Iran's Threat Perception from Türkiye: From the Second Karabakh War to the Fall of Bashar al-Assad

Introduction: Measuring actors' perceptions of threat from each other is a very complex and multi-layered issue, and a comprehensive examination and analysis of its various dimensions faces many obstacles. However, there are clear signs in the behavior of actors when they feel threatened by each other, including a wide range of elite positions on the threat to reciprocal practical actions in the face of the threat agent. Iran and Türkiye, as two neighboring actors with a common border, are considered two rivals with opposing interests in regions including the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, despite establishing an acceptable level of political and diplomatic relations and having some common security concerns over the past few decades. Türkiye's unwavering support for Azerbaijan and the spread of threats of Pan-Turkism, its growing influence in Central Asia, which can be seen in cases such as the Organization of Turkic-Speaking States, and the serious conflict of interests between these two actors in Syria and Iraq, are just some of the areas of conflict between these two regional powers. Since threat perception is one of the most important factors shaping countries' foreign policy and a basis for policymaking, in this article, we explain the evolution of Iran's threat perception of Türkiye by presenting a conceptual model and identifying the factors that affect this process.
Research question: The main question of the research is: What impact did the series of events and trends from the Second Karabakh War to the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government have on the increased sense of threat to Iran from Türkiye, and in what abstract form can these changes be explained?
Research hypothesis: This article shows that a series of events and trends in regions including the South Caucasus, Iraq, and Syria, particularly the fall of Assad as Iran’s regional ally, have increased Iran’s perception of Türkiye as a threatening state.
Methodology: The authors present an innovative theoretical model including the threat perception mechanism of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a process tracking method. Threat perception motivates a wide range of behaviors, from cooperation to conflict, and has been central to theories of war, alliances, and conflict resolution. The threat perception process in each country is influenced by various internal and external variables and factors.
Results and discussion: The Second Karabakh War led to changes in the equations of the South Caucasus near the Iranian borders and shifted the balance of power in favor of Baku. Baku's victory in this war was initially widely welcomed by Iranian officials. However, Israel's role in the Republic of Azerbaijan and its influence on the equations of this region and the presence of a third actor, Türkiye, in the Israel-Azerbaijan-Türkiye triangle, gradually increased Iran's sensitivity towards this axis, including Türkiye. The next event that increased Iran's perception of the Turkish threat was the Gaza War. The Gaza War and continued economic cooperation between Israel and Türkiye also increased the perception of the threat and sensitivity of Iranian elites towards Türkiye by intensifying the atmosphere of distrust towards Türkiye.
The most important event in the process of Iran’s threat perception of Türkiye in the period 2020-2024 was the fall of Assad and the rise to power of Turkish-backed forces. This, along with the reduction of the geopolitical influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region, led to the representation of Türkiye as a cooperative actor and partner centered on the US-Israeli (as the most prominent enemies in the Islamic Republic of Iran's threat perception system). The increased perception of the Iranian threat to Türkiye and the existence of the grounds and areas of disagreement that still exist between these two actors make it all the more necessary to adopt mechanisms and approaches to anticipate, prevent, and manage future tensions, especially in relation to the South Caucasus, Syria, and Iraq. This is especially so because, as explained in this article, if current trends continue, the likelihood of direct and indirect military confrontation between the two actors in the conflict zones has significantly increased.
Conclusion: The main feature of the Islamic Republic of Iran's threat perception system is based on the representation of the United States and Israel as the main enemies, and accordingly, the perceived threat from other actors is also classified. Explaining and analysing Iran's perception of the Turkish threat is a specific and complex case study. Undoubtedly, issues such as Türkiye's membership in NATO, the proximity and common border between the two countries, historical challenges, cultural and linguistic affinities, geopolitical rivalries in the region, different perceptions of political Islam, etc., have always influenced the perception of the threat posed by each other by these two actors. However, according to the conceptual model of the research, Türkiye’s perception of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran should be examined in the context of this actor’s relationship with the United States and Israel, as well as Iran’s perception of the issue. This can be clearly seen in explaining the change in Iran’s perception of the Turkish threat from the Second Karabakh War to the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.