate, prevent, and manage future tensions, especially in relation to the South Caucasus, Syria, and Iraq. This is especially so because, as explained in this article, if current trends continue, the likelihood of direct and indirect military confrontation between the two actors in the conflict zones has significantly increased. Conclusion: The main feature of the Islamic Republic of Iran's threat perception system is based on the representation of the United States and Israel as the main enemies, and accordingly, the perceived threat from other actors is also classified. Explaining and analysing Iran's perception of the Turkish threat is a specific and complex case study. Undoubtedly, issues such as Türkiye's membership in NATO, the proximity and common border between the two countries, historical challenges, cultural and linguistic affinities, geopolitical rivalries in the region, different perceptions of political Islam, etc., have always influenced the perception of the threat posed by each other by these two actors. However, according to the conceptual model of the research, Türkiye’s perception of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran should be examined in the context of this actor’s relationship with the United States and Israel, as well as Iran’s perception of the issue. This can be clearly seen in explaining the change in Iran’s perception of the Turkish threat from the Second Karabakh War to the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.