روسیه و پروندۀ هسته‌ای ایران؛ رویکرد به گفت‌وگوها و ایفای نقش در به‌دست‌آوردن توافق

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار روابط بین‌الملل، دانشگاه تهران

2 دکتری روابط بین‌الملل، دانشگاه تهران

چکیده

فدراسیون روسیه همواره در میزان و تداوم فعالیت‌های هسته‌ای ایران نقش مهمی داشته است. نقش این کشور با هیچ کشور دیگری مقایسه‌پذیر نیست؛ اما دربارۀ نقش و رویکرد آن، دیدگاه‌های مختلفی وجود دارد. از دلیل‌های اختلاف دیدگاه‌ها در این موضوع، به‌کارگرفتن رفتارهای متفاوت و دووجهی از سوی روسیه در مقابل ابعاد مختلف پروندۀ هسته‌ای ایران در دو دهۀ گذشته بوده است. این نوشتار با درنظر داشتن اهمیت نقش‌ روسیه در پروندۀ هسته‌ای ایران در پی پاسخ به این پرسش است که چرا روسیه در برابر برنامۀ هسته‌ای ایران رویکردی دووجهی و دوگانه درپیش گرفته است؟ در پاسخ به این پرسش، این فرضیه مطرح می‌شود که گفتمان هویتی اوراسیاگرایی با ترسیم نقش‌هایی مانند «قدرت بزرگ جهانی»، «ابرقدرت منطقه‌ای» و «ابرقدرت هسته‌ای» سبب شده‌اند روسیه ضمن بهره‌برداری از مزایای همکاری هسته‌ای با ایران، تلاش کند مانع هسته‌ای شدن و به‌دنبال آن افزایش شدید قدرت ایران شود. همچنین با هدف جلوگیری از تضعیف شدید ایران، مخالف اقدام‌هایی مانند عملیات نظامی علیه این کشور شود. بدین شکل رویکرد دووجهی خود را دنبال کند؛ زیرا تبدیل ایران به قدرتی هسته‌ای، افزایش قدرت آن به‌عنوان رقیب منطقه‌ای برای روسیه را در پی دارد؛ همچنین هرگونه حملۀ نظامی علیه ایران و یا تضعیف شدید آن، این کشور را به پایگاهی برای گسترش نفوذ آمریکا در مرزهای جنوبی روسیه تبدیل می‌کند. هر کدام از این وضعیت‌ها در تعارض با نقش‌های اصلی سیاست خارجی روسیه قرار دارد. این نوشتار برای پیشبرد فرضیۀ خود از روش توصیفی‌- تحلیلی و استفاده از منابع کتابخانه‌ای و مصاحبه بهره برده است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Russia and Iran's Nuclear Case; the Approach to the Negotiations and Play a Role in the Acquisition Agreement

نویسندگان [English]

  • Naser Hadian 1
  • Hadi Zargari 2
1 Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Tehran
2 PhD in International Relations, University of Tehran
چکیده [English]

The nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran has become one of the major international conflicts and disputes over the past decade as the main theme of our country's foreign policy. It is also noteworthy that the same viewpoint did not exist in Iran's nuclear program in domestic and foreign spheres, and different approaches and perspectives have been raised about the nature of this issue. The Russian Federation is one of those actors that play a direct and indirect role in this matter.
This country has always had an important role in the continuity and extent of Iran's nuclear activities and its role cannot be compared with any other country. Conditions such as Russia's nuclear-technical cooperation with Iran, its interests in how our country's nuclear activities are operating and its specific conditions, such as its permanent membership in the Security Council and the geographic situation of Russia and Iran, caused to increase the importance of its role. But there are different views on the role and approach. One of the reasons for the divergent views on this issue is the adoption of different and two-way behaviors from Russia over various dimensions of Iran's nuclear file over the past two decades. Considering the importance of Russian role in Iran's nuclear case this article trying to answer the question why Russia's ambivalent and ambiguous approach towards Iran's nuclear program is adopted?
To answer this question, it is necessary to pay attention to the material and identity dimensions shaping the principles of Russia's foreign policy. In response to the research question, the hypotheses generated that Eurasianism identity discourse assumes roles such as "great power", "regional superpower" and "nuclear superpower" for Russia. As a result, Russia has been cooperating with Iran to develop its nuclear energy program on the one hand, and on the other hand, it has been preventing a remarkable progress of Iran's nuclear technology, while opposing to measures such as military action to avoid severe weakening of Iran, since a nuclear Iran will be a powerful regional rival for Russia. Any military strike against Iran or undermine its goals could possibly result in turning this country into a base for U.S.'s in the southern borders of Russia. Each of these situations is in conflict with Russia's foreign policy main roles. The research to advance his hypothesis uses the analytical method and the library resources and benefited interview.
Since the beginning of the disagreement over Iran's nuclear program, Russia has been pushing for an effective role in this issue as an international conflict under the influence of the effort to acquire the role of a great global power. But the two other roles of Moscow, namely, superpower and regional superpower, have imposed a framework on Russia's role in Russia and its mechanisms for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. This is how the Russians strongly oppose the militarization of Iran's nuclear program and do not want their nuclear monopoly broken up in the region. It has also opposed any possible increase in Iran's power as a potential competitor in the region. The two other concerns of the Russians, which shaped the two-way approach of the activist, were the beginning of a war against Iran or Iran's proximity to the west. Since each of these two situations also has consequences for Russia, so too to avoid these two situations, mechanisms such as accompanying sanctions against the use of a military option or creating conditions for the reciprocity of the negotiating solution have priority.
It can be stated that Russia's approach to Iran's nuclear program can be explained by considering these mechanisms: Russian nuclear doctrine and Iran's nuclear program, the potential increase in Iran's capability and Russia's superpower role in the region, preventing any military strike against Iran and preventing its friendship with the west. The elite of the foreign policy apparatus of Russia has been trying to make the most of the interest in the subject of Iran's nuclear negotiations as one of its foreign policy issues, which has been linked to other issues, and follow their desired roles in a better way. In this regard, in recent years, it has used this as a means of engagement, confrontation or chaos to the West, even in relation to other issues, and while continuing its nuclear cooperation with Iran, they agreed to adopt sanctions against Iran. In assessing Russia's compliance with the sanctions against Iran for these reasons, it should be noted: Rejecting the Russian proposal by Iran to resolve nuclear disputes during the 2011 negotiations, Moscow's motivation to show its legitimate image in the international community, stop the progress of the Iranian nuclear program.
With regard to the nuclear deal, conditions such as concerns about unilateral action by the United States against Iran and the benefits of lifting sanctions against Iran have led Russia to be enthusiastic in the resumption of talks, despite the initial escalation of sanctions against Iran, with the United States, over the past few years. Of course, Russia continued to strive for its priorities, such as extensive oversight of Iran's activities, along with the removal of trade restrictions. Despite Russia's disputes with the west, Both Russia and the United States have directed their policy on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, working with Washington to achieve this goal is still meaningful for Moscow. So, to achieve this goal, Russia was inclined to advance negotiations. Another issue is the restoration of Russia's image in the nuclear talks. It should also be noted that Russia's real ability to create a barrier to a nuclear deal was not enough strong. The nuclear deal's implications have also been a major issue for Moscow, which provided Russia with Iran with much more nuclear and commercial cooperation.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Eurasianism
  • Foreign Policy
  • Iran
  • Iran Nuclear Deal
  • Iran Nuclear Negotiation
  • Iran Nuclear Program
  • Russia
English

1.   Alexandrov, Maxym, (2003), “The Concept of State Identity in International Relations”, Journal of International Development and Cooperation, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2003, pp. 33–46.

Baev, Pavel K. (2015), “The China Factor in Russian Support for the Iran Deal”, Brookings, Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/07/21-china-russia-support-for-iran-deal-baev, (Accessed on: 22/10/2016).
Berchil, Scott and Others (2012), International Relations Theories, Translated by Homeira Moshirzadeh and Ruhollah Talebi, Tehran: Mizan [in Persian].
El-Baradei, Mohamed (2012), The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times, New York: Bloomsburg Publishing Plc.
Hadian, Naser (2010), “Iran Nuclear Program; a Plurality of Views and Fields of Discourse”, Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 355-374 [in Persian].
Hopf, Ted (2005), “Identity, Legitimacy and Use of Military Force: Russia’s Great Power Identity and Military Intervention in Abkhazia”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 225- 243.
Ilin, Alexey and Claire Berger (2015), “How does Russia Benefits from Iran’s Deal?, MUFTAH, Available at: http://muftah.org/how-does-russia-benefit-from-the-iran-deal/#.Vn_SFrZ94rj, (Accessed on: 1/9/2016).
Jafari, Aliakbar and Roya Mirjalali (2010), “Character of Russia’s Foreign Policy in Nuclear Cooperation with Iran”, Political Sciences, Vol. 13, No. 51, pp. 155-180 [in Persian].
Karami, Jahangir (2005), Russia’s Foreign Policy Development; The Identity of the State and the Issue of West, Tehran: Printing and Publishing Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [in Persian].
Karami, Jahangir (2009), I. R. of Iran and Russian Federation’s Relations, Tehran: Printing and Publishing Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [in Persian].
Katz, Mark (2002), “Russian-Iranian Relation in Putin Era”, Demokratizatsiya, George Washington University, pp. 69-81, Available at: www2.gwu.edu/ieresgwu/ assets/docs/, (Accessed on: 27/12/2015).
Koolaee, Elaheh (2006), “Iran and Russia’s Relations; Continuity and Change”, Institute for Russian, Central Asian and the Caucasian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-16 [in Persian].
Koolaee, Elaheh and Alireza Noori (2010), “Putin Pragmatism and Change of Russia’s Foreign Policy Approach”, Politics, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 209-228 [in Persian].
Laruelle, Marlen (2009), Russian Eurosinism, Imperator Ideology, Translated by Seyed Jafar Seyedzadeh, Tehran: Abrar Moaser [in Persian].
Makarychev, Andrey S. (2008), “Politics, the State and De-Politicization; Putin’s Project Reassessed”, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 55, No. 5, pp. 62–71.
Mojtahedzadeh, Piroz and Ahmad Rashidinezhad (2011), “Geopolitical Analysis of Russia’s Foreign Policy toward Iran Nuclear Program (2000- 2008)”, Geopolitics, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 1-36 [in Persian].
Molaei, Yosef and Hadi Zargari (2016), “Russia and Security Council toward Iran Nuclear Issue”, Central Asia and the Caucasus Studies, Vol. 22, No. 94, pp. 103-134 [in Persian].
Moshirzadeh, Homeira (2007), International Relations Theories, Tehran: Samt [in Persian].
Pieper, Moritz (2014), “Chinese, Russian, and Turkish Policies in the Iranian Nuclear Dossier: between Resistance to Hegemony and Hegemonic Accommodation”, Asian Journal of Peace Building, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 17-36.
Pourahmadi, Hossein and Amir Abbasi Khoshkar (2012), “Bases of Russia’s Foreign Policy Behavior toward Iran Nuclear Issue”, Political Sciences Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 39-77 [in Persian].
Shoja, Morteza and Others (2013), Russia’s Foreign Policy in Caspian Sea in Eurasian Era, Tehran: Strategic Defense Research Center [in Persian].
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2010), “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, Available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents, (Accessed on: 25/2/2010).
“The World’s Biggest Natural Gas Reserves” (2013), Available at: https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/features/feature-the-worlds-biggest-natural-gas-reserves/, (Accessed on: 11/11/2018).
Torbakov, Igor (1992), “The ‘Statists’ and the Ideology of Russian Imperial Nationalism”, RFE/RL Research Paper 1, No. 11, pp. 10-16.
Trenin, Dmitri (2010), Iran: a View From Moscow, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

12.  Katz, Mark N. (2015), “Russian Anxieties about the Iranian Nuclear Accord”, Lobelog Foreign Policy, Available at: http://lobelog.com/russian-anxieties-about-the-iranian-nuclear-accord/, (Accessed on: 4/10/2016).

20.  Mousavian, Hossein (2012), Iranian Nuclear Crisis: a Memoir, Washington D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

21.  Omelicheva, Mariya (2012), “Russian Foreign Policy toward Iran: a Critical Geopolitics Perspective”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 331-344.

24.  Schwartz, Paul N. (2015), “What the Iran Deal Means for Russia”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russian Defense and High Technology Project, pp. 1-6, Available at: https://www.csis.org, (Accessed on: 14/9/2016).

 
Russian[1]
Белоглазов, Альберт Владиславович (2016), “Интервью с Альбертом Белоглазовым”, преподавателем кафедры международных отношений и зарубежного регионоведения в Институте международных отношений, истории и востоковедия Казанского Федерального Университетe, 22/06/2016.
Гришин, Яков Яковлевич (2016), “Интервью с Яковом Гришиным”, преподавателем кафедры международных отношений и зарубежного регионоведения в Институте международных отношений, истории и востоковедия Казанского Федерального Университетe, 20/06/2016.