Introduction: Measuring actors' perceptions of threat from one another is a complex, multi-layered issue, and a comprehensive examination of its dimensions faces many obstacles. However, actors' behavior clearly signals when they feel threatened by one another, including a wide range of elite positions on the threat and reciprocal actions taken in response to the threatening actor. Iran and Türkiye, as two neighboring actors with a common border, are considered rivals with opposing interests in regions including the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, despite establishing an acceptable level of political and diplomatic relations and sharing some security concerns over the past few decades. Türkiye's unwavering support for Azerbaijan, the spread of threats of Pan-Turkism, its growing influence in Central Asia, as seen in cases such as the Organization of Turkic-Speaking States, and the serious conflict of interests between these two actors in Syria and Iraq are just some of the areas of conflict between these two regional powers. Because threat perception is one of the most important factors shaping countries' foreign policy and a basis for policymaking, this article explains the evolution of Iran's threat perception of Türkiye by presenting a conceptual model and identifying the factors that shape this process.
Research question: What impact did the series of events and trends from the Second Karabakh War to the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government have on the increased sense of threat to Iran from Türkiye, and in what abstract form can these changes be explained?
Research hypothesis: This article shows that a series of events and trends in regions including the South Caucasus, Iraq, and Syria, particularly the fall of Assad as Iran’s regional ally, have increased Iran’s perception of Türkiye as a threatening state.
Methodology: The authors present an innovative theoretical model that includes the threat perception mechanism of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a process-tracking method. Threat perception motivates a wide range of behaviors, from cooperation to conflict, and has been central to theories of war, alliances, and conflict resolution. Threat perception in each country is shaped by various internal and external variables.
Results and discussion: The Second Karabakh War altered the equations of the South Caucasus near the Iranian borders and shifted the balance of power in favor of Baku. Baku's victory in this war was initially widely welcomed by Iranian officials. However, Israel's role in the Republic of Azerbaijan, its influence on the region's dynamics, and the presence of a third actor, Türkiye, in the Israel-Azerbaijan-Türkiye triangle gradually heightened Iran's sensitivity toward this axis, including Türkiye. The Gaza War further increased Iran's perception of the Turkish threat. The Gaza War and continued economic cooperation between Israel and Türkiye also heightened Iranian elites' perception of the threat and sensitivity toward Türkiye, intensifying the atmosphere of distrust toward Türkiye.
The most important event in Iran’s threat perception of Türkiye during 2020-2024 was the fall of Assad and the rise of Turkish-backed forces. This, along with the reduction of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s geopolitical influence in the region, led to the representation of Türkiye as a cooperative actor and partner centered on the US-Israeli (as the most prominent enemies in the Islamic Republic of Iran's threat perception system). The increased perception of the Iranian threat to Türkiye, together with the existing grounds and areas of disagreement between these two actors, makes it all the more necessary to adopt mechanisms and approaches to anticipate, prevent, and manage future tensions, especially in relation to the South Caucasus, Syria, and Iraq. This is especially so because, as explained in this article, if current trends continue, the likelihood of direct and indirect military confrontation between the two actors in the conflict zones has significantly increased.
Conclusion: The Islamic Republic of Iran's threat-perception system centers on portraying the United States and Israel as the primary enemies, and accordingly, threats from other actors are also categorized. Explaining and analyzing Iran's perception of the Turkish threat is a specific and complex case study. Undoubtedly, factors such as Türkiye's membership in NATO, the proximity and shared border between the two countries, historical challenges, cultural and linguistic affinities, regional geopolitical rivalries, and differing perceptions of political Islam have always shaped how each actor perceives the other's threat. However, according to the research's conceptual model, Türkiye’s perception of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran should be examined in the context of this actor’s relationship with the United States and Israel, as well as Iran’s perception of the issue. This is clearly evident in explaining the change in Iran’s perception of the Turkish threat from the Second Karabakh War to the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.