ژئوپلیتیک دریایی و سیاست خارجی روسیه در بحران‌های اوکراین و سوریه

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار گروه مطالعات روسیه، دانشکدۀ مطالعات جهان، دانشگاه تهران

2 دانشجوی دکتری روابط بین‌الملل، دانشگاه علامۀ طباطبایی

چکیده

توجه به اهمیت امنیتی و اقتصادی مناطق دریایی در سیاست خارجی روسیه در سال‌های اخیر افزایش یافته است. روسیه نفوذ و کنترل بر دریاهای مهم را از بنیادهای خیزش و تحکیم جایگاه خود در سیاست بین‌الملل می‌داند. از این‌رو برنامه‌های تقویت و نوسازی گسترده‌ای در حوزۀ نیروی دریایی در پیش گرفته است. روسیه که به‌دنبال بازپس‌گیری جایگاه خود در سیاست بین‌الملل است، به‌راستی قدرتی بزرگ نخواهد بود؛ مگر اینکه همانند بیشتر قدرت‌های بزرگ از گذشته تاکنون همچون انگلیس، آمریکا و چین که با افزایش قدرت، حضور گسترده‌تری در مناطق آبی جهان پیدا می‌کنند، در «اقیانوس جهانی» حضور پر‌‌رنگ‌تری داشته باشد؛ بنابراین مسئلۀ کنترل و تسلط بر مناطق آبی مهم جهان در مواردی همچون گرجستان، اوکراین و سوریه از مؤلفه‌های اصلی تبیین‌کنندۀ رفتار روسیه در سال‌های اخیر است. همچنین روسیه همانند همۀ قدرت‌های بزرگ جهان تلاش می‌کند تا در خارج از مرزهای خود حضور نظامی داشته باشد. بر این مبنا این نوشتار در پی پاسخ‌گویی به این پرسش است که علت مداخلۀ نظامی روسیه در بحران‌های اوکراین و سوریه چیست؟ در پاسخ گفته می‌شود که حفظ و تقویت کنترل روسیه بر دریاهای سیاه و مدیترانه از عامل‌های اصلی حضور این کشور در اوکراین و سوریه بوده است. با توجه به اینکه روسیه هم در اوکراین و هم در سوریه پایگاه‌های دریایی دارد با مداخله در این دو کشور به‌دنبال آن است که پایگاه‌های سواستوپول و ترتوس را حفظ کند و از این راه تسلط خود را بر این مناطق مهم تقویت کند.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Maritime Geopolitics and Russia’s Foreign Policy in Ukrainian and Syrian Crises

نویسندگان [English]

  • Jahangir Karami 1
  • Saman Fazeli 2
1 Associate Professor of Russia Studies Department, Faculty of Global Studies, University of Tehran
2 PhD Student in International Relations, Allameh Tabataba’i University
چکیده [English]

Russia has historically had a powerful army and air force but its Navy was weaker than its competitors. Attention to the security and economic importance of the sea areas in the Russian foreign policy in recent years has increased. Russia assumes that presence, influence and control over important seas is one of the foundations of the rise and strengthening of its position in international politics. In the other words, just like any other great power in the last two centuries like Britain, the USA and China which along with their power increased, have created large and strong navies and boosted their presence in the strategic seas, Russia also is going to do same, since its primary goal is to prove itself to the world as a great power and treats and to be treated as one of the poles of international politics. Therefore, Russia has followed wide reinforcement and modernization plans in the Navy. Furthermore, Russia like most of the world's great powers has tried to have military presence beyond its borders. On the other hand, two main international crises in the last six years have been Ukrainian and Syrian crises, which Russia has significantly intervened militarily in both. Syria unlike some countries like Egypt was one of the loyal partners of the Soviet Union and had good relations with it to such a degree that the Soviet Union was permitted to open a naval military base in Tartus in 1971, giving the Soviet Union a stable presence in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. This relationship has continued after the Cold War especially in the Syrian crisis in which Russia firmly supported Syrian government against its enemies who wanted to oust the Assad regime, vetoed all anti-Assad resolutions in the Security Council and finally intervened militarily on the eve of the collapse of the Assad regime on December 2015 and rescued it. On the other side, after Euromaidan demonstrations and the fall of pro-Russian president in Ukraine, as the most important countries for Russia in the Near Abroad, Russia with permission from its parliament invaded the Crimean Peninsula and after a controversial referendum annexed this peninsula. Why Russia did such military actions in Syria and Ukraine? On this basis, the authors seek to answer the question that what is the cause of Russian intervention in the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis? Russia obviously has economic and political interest in Syria but why didn't Russia support Saddam in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 despite that it had even far more economic interest in there than Syria? Or despite the security importance of Ukraine and Russia's concerns about joining of Ukraine to the EU and NATO, why wasn't Russia so sensitive about Baltic countries and allowed them to become members of the EU and NATO? What was the different between Ukraine and Syria and the other cases? In other words what was the 'deep" cause of Russian military involvement in these two crises? In response, the authors claim that one of the main causes of Russia's intervention in Ukraine and Syria is to maintain and strengthen control over the Black and the Mediterranean seas. Given the fact that Russia has naval bases in both Ukraine and Syria by intervening in Ukraine and Syria tries to save the Sevastopol and Tartus bases and thereby strengthens its control of these important areas. As a matter of fact, one of the main factors explaining Russia foreign policy as a whole in recent years is control and domination over the world's crucial water areas. It is obvious that effective and strong influence over the vital sea areas requires having presence in the important coastal countries. Thus having good relations with some coastal countries have become a strategic goal for Russia. No other countries could better serve this Russian goal than Syria and Ukraine, which have unique positions in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea respectively. Russia, as the traditional land power, views the Black Sea as the gate towards world domination and hegemony and sees the Mediterranean Sea as an indispensable part to access the "World Ocean". It shouldn't be overlooked that Russia at first gave much more weight to the Black Sea than the Mediterranean. but in the past two decades during which, NATO has exclusively dominated over the Mediterranean on the one hand and Russia has become more powerful and assertive after the "lost decade" of the 1990s on the other hand, Russia has given more attention to the Mediterranean Sea than before. Russia has traditionally associated Geopolitical thinking and because of its size and geography has been one of the most important geopolitical regions that have attracted geopoliticians. But ironically at the same time, Russia suffers from a "Geopolitical Dilemma" since it has no appropriate access to the warm and free waters. Based on this the authors have found out that the main reason behind the Russian military interventions in Ukraine and Syria was to overcome its Geopolitical Dilemma and to secure its access to the Mediterranean and the Black seas. Indeed, Russia viewed Ukraine and Syrian events through the lens of its long-term, strategic interest so it paid many economic and political costs to ensure its foothold in Tartus and Sevastopol. The methodology used in this article is Descriptive-analytical and data collection is conducted in a combined way desk research and internet resources.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Geopolitics
  • Navy
  • Russia
  • Syria
  • Ukraine
Allison, Roy (2013), “Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis”, International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4, pp. 795–823.
Bagdonas, Azuolas (2012), “Russia’s Interests in the Syrian Conflict: Power, Prestige and Profit”, European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 55-77.
Brannon, Robert (2009), Russian Civil-Military Relations, Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Criekemans, David (2011), “Mental Maps, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Analysis: Basic Analytical Framework and Application to Sub-State Diplomacy in the Mediterranean”, University of Porto, Available at: www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011, (Accessed on: 25/12/2016).
Delanoe, Igor (2013), “Le Partenariat Sratégique Russo-Syrien: la Clef du Dispositif Naval Russe en Méditerranée”, Fondation Pour la Recherche Stratégique, Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/165099/201306.pdf, (Accessed on: 17/12/2016).
Delanoe, Igor (2014), “After the Crimean Crisis: towards a Greater Russian Maritime Power in the Black Sea”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 367- 382.
Dolatyar, Mostafa (2002), “Hydropolitics: Challenging the Water-War Thesis”, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 115-124.
Ezzati, Ezzatollah (2007), Geopolitics, Tehran: Samt [in Persian].
Gokmen, Semra (2010), “Geopolitics and the Study of International Relations”, Available at: https://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12612289, (Accessed on: 28/12/2016).
Ieee.es (2015), “Russian National Security Strategy”, Available at: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf, (Accessed on: 6/2/2017).
Knutsen, Torbjorn (2014), “Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics, and the Heartland Thesis”, The International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 835-857.
Koolaee, Elaheh (1997), Politics and Government in the Russian Federation, Tehran: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [in Persian].
Koolaee, Elaheh (2010), Politics and Government in Central Eurasia, Tehran: Samt [in Persian].
Koulieri, Olga (2006), “Russian Eurasianism and the Geopolitics of The Black Sea”, Available at: www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/special/S43/S43.pt4, (Accessed on: 8/3/2017).
Kovalsky, Nicolai (1998), “Security Considerations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East: a Russian Perspective”, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 2-14.
Lieven, Anatol (1997), “Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia, and the West”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 55-77.
Litsas, Spyridon (2016), “Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean: Intervention, Deterrence, Containment”, Digest of Middle East Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 56-73.
Lutterbeck, Derek and Georgij Engelbrecht (2009), “The West and Russia in the Mediterranean: towards a Renewed Rivalry”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 385–406.
Metelitsa, Alexander (2014), “16% of Natural Gas Consumed in Europe Flows through Ukraine”, Available at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/15411/, (Accessed on: 10/2/2017).
Mirheydar, Doreh and Hossein Hamidinia (2006), “Comparison of Geopolitics and International Relations in Terms of Methodology and Concepts”, Geopolitics, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1-41 [in Persian].
Mojtahedzadeh, Pirouz (2007), Political Geography and Geopolitics, Tehran: Samt [in Persian].
Office of Naval Intelligence (2015), “The Russian Navy - a Historic Transition”, Available at: https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/historic.pdf, (Accessed on: 25/12/2016).
Peck, Michael (2017), “How Russia is Turning Syria into a Major Naval Base for Nuclear Warships”, The National Interest, Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-russia-turning-syria-major-naval-base-nuclear-warships-19813 (Accessed on: 5/3/2017).
Petrov, Nikita (2007), “Russia’s Navy gets Ambitious”, Sputnik News, Available at: https://sputniknews.com/analysis/2007073170008268/, (Accessed on: 18/11/2016).
Rudd, David (2015), “The Russian Federation Navy Post-2015: Implications for Western Navies”, Canadian Naval Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 4-9.
Russia Today (2017), “More S-400 Air Defense Systems to be Deployed in Crimea in Coming Days”, Available at: https://www.rt.com/news/414011-s400-missile-deployment-crimea/ (Accessed on: 17/4/2017).
Shelest, Hanna (2015), “Southeast European and Black Sea Studies”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 191-201.
Souleimanov, Emil Aslan and Katarina Petrtylova (2015), “Russia’s Policy toward the Islamic State”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 66-78.
Srivastava, Nitika (2016), “Russia’s Naval Resurgence in Eurasia”, Journal of the National Maritime Foundation, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 1-16.
Strategic Comments(2000), “Reviving Russia’s Navy”, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 6, pp. 1-2.
Strategic Comments (2015), “Russia’s Naval Modernisation Will Take Time”, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 6, pp. 1-2.
TASS (2017), “Russia will Use Naval Base in Tartus and Syria’s Hmeymim Base on Disinterested Terms”, Available at: http://tass.com/defense/926348, (Accessed on: 1/2/2017).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2016), “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (Approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), Available at: www.mid.ru/en/foreign_plicy/official _documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248, (Accessed on: 30/1/2017).
Widen, J. J. (2015), “21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Considerations for the Modern Era”, The Mariner’s Mirror, Vol. 101, No. 2, pp. 252-253.
Willett, Lee (2009), “The Navy in Russia’s Resurgence”, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, No. 1, pp. 50-55.
Yesilot, Okan (2014), “The Crimean Crisis in the Context of New Russian Geopolitics”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 167-181.
Zappa, Cira and Charles Zargbibe (1985), On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.