Survival Strategies of Inefficient Non-Democratic Regimes in Central Asia

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran

2 A Ph.D. Candidate of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran

Abstract

Introduction: After the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, and the emergence of a liberal post-Cold War environment, it was expected that non-democratic regimes in Central Asia would transition to democracy. But the political situation turned out to be different. After independence, all five Central Asian leaders, who shared a communist background, adopted presidential systems and all of them, to varying degrees, exhibited various authoritarian traits. In these regimes, protesters and dissidents were suppressed or nearly eliminated; civil and political rights were minimized, and the emphasis was on providing economic and social goods and maintaining stability. This took precedence over political freedoms. Two years after the independence, the ruling elites succeeded in suppressing or absorbing political opponents. Key opposition leaders were arrested, exiled or joined the ruling governments. For a decade (1991-2001), all Central Asian regimes had a score between 5.5 and 7 on the Freedom Index (a combination of political rights and civil liberties), a situation that has persisted to this day.
After independence, Central Asian regimes adopted democratic processes such as elections, but their true nature remained authoritarian. Indeed, through the interplay of domestic dynamics and international norms, different types of authoritarian regimes emerged in each of these countries. According to the Freedom House report, all five Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, are known as authoritarian regimes. When it comes to the secret of the persistence of political regimes, two factors are usually cited: democratic legitimacy and efficiency. However, despite their lack of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness, Central Asian political regimes have maintained power for years, successfully suppressing their opponents and eliminating their critics. Their stability and continuity have now become a complex issue. The present study focuses on identifying the mechanisms of persistence of ineffective non-democratic regimes in Central Asia.
Research question: The research question is: What strategies do these regimes use to continue their survival?
Research hypothesis: The stability of these regimes is not accidental, but the product of rational elite design at two levels. The first level is internal, such as repression, hereditary networks, symbolic elections and personality cult. The second level is external, such as security and political alliances, presence in regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and cooperation with major powers such as China and Russia.
Methodology and theoretical framework: In this article, based on the rational choice theory of new institutionalism, the strategies for the survival of ineffective undemocratic regimes in Central Asia are discussed. Rational choice, as one of the most important branches of new-institutionalism theory, can help clarify how structures emerge, evolve, and persist. The theoretical model of this research shows that political decision-makers in this region, based on the intensity of the political threat and the amount of financial resources, always choose a strategy that allows them to maintain their power at the lowest cost. Exploratory and comparative methods have been used in the specific content analysis. Data have been collected through library sources, official reports, and the World Bank Website.
Results and discussion: Inefficient and undemocratic regimes in Central Asia ensure their survival by relying on hard and soft strategies. The research findings show that the ruling elites in this region, by calculating the costs and benefits of political actions, use strategies such as repression, propaganda, rent distribution, symbolic elections, protectionism, and regional and international coalition building. They use these strategies in a way that secures the interests of the ruling regime and ensures loyalty to themselves.
Conclusion: Persistence is not only the product of repression, but also the result of conscious, calculated, and purposeful choices by political actors to maximize their own interests. Coercion, repression, propaganda, media control, personality cults, symbolic elections, and financial support allow Asian non-democratic regimes to maintain their power at home and prevent the formation of opposition coalitions abroad. Regionalism and cooperation with great powers provide the basis for the support of foreign powers. The country's rulers intimidate opponents with a strategy of repression. They reduce discontent with propaganda. They create and maintain their power with a cult of personality, and they maintain the appearance of popular rule by holding elections. They ensure the loyalty of domestic and foreign elites by paying rent. Even in conditions of economic inefficiency, this model allows non-democratic regimes to survive.

Keywords

References

فارسی
استوکر، جری و دیوید مارش (1399)، روش و نظریه در علوم سیاسی، ترجمۀ امیرمحمد حاجی یوسفی، تهران: پژوهشکدۀ مطالعات راهبردی.
تیموری، عباد (1401)، عقلانیت نهادی: نهادها چگونه بر تصمیم‌گیری انسان تأثیر می‌گذارند؟، تهران: طرح‌نو.
دی تنسی، استیون و نایجل جکسون (1392)، مبانی سیاست، ترجمۀ جعفر محسنی دره بیدی، تهران: ققنوس.
ساندرز، دیوید (۱۳۸۰)، الگوهای بی‌ثباتی سیاسی، ترجمۀ حمید امانت، تهران: پژوهشکدۀ مطالعات راهبردی.
فاطمی‌نژاد، احمد و روح‌الله اسلامی شعبجره (1401)، «چین، هند و نظم منطقه‌ای در آسیای مرکزی: آزمونی برای مدیریت قدرت‌های بزرگ»، مطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی، دورۀ 15، شمارۀ 1، صص. 205-228، (doi:/10.22059/jcep.2022.345680.450083)
کالینز، کاتلین (1401)، سیاست طایفه‌ای و گذار در آسیای مرکزی، ترجمۀ الهه کولایی و محمدکاظم شجاعی، تهران: وزارت امور خارجه.
کولایی، الهه (1398)، سیاست و حکومت در آسیای مرکزی. تهران: سمت.
کولایی، الهه و حمیدرضا عزیزی (1389)، «نقش انتقال انرژی در روابط ترکمنستان با روسیه»، مطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی، دورۀ 4، شمارۀ 7، صص. 105-125، قابل دسترس در: https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_22261.html (تاریخ دسترسی: 6/11/1389).
هاوزر، مگان (1403)، استراتژی‌های انتخاباتی در رژیم‌های اقتدارگرا، ترجمۀ داود نجفی، تهران: نگاه معاصر.
English
Abdukadirov, Sherzod (2009), “The Failure of Presidentialism in Central Asia”, Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 285-298, (doi: 10.1080/02185370903403509).
Bellin, Eva (2004), “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 139–157, (doi:10.2307/4150140).
Buranelli, Costa (2020), “Authoritarianism as an Institution? The Case of Central Asia”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 1005–1016, (doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa058).
Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Victoria Murillo (2004), “Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 742– 757, (doi: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00099.x).
Crabtree, Charles, Holger Kern, and David Siegel (2020), “Cults of Personality, Preference Falsification, and The Dictator’s Dilemma”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 409-434, (doi: 10.1177/0951629820927790).
Collins, Neil, Elaine Sharplin, and Aziz Burkhanov (2023). “Challenges for Political Science Research Ethics in Autocracies: A Case Study of Central Asia”, Political Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 330-346, )doi:10.1177/14789299231153074(
Fant, Simone, (2025), “Uranium: Kazakhstan-Russia Axis Holds Europe in Check”. www.renewablematter.eu/en/uranium-kazakhstan-russia-axis-holds-europe-in-check (Accessed on: 15/1/2015).
Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski (2007), “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 11, pp. 1279-1301, (doi: 10.1177/0010414007305817).
Hill, Fiona (2001), Silencing Central Asia: The Voice of Dissidents: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/silencing-central-asia-the-voice-of-dissidents/ (Accessed on: 18/6/2001).
Hicken, Allen )2011(, “Clientelism”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 289– 310, (doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220508).
Hale, Henry (2014), Patronal Politics, Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
         (doi: /10.1017/CBO9781139683524).
Ishak, Phoebe (2018), “Autocratic Survival Strategies: Does Oil Make a Difference?”, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 1-22, (doi: 10.1515/peps-2018-0043).
Immergut, Ellen (1998), “The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism”, Politics & Society, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 5-34, (doi: 10.1177/0032329298026001002).
Uzbekistan at Ten: Repression and Instability (2001) International Crisis Group, Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/uzbekistan/central-asia-uzbekistan-10-repression-and-instability(Accessed on: 21/8/2001).
Jupille, Joseph, and James Caporaso (2022), Theories of Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
(doi: 10.1017/9781139034142).
Koelble, Thomas (1995), “The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 231-243, (http://www.jstor.org/stable/422167), (Accessed on: 15/11/2025).
Kubicek, Paul (1998), “Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or Cure?” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 29-43, (doi: 10.1080/01436599814514).
Knox, Colin and Bakhytzhan Kurmanov (2024), “Variegated Digital State Repression in Central Asia”, Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 389-405, (https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12644).
Lecours, Andre (2005), New Institutionalism, Theory and Analysis, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Levi, Margaret (1997), “A Model, a Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis”, in: Lichbach and Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lowndes, Vivien (1996), “Varieties of New Institutionalism: a Critical Appraisal”, Public Administration, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 181-197, (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.1996.tb00865.x).
Lowndes, Vivien, and Mark Roberts (2013), Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lewis, David (2021), “Varieties of Authoritarianism in Central Asia”, in: Isaac, Rico, and Marat, Erica, Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Central Asia, Chapter 5. (doi.org/10.4324/9780429057977).
Leonard, Peter (2016), Cults of Personalities Proliferate in Central Asia, May 23: https://apnews.com/general-news-15e56ebbc9ef4919be3ab931ad823173?utm_source=copy&utm_medium=share(Accessed on: 23/5/2016).
Lillis, Joanna (2018), Uzbekistan: Even in Death, Cult Grows around Karimov, July 6, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistans-new-president-cult-Karimov (Accessed on: 6/7/2018).
March, James, and John Olsen (1989), Rediscovering Institutions, New York: Free.
March, James, and Herbert Simon (1958), Organizations, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
March, James and Johan Olsen (2008), “Elaborating the New Institutionalism”, in: Sarah A. Binder, R. A. W. Rhodes, and Bert A. Rockman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (online edn, Oxford Academic, 2 Sept. 2009),  (doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0001).
Nanovsky, Simeon and Colin Knox (2024), “Political Stability in Authoritarian Regimes: the Case of Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 346-369, (/doi:10.1080/02634937.2024.2402067).
North, Douglass (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Orange, Mia (2019), Sustaining Authoritarianism: Clientelism and Repression in Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania, [Doctoral Thesis (monograph), Department of Political Science], Lund University.
Omidi Ali, Hasan Khan Kashif, and Oskar Schortz (2024), Explaining the Vicious Circle of Political Repression and Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia, Cogent Social Sciences, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1-17, (doi: 10.1080/23311886.2024.2350115).
Powell, Walter and Paul Dimaggio (1991), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Robinson, Neil (2007), “The Political Is Personal: Corruption, Clientelism, Patronage, Informal Practices and the Dynamics of Post-Communism”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 7, pp. 1217–1224, (doi: 10.1080/09668130701607177).
Rothstein, Bo (1996), “Political Institutions: An Overview”, in: Robert Goodin, A New Handbook of Political Science, UK: Oxford University Press.
Rixen, Thomas and Lora Anne Viola (2016), “Historical Institutionalism and International Relations: Toward Explaining Change and Stability in International Institutions”, in: Rixen, Thomas, Lora Viola, and Michael Zūrn (eds.), Historical Institutionalism & International Relations: Explaining Institutional Development in World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press,  (doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779629.003.0001).
   Scharpf, Fritz Wilhelm (1997), Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,  (doi: 10.4324/9780429500275).
       Schedler, Andreas (2009), “The New Institutionalism in the Study of Authoritarian Regimes”, Totalitarismus und Demokratie, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 323–340, (https://hait.tu-dresden.de/media/zeitschrift/TD_06_02_Schedler.pdf), (Accessed on: 6/2/2009).
Shkel, Stanislav (2019), “Neo-Patrimonial Practices and Sustainability of Authoritarian Regimes in Eurasia”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 169-176, (doi: 10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.04.002).
Stokes, Susan (2009), “Political Clientelism”, in Carles Boix, and Susan C. Stokes (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics,   (doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.003.0025), (Accessed on: 22/12/2025).
      Smith, Ian Oliver (2014), “Election Boycotts and Regime Survival”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, No. 5, pp. 743–765, (doi: 10.57709/1059863).
Tsebelis, George (1990), Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, University of California Press, (https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pnk3s).
Wampler, Brian (2008), “When Does Participatory Democracy Deepen the Quality of Democracy? Lessons from Brazil”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 61– 81, (doi.org/10.5129/001041508X12911362383679).
Weingast, Barry (2002), “Rational Choice Institutionalism”, in: Katnelson, Ira and Helen Milner, Political Science: The State of the Discipline, New York: Norton and Company.
World Bank (2024), https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators (Accessed on: 1/9/2025).
Zakirov, Bekzod (2021), “Authoritarian Regime Stability in Uzbekistan under Patronal President Islam Karimov”, Central Asian Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 273-296, (doi: 10.30965/22142290-12340005).
        Ziegler, Charles (2016), “Great Powers, Civil Society and Authoritarian Diffusion in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 549-569,  (doi: 10.1080/02634937.2016.1228608).
       Zucker, Lynne (1977), “The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 42, No. 5, pp. 726-743,  (doi: 10.2307/2094862).
       Zurich ETH (2010), Curse or Cure-Natural Resources and the Great Game in Central Asia, International Relations and Security Network,  Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/130815/ISN_Special_Issues_Aug.2010.pdf (Accessed on: 1/8/2010).
Central Eurasia Studies
Volume 18, Issue 2 - Serial Number 37
February 2026
Pages 229-256

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics