اثربخشی تحریم‌های اقتصادی اتحادیۀ اروپا علیه روسیه (2022- 2023)

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استاد، گروه مطالعات منطقه‌ای، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

2 کارشناسی ارشد روابط بین‌الملل، گروه حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه یزد، یزد، ایران

چکیده

تهاجم روسیه به اوکراین نشان می‌دهد همچنان از ابزارهای اقتصاد سیاسی بین‌الملل، مانند تحریم‌ها استفاده می‌شود. یکی از این ابزارهای مهم برای فشار بین‌المللی علیه روسیه در جنگ با اوکراین، تحریم‌های اقتصادی علیه روسیه و مسائل مربوط با آن و اثربخشی رژیم تحریم علیه روسیه است. در این نوشتار در پی پاسخ این پرسش هستیم که تحریم‌های اقتصادی اتحادیۀ اروپا علیه روسیه در پی حملۀ این کشور به اوکراین (2022- 2023) چقدر اثر داشته است؟ در پاسخ این فرضیه مطرح می‌شود که تحریم‌های اقتصادی اتحادیۀ اروپا علیه روسیه در واکنش به حملۀ روسیه به اوکراین، اثربخشی متفاوتی داشته و از نظر بازدارندگی، نمادگرایی بین‌المللی و نمادگرایی داخلی تأثیر قابل ‌توجهی داشته است. روش این نوشتار آمیختۀ اکتشافی است. ابتدا داده‌ها را به‌وسیلۀ منابع اسنادی، کتابخانه‌ای و مجازی گردآوری شد. سپس با استفاده از نظریۀ لیندسی، پرسشنامۀ نیمه‌ساختمند تنظیم و تدوین و با روش دلفی فازی، نظرهای خبرگان را گرد‌آوری و در پایان داده‌ها را با استفاده از نرم‌افزار اس‌پی‌اس‌اس تحلیل شد. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد اثربخشی رژیم تحریم اتحادیۀ اروپا علیه روسیه در هدف‌های بازدارندگی، نمادگرایی بین‌المللی و نمادگرایی داخلی 63 درصد موفقیت‌آمیز بوده و از نظر سازگاری و براندازی به ترتیب 44 و 34 درصد بوده که اثربخشی قابل ملاحظه‌ای نداشته و با توجه به تحلیل به‌دست آمده، می‌توان گفت موفقیت‌آمیز نبوده است.  

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Effectiveness of the EU Economic Sanctions against Russia (2022-2023)

نویسندگان [English]

  • Elaheh Koolaee 1
  • Amir Reza Emami 2
1 Professor, Department of Regional Studies, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 M.A. in International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran
چکیده [English]

Introduction: One of the important tools used within the framework of international pressure against Russia after its aggression against Ukraine is economic sanctions, which were the reaction of many Western countries and the Western world in general, as a form of punishment for actions that consider Russia an aggressor. One related issue still under debate is the effectiveness of the sanctions regime against Russia. Therefore, this research aims to understand, describe, and measure the effectiveness of economic sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine from February 2022 to November 2023. The importance of the issue lies in examining economic sanctions in the context of Russia's attack on Ukraine, which can help clarify the extent of the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia. Therefore, the necessity of this research stems from the fact that previous researchers have examined this event from different perspectives. Through their research, it was found that there is no single, comprehensive study that focuses solely on the effectiveness of economic sanctions against Russia (2022-2023). Previous research has used a quantitative or qualitative approach, often using a case study research method, and has focused on various issues, including the legal dimension of sanctions effectiveness, trade relations, and sanctions packages of different actors.
Research question: This article seeks to answer the question, “To what extent have EU economic sanctions against Russia been effective in its invasion of Ukraine (2022-2023)?"
Research hypothesis: The hypothesis of this research is based on the claim that the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union against Russia in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from 2022 to 2023 have varying degrees of effectiveness and will have a significant impact from the perspective of compliance, international and domestic symbolism.
Methodology and theoretical framework: Drawing on Lindsay's theory of sanctions effectiveness, this study assesses the effectiveness of economic sanctions in relation to five separate objectives: compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, and domestic symbolism. The present study uses a mixed-methods study and considers a sequential exploratory design appropriate for its approach. This method begins with the collection and analysis of qualitative data, followed by the collection and analysis of quantitative data, and finally leads to interpretation. Therefore, data were collected through documentary, library, and virtual sources. Then, with the help of Lindsey's theory, a semi-structured questionnaire was developed by the researcher and distributed to 44 identified experts, including university professors and individuals in the fields of sanctions and international political economy. This study adopts a purposive non-probability sampling design, employing the fuzzy delphi method to elicit expert judgments.
Results and discussion: Since this research aimed to examine the effectiveness of the European Union's economic sanctions against Russia, the data were evaluated based on five objectives and criteria (compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, and domestic symbolism) and using the fuzzy delphi method. The results of this analysis are as follows; The average level of agreement in the compliance criterion is 0.441 and in the subversion criterion, 0.347 and deterrence, 0.631 in international symbolism and 0.636 in domestic symbolism, meaning that the effectiveness of the EU sanctions regime against Russia from 2022 to 2023 in compliance objectives, international symbolism and domestic symbolism is 63%, and from the perspective of compliance and subversion, 44 percent and 34 percent, respectively. Cronbach's alpha was calculated using SPSS 25 software andits value was 0.725, indicating acceptable reliability of this questionnaire.
Conclusion: There is a consensus that the effectiveness of economic sanctions is linked to the goals of the sending governments. If economic sanctions fail to achieve their officially stated goals, they may still serve various and unclear agendas, unclear programs with their own effectiveness, which explains why sanctions remain a popular tool in foreign policy. Therefore, for this purpose, this research has used Lindsay's five-dimensional framework to assess the effectiveness of sanctions in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The results show that the European Union sanctions regime against Russia during Russia's invasion of Ukraine (2022-2023) was effective and successful in terms of adapting to international and domestic symbolism but was not significantly effective in terms of adaptation and subversion.
According to the analysis, it can be admitted that they have not been successful. This level of effectiveness suggests that the EU sanctions regime has been considered relatively effective in terms of deterrence against specific targeted actions (Russia) as well as in conveying a symbolic message at the international and domestic levels, but in terms of compliance, it is clear that the sanctions regime has a relatively weaker impact on the implementation or compliance of measures imposed by the target (Russia) or other relevant actors. This indicates less success in achieving desired compliance with the imposed sanctions.
Finally, regarding the effectiveness of subversion, this study also shows that the sanctions regime has been less effective in terms of subversion and has faced challenges. While the sanctions regime has shown moderate effectiveness in deterrence and symbolization, it has faced limitations in achieving compliance and subversion. Finally, this assessment demonstrates the complexity of the impact and effectiveness of sanctions in countering the consequences of the invasion of Ukraine, emphasizes the multifaceted nature of assessing the impact of sanctions and argues that the effectiveness of the sanction’s regime against Russia, despite numerous gaps and widespread criticism, is still used, which indicates the dominance of this concept in international political economy.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Effectiveness
  • Sanctions
  • Invasion
  • European Union
  • Russia
  • Ukraine
  • Lindsay

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