نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 استادیار روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه تهران
2 دکتری روابط بینالملل، دانشگاه تهران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran has become one of the major international conflicts and disputes over the past decade as the main theme of our country's foreign policy. It is also noteworthy that the same viewpoint did not exist in Iran's nuclear program in domestic and foreign spheres, and different approaches and perspectives have been raised about the nature of this issue. The Russian Federation is one of those actors that play a direct and indirect role in this matter.
This country has always had an important role in the continuity and extent of Iran's nuclear activities and its role cannot be compared with any other country. Conditions such as Russia's nuclear-technical cooperation with Iran, its interests in how our country's nuclear activities are operating and its specific conditions, such as its permanent membership in the Security Council and the geographic situation of Russia and Iran, caused to increase the importance of its role. But there are different views on the role and approach. One of the reasons for the divergent views on this issue is the adoption of different and two-way behaviors from Russia over various dimensions of Iran's nuclear file over the past two decades. Considering the importance of Russian role in Iran's nuclear case this article trying to answer the question why Russia's ambivalent and ambiguous approach towards Iran's nuclear program is adopted?
To answer this question, it is necessary to pay attention to the material and identity dimensions shaping the principles of Russia's foreign policy. In response to the research question, the hypotheses generated that Eurasianism identity discourse assumes roles such as "great power", "regional superpower" and "nuclear superpower" for Russia. As a result, Russia has been cooperating with Iran to develop its nuclear energy program on the one hand, and on the other hand, it has been preventing a remarkable progress of Iran's nuclear technology, while opposing to measures such as military action to avoid severe weakening of Iran, since a nuclear Iran will be a powerful regional rival for Russia. Any military strike against Iran or undermine its goals could possibly result in turning this country into a base for U.S.'s in the southern borders of Russia. Each of these situations is in conflict with Russia's foreign policy main roles. The research to advance his hypothesis uses the analytical method and the library resources and benefited interview.
Since the beginning of the disagreement over Iran's nuclear program, Russia has been pushing for an effective role in this issue as an international conflict under the influence of the effort to acquire the role of a great global power. But the two other roles of Moscow, namely, superpower and regional superpower, have imposed a framework on Russia's role in Russia and its mechanisms for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. This is how the Russians strongly oppose the militarization of Iran's nuclear program and do not want their nuclear monopoly broken up in the region. It has also opposed any possible increase in Iran's power as a potential competitor in the region. The two other concerns of the Russians, which shaped the two-way approach of the activist, were the beginning of a war against Iran or Iran's proximity to the west. Since each of these two situations also has consequences for Russia, so too to avoid these two situations, mechanisms such as accompanying sanctions against the use of a military option or creating conditions for the reciprocity of the negotiating solution have priority.
It can be stated that Russia's approach to Iran's nuclear program can be explained by considering these mechanisms: Russian nuclear doctrine and Iran's nuclear program, the potential increase in Iran's capability and Russia's superpower role in the region, preventing any military strike against Iran and preventing its friendship with the west. The elite of the foreign policy apparatus of Russia has been trying to make the most of the interest in the subject of Iran's nuclear negotiations as one of its foreign policy issues, which has been linked to other issues, and follow their desired roles in a better way. In this regard, in recent years, it has used this as a means of engagement, confrontation or chaos to the West, even in relation to other issues, and while continuing its nuclear cooperation with Iran, they agreed to adopt sanctions against Iran. In assessing Russia's compliance with the sanctions against Iran for these reasons, it should be noted: Rejecting the Russian proposal by Iran to resolve nuclear disputes during the 2011 negotiations, Moscow's motivation to show its legitimate image in the international community, stop the progress of the Iranian nuclear program.
With regard to the nuclear deal, conditions such as concerns about unilateral action by the United States against Iran and the benefits of lifting sanctions against Iran have led Russia to be enthusiastic in the resumption of talks, despite the initial escalation of sanctions against Iran, with the United States, over the past few years. Of course, Russia continued to strive for its priorities, such as extensive oversight of Iran's activities, along with the removal of trade restrictions. Despite Russia's disputes with the west, Both Russia and the United States have directed their policy on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, working with Washington to achieve this goal is still meaningful for Moscow. So, to achieve this goal, Russia was inclined to advance negotiations. Another issue is the restoration of Russia's image in the nuclear talks. It should also be noted that Russia's real ability to create a barrier to a nuclear deal was not enough strong. The nuclear deal's implications have also been a major issue for Moscow, which provided Russia with Iran with much more nuclear and commercial cooperation.
کلیدواژهها [English]
English
Russian[1]
)