تأثیر گفتمان‎های هویتی روسیه بر نقش‌یابی اوراسیایی ایران

The attitude and approach of Russia's encounter with Eurasian region has gone a long way in the post-Sovietera. The identity discourses of Russia including Westernism, Statism and Eurasianism in the post-Soviet era have determined the interpretation of Russian political system regarding Eurasia and Eurasian regionalism based on formation of a spiritual system. This topic beyond the endless process of adaptability of Russia’s regional behavior with different spiritual systems and identity statements has led to a continuous review and re-listing of its rivals, colleagues and allies, especially in Eurasia. For example, due to the evolution of Russia’s identical attitude towards Eurasia and regionalism approach, Iran’s place in this category and the preference / not to cooperate with it has been repeatedly changed. Despite the differences in form, the instrumentalist rule of conduct with Iran has been the joint production of Russian identity discourses. This behavioral rule has been the result of a social learning of interactive process between prior identities and latent identity experiences. The following article is aimed at understanding the “role of Russian identity discourses in the Eurasian role of Iran”, which seeks to verify the notion based on “the role of deterrence of these discourses on findings to verify Iran’s Eurasian role”.
Because of the proximity of the two countries with Eurasia, the conceptualizations of Russia’s identity from Iran have been most influenced by the materialist-semantic process of the country’s identity discourses. In other words, under the influence of this subject, some assumed roles have been defined for Iran such as the “South Threat”, “Playing Card with the West”, “a natural partner and ally against the common enemy”, “a reliable and credible ally in the region and the world”. In Russia’s Eurasian politics, the construction has left behind an endless rupture. As a result, the lack of interests in relation to Iran and the preference / unwillingness of cooperation with it have been repeatedly transformed into different topics of debate. Specifically in Eurasian region all three discourses with differences in identity and political thoughts have preferred to adopt an instrumentalist approach to Iran.
This article tries to examine what has gone through the implementation of a critical constructivist approach, which focuses on the process of transforming the attitude of Russia’s dual identity discourse into Iran-Eurasia. The main goal is to answer this question: “What role did Russia’s identity discourses have during the post-Soviet era in Iran’s function in Eurasia?” In response, the hypothesis will be tested that “Russia’s identity discourses have played a deterrent role in the Eurasian role of Iran”, will be tested. In this regard, the three dialectics of Westernism, Statism and Eurasianism (conservative and critical) in relation to Iran were studied. In terms of Westernism toward cooperation with Iran, there is a discrepancy between a priori and a posteriori identity. In fact, the late Western experience of Iran (such as the experience of Iran’s constructive role in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan crises and its non- intervention approach in the Chechnya crisis) has changed the cynical meanings of Iran (such as the Islamic / South threat) and has created the ground to cooperate with it. Regarding the state-oriented nature and the critical nature of Eurasianism, the proactive identity of Iran in relation to it confirms its pre-emptive identity. The two despite sharing somewhat discriminating meanings with the anti-Western identity in Iran, favored a “flexible, temporary, and instrumental” cooperation with Iran on the sustained and inseparable co-operation with the “power policy”.  Here one can also speak of the effect of latent experiences, but these experiences appear to have a stabilizing role, not a changeable one in the anti-Semitism of the discourses between Statism and critical Eurasianism. However, the conservative Eurasian type supports unity with Iran. But, as noted, this alliance is only against the common “western” threat in Eurasian region; it has been dealing with creation of the identity structures of “Eurasian civilization” and “the Russian world”.
The inappropriateness of a priori and posterior identity look at Iran in the discourse of Westernism and the appropriateness of this in the two discourses of statism and Eurasianism were derived from the social learning of interactive processes simultaneously with the triples of the West-Eurasia-Iran. Russia’s laws and rules of conduct have been developed with Iran. The result, in particular, in the Eurasian region has been the creation of an instrumentalist rule of law with Iran among all Russian identity discourses. This code of conduct has deprived the possibility of a process of institutionalization of the Eurasian function of Iran. It seems that the Islamic Republic of Iran, because of its anti-Western / anti-American identity and its institutional isolation, has accepted the politics of inhibiting production structures in Russian identity discourses on its Eurasian dedication and against the acquisition of Russia’s support and cooperation in the international arena and its foreign policy priorities namely, the Middle East favored the “insignificance” of the “active role” in the Eurasian region. At the same time, it is not possible to speak of Eurasia’s “complete passivity” and “stagnation” toward Iran. Iran has acted as an intermediary in ending some of the region’s conflicts and has resisted the Caspian Sea littoral states demands in reaching its proportional share. But the point is that, in contrast to other regional and global actors (China, Turkey, the United States and the European Union) which have been able to expand their sphere of influence and interests in “unnecessary conditions of Russia” Iran has succeeded in advancing some of its innovative regionalization policies but has not found regional capability in the “Need for Russia’s conditions”. As a result, Iran’s participation in the existing Eurasian regionalism has had little achievement and the new regionalism initiative of the country, such as the formation of the organization of the Caspian Sea littoral states, the convergence of Persian-speaking countries, and the plan to establish “Nowruz International Foundation” have not been successful.