تبیینی بر سیستم دفاع موشکی روسیه از دیدگاه واقع‌گرایی نوکلاسیک

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار، گروه روابط بین‌الملل، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران

2 دکتری روابط بین‌الملل، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران

10.22059/jcep.2023.324174.450005

چکیده

در سال‌های اخیر برنامۀ استقرار سیستم دفاع موشکی روسیه نه در قالب برنامه‌ای تاکتیکی، بلکه مانند برنامه‌ای راهبردی ارتقا یافته است. این برنامه شامل توسعۀ ابزارهای شناسایی، رهگیری و هشدار زودهنگام و استقرار آن‌ها در مناطق راهبردی در قلمرو روسیه و برخی کشورهای متحد آن است. این پرسش مطرح است که چرا روسیه اقدام به توسعه و استقرار سامانه‌های دفاع موشکی کرده است؟ در دسته‌بندی کلان، این نوشتار از دستۀ پژوهش‌های کیفی است که در ارائۀ داده‌های مربوط به سامانه‌های دفاع موشکی به روش تاریخی و زمینۀ آزمون فرضیه به روش تجربی انجام شده است. در قالب این روش، در این نوشتار به سخنان مقام‌های روس و بررسی اسناد سیاست خارجی و امنیتی روسیه و هم‌زمانی این برنامه نیز توجه کرده‌ایم. فرضیۀ نوشتار این است که تلاش غرب برای استقرار سپر دفاع موشکی موجب شد رهبران روسیه احساس تهدید کنند و امنیت و جایگاه بین‌المللی کشورشان را به‌عنوان یک قدرت بزرگ و یکی از دو کانون اصلی قدرت نظامی در خطر ببینند. در نتیجه، سامانه­های دفاع موشکی خود را از نظر کیفی ارتقا دادند و در مناطق راهبردی مستقر کردند. در این نوشتار دریافتیم بین این سه متغیر، استقرار سپر دفاع موشکی غرب، ادراک رهبران روسیه و استقرار سیستم دفاع موشکی روسیه، رابطۀ معناداری وجود دارد. افزون بر آن، استقرار نیروهای تهاجمی آمریکا در اروپا که در پی خروج واشینگتن از پیمان کنترل تسلیحات پدید آمد نیز در پیدایش چنین رویکردی مؤثر بوده است. همچنین یافته­های نوشتار نشان می‌دهد که هم سطح فناوری سامانه‌های دفاع موشکی روسیه به‌نسبت نمونۀ غربی آن پایین‌تر است و هم قلمرو پوشش آن‌ها محدودتر است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Analysis of Russian Missile Defense Systems in the Lense of Neo-Clasical Realism

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammad Reza Takhshid 1
  • Morteza Shoja 2
1 Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran
2 Ph. D, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran
چکیده [English]

Introduction: The Russian army is developing some reconnaissance and interceptor vehicles such as the S.300 systems to defend strategic areas belonging to some of its allied countries. Another defensive shield system was also produced on a regional scale, such as the S-400 which is more capable than the S-300 system. During this process, the Russian military began production of the S-500 defense system. Production sites of S-300 and S-400 missile systems were established in some vital regions of Russia (in Kaliningrad and Crimea) and the territory of some allied countries. However, the Russian defense shield is technically weaker and more limited compared to the Western countries defense shield, but without a doubt, this plan will not remain at these levels.  The development of Russia's defense shield means that Russian leaders intend to defend their country against the threat of Western ballistic missiles. Of course, these equipments increase the offensive power of Western countries, especially by carrying tools and increasing missile defense systems. One of the main tools of Russia's defense shield is the S-300 missile system.
The PMU S-300 model is capable of countering an attack missile with a speed of Mach 2-8 and a range of 1000 km. This system was established in Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The S-400 system is also capable of shooting down stealth aircraft, ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles and drones with a range of 400 km. But two tools only work on atmosphere.
The S-500 system is also in the final stage of production with a range of 600 km and a speed of Mach 7, which is capable of shooting down hypersonic missiles and spy satellites. It is expected to be fulfilled by 2025. In addition, the Russian military has developed some ground-based early warning radars called Voronezh.
The Voronezh MD model has an inspection area of 6000 km and has the capacity to detect 500 targets. Of course, this radar is only an early warning system and is not compatible with any interceptor device. Reconnaissance satellite technology has also been used for defense. Currently, several Cosmos class satellites are in service and will be deployed in outer space for this purpose. The Russian military plans to upgrade this technology and surveillance. The plan to deploy Russian missile defense systems appears not as a tactical plan, but as a strategic plan. This plan is simultaneously qualitative and quantitative in the development of detection and interception systems as well as early warning systems.
Research Question: “Why is Russia thinking of creating a missile defense shield?
 Research Hypothesis: The hypothesis of the article is that "the concern of Russian leaders about the Western plan to create a missile defense shield has led to the development of their own missile defense tools."
Methodology (and Theoretical Framework if there are): This is a historical and descriptive method with an emphasis on monitoring Russia's anti-ballistic systems, as well as examining the country's official doctrine in the field of security and foreign policy.  This research also deals with the situation of the Russian authorities.  
 Results and Discussion: The research results show that the US and NATO defense shield was the main motivation of the Russian authorities to create missile defense systems. The US and NATO missile defense shields consists of SM3 interceptors, Aegis radars and early warning satellites. However, each part is separated but they are connected by all. They will be deployed in four stages in the mentioned areas, which can defend the American forces and its allies. Those regions are American homeland, Alaska, Greenland, South Persian Gulf and South Korea. They are also carried by destroyers in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. In parallel, NATO is building its own defense shields in some places in the center and east of the continent, which are: The radar station in Turkey, the Aegis radar system in Poland and the THAAD system in Romania and the command section in Germany. The four Aegis radar systems installed on the ships they command are in the port of Rota (Spain). Some say that the third and fourth parts of the defense shield are capable of targeting Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. The defensive shield also protects Western countries that have developed their offensive capacity in conjunction with defensive tools. Due to the withdrawal from the INF Treaty, there are no restrictions against the West. Putin’s opposition to Trump’s extension of the New Start Treaty without any conditions and Trump’s insistence on concluding a comprehensive agreement annoyed Russian authorities. In addition, Russian authorities are not happy about the establishment of a Western defensive shield near the country’s western borders. These actions cause Russia to react in the same way.
Conclusion: Russia's action in the development of defense systems is one of the main factors of change in the military doctrine of this country. Previously, the Russian military organized its strategic tools around the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and parity. But Russia is trying in the same direction in response to the deployment of Western missile defense elements in some strategic parts of the continent. As a result, Russia's new doctrine is based on an offensive and defensive strategy. Nevertheless, the current interactions between the West and Russia have created a new round of arms competition, especially in strategic defense tools. Russian defense systems are not at the level of their Western counterparts either in terms of content or technical quality. But these are accompanied by offensive tools that have been developed in strategic areas to pose the same threats against the West. According to this emerging trend, the Russian missile defense zone will also cover more strategic areas in the future.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Russia
  • Missile
  • America
  • Defense Shield
  • NATO
  • S-300
  • S-400 S-500
  • Voronezh
  • Satelite
Asadi, Aliakbar (2010) “Realism and Rival Views to Foreign Policy”, Rahbord Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 19, pp. 223- 252. [in Persian] http://www.rahbord.csr.ir/ article_124384.html (Accessed on: 17/11/2021).
Benton, Nicholas (2022), “the Role of Russian Air and Missile Defense Systems”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 41, No. 5, pp. 483-497. (doi:10.1080/01495933. 2022.2111911)
Boese, Wade (2002), “U.S. Withdraws from ABM Treaty; Global Response Muted”, available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/abmjul_ aug02 (Accessed on: 21/10/2021).
Carmen, Cristina (2012), “Russian Reactions to NATO Missile Defense”, Europe Commission, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/ documents/dnat/dv/dnat061112russianreactions_/dnat061112russianreactions_en.pdf [Accessed on: 4/9/2021].
Constitution (2020), Constitution of Russia Federation, available at: http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-02.htm (Accessed on 17/1/2023).
Cordesman, Anthony (2020), “The Gulf and the Challenge of Missile Defense: Net Assessment Indicators”, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/gulf-and-challenge-missile-defense-net-assessment-indicators (Accessed on: 26/12/2021).
Daniell, Jonathon (2017), “35th ADA BDE Welcomes New Commander”, available at: https://www.army.mil/article/189286/35th_ada_bde_welcomes_new_ commander (Accessed on: 7/12/2021).
Defenceworld (2019), “Russian S-500 Serial Production in 2020 After Succesful Test in Syria”, available at: https://www.defenseworld.net/news/25612/Russian_ S_500_Serial_Production_in_2020_After_Succesful_Test_in_Syria (Accessed on: 10/7/2021).
Dubowitz, Mark, Behnam Ben Talebuand and Varsha Koduvayur (2020), “Countering the Iranian Threat in the Persian Gulf”, available at: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/12/15/defending-forward-countering-iranian-threat-in-the-persian-gulf/ (Accessed on 23/7/2021).
Euractive (2016), “US Activates Romanian Missile Defense Site”, Angering Russia, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/us-activates-romanian-missile-defence-site-angering-russia/ (Accessed on: 6/11/2021).
Falahatpishe, Heshmatollah, Hamid Dorj (2019), “Russia’s Trying for Dismantle of Effects of America Defence Shield”, Central Eurasia Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 437-457. [in Persian] (doi:10.22059/JCEP.2019.274028.449824)
Fedorov, Yury (2009), “American Ballistic Missile Defence, Rusia Iskander and a New Risis in Europe”, available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/ files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/220509summary.pdf (Accessed on: 4/11/2021).
Felgenhauer, Pavel  (2007), “Offer to Share Gabala Politically Astute, Practically Inadequate”, available at: https://jamestown.org/program/offer-to-share-gabala-politically-astute-practically-inadequate/ (Accessed on: 18/2/2022).
Gady, Franz-Stefan  (2018), “Russia Inducted 80 New ICBMs in Last 5 Years”, available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/russia-inducted-80-new-icbms-in-last-5-years/ (Accessed on: 7/4/2021).
Giles, Keir (2015), “Russian Ballistic Missile Defense: Rhetoric and Reality”, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280632969 (Accessed on: 2/12/2021).
Global Seurity (2019), “Voronezh High Depot Readiness (HDR) – Locations”, available at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/voronezh-sites. htm (Accessed on: 26/2/2021).
Gobarev, Victor (2001), “the Early Development of Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense System”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 29–48. (doi:10.1080/13518040108430478)
Gotev, Georgi (2016), “New Russian missiles in Kaliningrad ‘are answer to US Shield”, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/new-russia-missiles-in-kaliningrad-are-answer-to-us-shield (Accessed on: 22/6/2021).
Ischer, Sabine (2007), “Russia: a Difficult Partner for the EU”, available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/activities/detail/article/russia-a-difficult-partner-for-the-eu/ (Accessed on January 18, 2022)
Karami, Jahangir (2005), Russia’s Foreign Policy Changing: State’s Identity and Problem of the West, Tehran, Center for Political and International Studies. [in Persian]
Kattan, Ari (2019), “GCC Missile Defense: Obstacles on the Road to Integration”, available at: https://cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/2019-07/Paper%206%20-%20GCC%20Missile%20Defense-%20Obstacles%20on%20the%20Road%20 to%20Integration%20.pdf (Accessed on 1/19/2023).
Kramer, Andrew and Thom Shanker (2007), “Russia Suspends Arms Agreement Over U.S. Shield”, New York Times, July15, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/world/europe/15russia.html (Accessed on: 10/11/2021).
Koolaee, Elaheh and Sara Rava (2015), “Factors of Changing in Military Doctorine of Russia Federation”, Foreign Policy Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 133-159 [in Persian] http://fp.ipisjournals.ir/article_21428.html (Accessed on: 7/9/2021).
Koolaee, Elaheh, Jafar Khashe and Habib Rezazadeh (2011), “Russia- America Relation in Shadow of Obama’s “Reset” Policy”, Central Eurasia Studies, Vol. 4, No. 9, pp. 79-98. [in Persian] https://jcep.ut.ac.ir/article_24223.html [Accessed on: 14/6/2022].
Khoo, Nicholas, Reuben Steff (2013), “This Program Will Not Be a Threat to Them: Ballistic Missile Defense and US relations with Russia and China”, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 17-28. (doi:10.1080/14751798.2013. 864869)
Kristensen, Hans M. (2017), “Russian Nuclear Forces: Buildup or Modernization?, Russia Mater, available at: https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/russian-nuclear-forces-buildup-or-modernization (Accessed on: 24/12/2021).
Mankoff, Jeffry (2012), “The Politics of US Missile Defense Cooperation with Europe and Russia”, International Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 329–347. (doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012. 01074.x)
Medvedev, Dimitry (2008), “The Foreign Policy Concept of Russia Federation”, available at: https://russiaeu.ru/userfiles/file/foreign_policy_concept_english.pdf (Accessed on: 21/8/2021).
The Ministry of Foreign Affaires of Russia Federaton (2013), Concept of Foreign Policy of Russia Federation, available at: https://www.mid.ru/en/ foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/ 122186 (Accessed on: 12/11/2021).
Missilethreat (2019), “SS-X-30 “Satan II”, available at: https://missilethreat.csis.org/ missile/rs-28-sarmat/ (Accessed on: 28/2/2022).
Moradi, Seyyed Mehdi, Moslem Golestan and Rahim Noruozi (2015), “the Effects of America Deffense Shield Plan on Russia Security in Eurasia”, Central Asia and Caucasus Journal, Vol. 21, No. 91, pp. 165-197, available at: http://ca.ipisjournals.ir/article_22225.html (Accessed on: 28/2/2022). [In Persian]
NATO (2016), “Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS)-Romania Operationally Certified”, available at: http://www.defense-aerospace.com/ articles-view/release/3/173811/aegis-ashore-missile-defense-site-in-romania-declared-operational.html (Accessed on: 16/11/2021).
Nikolsky, Aleksey (2012), “Russia and the Changing World”, Russia Today, available at: http://rt.com/politics/official-word/putin-russia-changing-world-263/ (Accessed on: 11/5/2021).
Nygaard, Ida and Una Hakvag (2013), “Why Russia Opposes a NATO Missile Defence in Europe – a Survey of Common Explanations”, Availabl at: https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/13-00111.pdf (Accessed on: 29/1/2022).
Osborn, Andrew (2011), “Dmitry Medvedev Threatens US Over Planned Missile Defence Shield”, available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ europe/russia/8910909/Dmitry-Medvedev-threatens-US-over-planned-missile-defence-shield.html (Accessed on: 3/11/2021).
Panda, Ankit (2020), “A New U.S. Missile Defense Test May Have Increased the Risk of Nuclear War”, available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/19/ new-u.s.-missile-defense-test-may-have-increased-risk-of-nuclear-war-pub-83273 (Accessed on: 20/1/2021).
Philiph, Alex (2020), “Russia to Deliver S-400 By 2021-end, But Will Supply Missiles and Bombs Amid LAC Tension”, available at: https://theprint.in/ defence/russia-to-deliver-s-400-by-2021-end-but-will-supply-missiles-and-bombs-amid-lac-tensions/452285/ (Accessed on: 11/5/2022).
Podvig, Pavel (2018), “Russia’s Current Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control”, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 256-267. (doi: 10.1080/25751654.2018.1526629)
Podvig, Pavel (2017), “Missile Defense in Russia”, available at: https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/Missile-Defense-In-Russia.pdf [Accessed on: 6/3/2022].
Rose, Gideon (1998), “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 144-172. (doi:10.1017/S0043887100007814)
Reif, Kingston and Shannon Bugos (2020), “New START in Limbo Ahead of U.S. Election”, available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-11/news/new-start-limbo-ahead-us election (Accessed on: 9/11/2021).
Sanaei, Mahdi and Roghayye Keramati-Nia (2022), “Reform in Russia Constitution 2020: Enduring and Increasing Authoritarianism”, Central Asia and Caucasus Quarterly, No. 113, pp. 21-59. [in Persian] available at: http://ca.ipisjournals.ir/ article_244895.html (Accessed on: 10/10/2021).
Sanger, David and William Broad (2018), “U.S. to Tell Russia It Is Leaving Landmark INF. Treaty”, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/ us/politics/russia-nuclear-arms-treaty-trump-administration.html (Accessed on: 14/8/2021).
Schweller, Randall (2000), in: Peter D. Feaver, et al (2000), “Correspondence; Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)”, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 165–193. (doi: 10.1162/ 016228800560426)
Schweller, Randall and David Priess (1997), “A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate”, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 1-32. (doi: 10.2307/222801)
Stepanova, Victoria (2008), “Missile Defense in Central Europe: The View from Moscow”, Washington University, available at: http://students.washington.edu/ nupsa/Docs/Volume3/Victoria_Stephanova_Missile_Defense_in_Central_Europe.pdf (Accessed on: 7/9/2020).
Suomenaro, Matti and Jennifer Cafarella (2018) “Russia Expands Its Air Defense Network in Syria”, available at: https://www.iswresearch.org/2018/11/russia-expands-its-air-defense-network.html (Accessed on: 18/3/2021).
TASS (2019), “US Missile Defense System and NATO European Missile System”, available at: http://tass.com/infographics/7270 (Accessed on: 6/12/2021).
Themoscotimes (2020), “Russia Eyes Early Delivery of Advanced S-500 Air Defense System”, available at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/02/04/ russia-eyes-early-delivery-of-advanced-s-500-air-defense-system-a69145 (Accessed on: 10/3/2021).
themoscotimes (2020), “Russia Touts S-500’s Ability to Destroy Hypersonic Weapons in Space”, Available at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/07/ 03/russia-touts-s-500s-ability-to-destroy-hypersonic-weapons-in-space-a70767 (Accessed on: 8/11/2021).
Union of Concerned Scientists (2002), “History of Russia's Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) System”, available at: https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/history-russias-anti-ballistic-missile-abm-system [Accesed oh: 21/9/2021].
Utiashvili, Shota (2017), “New Russian Weaponry in the Caucasus and Its Impact on Georgia’s NATO Aspiration”, available at: https://www.gfsis.org/blog/ view/668 (Accessed on: 18/2/2021).
Valiev, Anar (2012), “Undecided Fate of the Gabala Radar Station, Jamestown Fundation”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 9, No. 72, available at: https://jamestown.org/program/undecided-fate-of-the-gabala-radar-station/ (Accessed on: 28/3/2021).
Waterfield, Bruno (2012), “Russia Threatens NATO with Military Strikes over Missile Defense System”, available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/europe/russia/9243954/Russia-threatens-Nato-with-military-strikes-over-missile-defence-system.html (Accessed on: 5/11/2021).
Wheeler, Nicholas and Ken Both (2008), “Rethinking the Security Dilemma”, available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/37146990 [Accessed on: 9/2/2022].
Weitz, Richard (2010), “Illusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO and Missile Defence”, Survival, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 99–120. (doi:10.1080/00396338.2010.506824)
Wilson, Benjamin (2019), “Keynes Goes Nuclear: Thomas Schelling and the Macroeconomic Origins of Strategic Stability”, Modern Intellectual History, pp. 1- 31. (doi.org/10.1017/S1479244319000271)
Wolforth, William (2011) “No One Loves a Realist explanation”, International Politics, Vol. 48, No. 4-5, pp. 441-459. Available at: https://sites.dartmouth.edu/ wwohlforth/files/2013/04/ip_48_4-5_1r_Wohlforth.pdf (Accessed on: 9/2/2022).
Yost, David (2011), “Strategic Stability in the Cold War: Lessons for Continuing Challenges”, Proliferation Papers, No. 36, Available at: https://apps.dtic.mil/ sti/pdfs/ADA557632.pdf (Accessed on: 11/5/2021).