The Srutural Developements in the South Caucasus Security Complex (2020-2024)

Introduction: Between 2020 and 2024, the South Caucasus experienced numerous geopolitical events that significantly changed the status quo in the region. Components of the South Caucasus security complex, such as social structure, polarity, the nature of actors, anarchy and borders can be explained within the framework of sub-regional security complex centered around Russia prior to the Ukrainian developments of 2022. However, with the changes that occurred between 2022 and 2024, the concept of sub-regional security complex has lost its explanatory power for application in the South Caucasus region. Therefore, the primary goal and subject of this research is to identify the type of security complex that governs the region and to explain how the components of the South Caucasus security complex are affected by new regional and international developments.
Research question: How has the South Caucasus security complex changed under the influence of developments between 2020 and 2024?
Research hypothesis: Given these developments, components of the security complex – such as borders, the social structure, type of polarity and states influenced by the Second Nagorno-Karabakh and a result of the Ukrainan War. Ultimately, the region is witnessing a shift in trends, from moderate anarchy to increasing anarchy and greater regional autonomy.
Methodology and theoretical framework: This study seeks to assess the components of the south Caucasus security complex using a quantitative approach and interpretive structural modeling (ISM). Buzan's original definition of a security complex is as follows: a group of states whose primary security concerns are so interconnected that their national security cannot realistically be considered in isolation from one another. The basic structure of a regional security complex consists of four variables. 1. Borders that separate the security complex from its neighbors. 2. Anarchic structure, meaning that a regional security complex comprises two or more autonomous units. 3. Polarity, which refers to the distribution of power among the units. 4. Social structure, which includes patterns of friendship and enmity among the units. Depending on the configuration of a security complex, three types of evolutionary processes can be observed in each complex: 1. Maintaining the status quo means not making fundamental changes to the fundamental structure of the complex. 2. Internal transformation, indicating that changes in the fundamental structure occur within the existing external boundaries. This could include changes in the structure of anarchy (due to regional integration), changes in polarity (due to divergence, mergers, conquest, low growth rates, etc.) or prevailing patterns of friendship and hostility (due to ideological transitions, wars, leadership changes, etc.). 3. External transformation refers to the opening or closing of external borders, changing membership in the regional security complex, and most likely changing the fundamental structure in other ways.
Result and discussion: From 2020 to 2024, the border of South Caucasus security complex has witnessed internal and external developements. Internally, the full restoration of Azerbaijan's territorial sovereignty after the war led to the country's increased border expansion with its two neighbors, Iran and Armenia. Externally, the South Caucasus has transformed from an arena of competition primarily between Russia and the West into a new geopolitical space in which where more than six powers are competing for influence. This shift challenged Russia's monopoly position and the status quo that had dominated the region for 200 years. The decline of Russia’s geopolitical power created a closer connection between the South Caucasus and the greater Middle East and Middle Eastern countries see the South Caucasus as a natural extension of their territories. Regarding anarchic Structure of the region, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, which resulted in a ceasefire agreement, emphasized the Russian military presence as peacekeepers, the restoration of Soviet-era routes under Russia control and the return of refugees. Russia's military presence in Karabakh somewhat moderated the turbulent nature of the region. However, normalization talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan failed to materialize after Azerbaijan fully restored sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh in a one-day war in 2023. By 2024, Russia withdrew its military forces from Nagorno-Karabakh following bilateral agreements with Azerbaijan. This withdrawal, coupled with Russia's planned withdrawal from the border areas of Armenia and Iran in 2025, is expected to exacerbate the turbulent situation in the region. In terms of Polarity, Armenia’s military and economic capacity is incomparable to Azerbaijan's, whose advantage is evident in defense budgets and economic growth. Before the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, the regional polarity was balanced between the three countries due to alliances such as Armenia's military partnership with Russia and its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War shifted the regional polarity to a unipolar structure centered on Russia, which lasted until 2022. By 2024, several factors, including Russia’s military withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh, the suspension of Armenia’s membership in CSTO and Armenia’s reduction in reliance on Russian arms imports (from 90% to 10%), significantly weakened Russia's central role in the region. Regarding Social Structure, between 2020 and 2024, the Hobbesian nature of hostility in the region has decreased compared to previous years. Historically, the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis and the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have played a key role in shaping patterns of hostility and friendship in the South Caucasus. After 2020, the processes of resolving these conflicts entered certain stages in the transformation of the social structure of the region.
Conclusion: Regional and international developments between 2020 and 2024—such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Russo-UkrainianWar, the restoration of Azerbaijani political sovereignty in Khankendi in 2023, the Georgian parliamentary elections in 2024, and Armenia's shift from idealistic to realist southern policies—had a significant impact on the policies of the South Caucasus. These events have led to transformations across all structural components of the regional security order. In this context: borders have experienced both internal changes and external developements due to the increasing inter-connectedness of developments in the South Caucasus with West Asia. The social structure has undergone a fundamental change, shifting from a Hobbesian framework of hostility to a Kantian framework driven by changes in Armenian pragmatic politics. The polarity has shifted from a sub-regional security complex after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War to a standard regional structure influenced by the Ukraine War. Anarchy has moved from moderation to escalation, leading to greater regional autonomy. Overall, geo-economic dynamics—such as energy transit routes, trade corridors and transportation networks—have increasingly become the focal point of competition between regional and international powers, surpassing geopolitical factors in importance. The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War reinforced this trend, while the Ukraine War and Russia's efforts to replace Western partners with Eastern ones for economic stability further strengthened it.