امنیت و سیاست چین در برابر طالبان: تحول در رویکردها پس از اوت 2021

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

دکتری روابط بین‌الملل، دانشکده روابط بین‌الملل، دانشگاه ملی تاجیکستان، دوشنبه، تاجیکستان

10.22059/jcep.2025.387397.450286

چکیده

با خروج نیروهای آمریکایی از افغانستان در اوت 2021 طالبان به قدرت رسید. بسیاری از کشورها به‌دلیل تحقق‌نیافتن وعده‌های حقوق بشری و تشکیل دولت فراگیر، از شناسایی حکومت طالبان خودداری کردند. با وجود این، چین پیش و پس از اوت 2021 با طالبان روابط رسمی و رو به افزایشی داشته است. با توجه به اهمیت اصل مداخله‌نکردن و راهبرد اقتصادمحور در سیاست خارجی چین، دیدگاه غالب بر منافع اقتصادی چین و بهره‌برداری از ذخایر طبیعی افغانستان در چارچوب طرح یک کمربند و یک راه تأکید دارد. با بررسی روابط متغیر چین و افغانستان در ده‌های گذشته، به نظر می‌رسد منافع چین در دورۀ کنونی فراتر از سود اقتصادی است. در این نوشتار با رویکرد واقع‌گرایی تدافعی تحلیل می‌کنیم که مهم‌ترین عامل در سیاست خارجی چین، نگرانی‌های امنیتی است. پرسش این است که کدام عامل بر شیوۀ تعامل چین با طالبان بیشترین تأثیر را داشته است؟ فرضیه این است که توانایی طالبان در مهار گروه‌های جدایی‌طلب و تروریستی که امنیت ملی چین را تهدید می‌کنند، مهم‌ترین عامل مؤثر است. این نوشتار با روش ردیابی فرایند نشان می‌دهد که از دورۀ جنگ سرد تاکنون چین همواره در افغانستان ملاحظه‌های امنیتی داشته و با خروج آمریکا از افغانستان در سال 2021، مسئولیت حفظ ثبات و امنیت در افغانستان برای چین افزایش یافته است. در نتیجه، چین با رویکردی واقع‌گرایانه و تدافعی، به‌دنبال حفظ امنیت ملی خود از راه تعامل هوشمندانه با طالبان است، به‌گونه‌ای که اقتصاد ابزاری برای تحقق هدف‌های امنیتی شده است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

China's Security and Policy Towards the Taliban: Evolution in Approaches After August 2021

نویسنده [English]

  • fardin hashemi
Ph.D. in International Relations, Faculty of International Relations, Tajik National University, Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
چکیده [English]

Introduction: The Taliban came to power with the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan in August 2021. Many countries refused to recognize the Taliban due to their failure to fulfill their promises on human rights and the formation of an inclusive government. However, given the importance of the principle of non-interference and China's economy-centric foreign policy strategy, China has had increasing official engagement with the Taliban before and after August 2021. Given the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, many analysts see China’s engagement with the Taliban as an opportunity to exploit Afghanistan's natural and underground resources, in line with the broader “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). However, examining the changing relations between China and Afghanistan over the past decades, it seems that China's interests at the current juncture go beyond economic interests. Using a defensive realism approach, this research analyzes that the most critical factor in China's foreign policy is security concerns. The purpose of this research is to investigate the influence of security factors on China's relationship with the Taliban following August 2021.
Research question: The main question is which factor has had the most significant impact on how China interacts with the Taliban?
Research hypothesis: The Taliban's ability to contain separatist and terrorist groups that threaten China's national security is the most important influencing factor.
Methodology: This study employs a qualitative approach, utilizing the process trace analysis method. In this method, researchers try to analyze an event and uncover complex historical narratives by breaking it down into stages, events, and incidents and ultimately linking them together in a causal sequence. In this method, the research hypothesis is first stated. Then, the chronological sequence and order of events are arranged in such a way as to determine how far back in the past one must go to find the cause. Then, in a causal process, it must be explained how the variables affect each other. Finally, the necessary evidence is collected to prove the hypothesis, and a conclusion is drawn. This study uses the process tracing method and defensive realism theory to test the hypothesis. This study examines official relations between China and Afghanistan in three periods:

Cold War era,
The occupation of Afghanistan by the United States (2001-2021),
The second Taliban government.

Results and discussion: The study demonstrates how China’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan has evolved to meet its security interests. Using the theory of defensive realism, this research concludes that from the Cold War era to the present, China has consistently maintained security concerns about Afghanistan. With the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, China’s responsibility to maintain stability and security in Afghanistan has increased significantly. While during the US occupation of Afghanistan, China focused on Afghanistan's natural resources to sustain its economic growth, the country's motivation for broader engagement with the Taliban now stems from the Taliban's ability to contain terrorist groups that threaten China's national security. China seeks to prevent the spread of fundamentalism, extremism, and Islamist terrorism and is demanding that the Taliban control Uyghur militants in Afghanistan or hand them over to China. China remains deeply concerned about the radicalization of the Uyghur Muslim population in Xinjiang province.
The severity of these threats and the effectiveness of the Taliban regime in controlling them will, to a large extent, determine the pace and content of China's policy. In contrast, despite public propaganda, China's economic interests are much less prominent and certainly not something that would immerse it in the war-torn and unstable country of Afghanistan. Although security remains China's primary concern, according to defensive realism, China is unlikely to resort to military intervention in Afghanistan. Instead, it aims to achieve its security goals through peaceful means, positive interactions, and various forms of exchanges and diplomacy. So far, China's most significant interaction with Afghanistan has been border control efforts, designed to prevent terrorist infiltration into China.
A similar pattern has emerged in Central Asia, where China is seeking to deepen cooperation with countries in the region to combat terrorist threats and other security concerns. Internationally, Beijing aims to ensure that neighboring countries do not provide ideological, political, or material support to the Uyghur militant community. Given the direct security threats posed by extremist and separatist groups, China has adopted a cautious policy based on strengthening regional and diplomatic cooperation to prevent the spread of insecurity and maintain peripheral and regional stability. Therefore, while China is actively engaging with the Taliban, this engagement should not be confused with supporting them. Still, instead, the country has no choice but to engage with the current Afghan government in line with its security interests.
Conclusion: As a result, China's top priority in Afghanistan is security, and it sees engagement with the Taliban as the best way to reduce security threats. Since the Cold War, China has always had security concerns in Afghanistan, and with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, China's responsibility for maintaining stability and security in Afghanistan has increased. Combating extremism, separatism, and terrorism, especially from Uyghur groups, will likely remain a top priority of China's policy toward Afghanistan in the future. At the current juncture, the Taliban's will and ability to control these threats are the leading indicators of the direction of China's policy, and it seems that this will remain so in the future. In the future, China is likely to continue benefiting from non-interventionist yet proactive engagement. This model combines regional diplomacy, economic incentives, and multilateral pressure through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In this regard, China is trying to force the Taliban to adopt more moderate policies and adhere to security commitments.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Security
  • Terrorism and Extremism
  • Afghanistan
  • China
  • Taliban
  • Uyghur
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