Intruduction: In the first half of the 21^st century the international community has witnessed many changes. Following the changes in the structure of the international order and the distribution of power, the world is not a unipolar system led by the United States, unlike the post-Cold War era. In addition, there are growing tensions, some hidden and some overt, among the Great powers that are manifesting in the geopolitical and normative sphears. These topics, that range from changing power dynamics, the emergance of new state actors in the international community, environmental concerns, organized crime, immigrant issues, cyber warfare, the tensions over the South China Sea, Taiwan, the Ukraine Crisis, NATO expansion, among others, if it is not solved, it can be a danger for the future of the mankind. Therefore, the management of differences between great powers including Russia, China, the US, India, Japan, Germany, France, and England is recommended to avoid. To move towards this goal, the concert of powers in the 19th century has been the theme. This literature attempts to assess the probability of a true concert of powers in the 21^st century as a way to manage competition between the United States, China and Russia, especially after the Ukraine Crisis in 2014 and 2022.
Research Question: The main question is that, after the Ukraine crisis, to manage the tension and differences between great powers, can we imagine the possibility of forming a concert of powers like in the 19th century?
Research Hypothesis: Inspired by the works of the thinkers of the Islamic Republic and using the balance of hostile power and management found in the works Headley Bull and Benjamin Miller, it can be suggested that the current differences in the structural, normative, ideological and cognitive views of the United States, China and Russia toward global governance make the formation of a concert of powers simply impossible.
Methodology and Theoretical Framework: This paper has a qualitative approach and uses sample research as one of the common approaches in the Islamic Republic of Iran. To dig deeper, the history of concert of powers was examined to ensure the possibility of an emerging concert or lack thereof, was closer to today's reality. In addition, to achieve a model of how China, Russia and the United States commit to or hinder the formation of a concert of powers, the elements that make a concert of powers possible were analyzed. The concert of powers is a collective security system or a security regime that was formed based on the cooperation between the four great powers of the 19^th century, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Headley Bull, in the Anarchic Society, wrote that in the 19^th century, there was an international society and international relations as an order in which the managerial responsibilities of the Great powers constituted the system. Despite the element of cooperation, a certain type of balance of power determines how international relations work. It is called the associational balance of power. It became the enemy's balance of power due to constant pressure to increase power. In addition to Bull’s view, Miller added that internal issues, ideological and cognitive factors may be equally important in concert formation. This literature is in theoritically based on the views of the two thinkers mentioned above.
Results and Discussion: This research has indicated that the international relations have had 3 separate cases of power coordination. From 1815 to World War I, from 1975 Helsinki accords to 1989 and from the Paris Charter in 1990 to 2014 which marked Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine. The data show that in each of these periods, great powers had to manage, resolve or otherwise cooperate with their differences on a regional or global scale. Moreover, the views of the Americans, Chinese and Russians towards the formation of a concert of powers may not be the same. The Russian may be the only ones to insist on a concert of powers, while the Chinese were not positive about it until 2008. During the cold war, the United States engaged in concerted behavior, for lack of a better term, although it has deviated from it ever since the end of the cold war. This conclusion is based on the policies that the United States has adopted to contain Russia and China and the lack of recognition that the Americans have for the areas of influence something that Russians keep pointing out. Russians are not only pessimistic about the intentions of the United States, but also see these differences as the return of strategic and geopolitical competition. Therefore, the reality of international system after the war in Ukraine shows that the balance of hostile forces is the current approach governing international relations.
Conclusion: After decades, the level of cooperation between the three Great powers identified in this article as pillars of the potential concert of powers has declined. Efforts to cooperate have sometimes failed because China and Russia refuse to cooperate with the West and the United States. This has led the international community to the most chaotic state of recent times where the liberal order is pitted against any order favored by the Chinese and the Russians. In addition, the concept of Sovereignty has changed and the West, allied with the United States has taken measures to contain China and Russia. It can no longer consider a concert of powers which Great powers participate in the management of world affairs. If we want to accept the idea of forming a coordinated collective security system, in the 21st century, developing states, great powers, as well as emerging countries should legitimately and appropriately regulate their actions with such an order.