عنوان مقاله [English]
Introduction: In addition to the main and announced goals of the US government for attacking Afghanistan, including: the destruction of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda Network, advancing the process of democratization and nation-state building, strengthening the governmental and political structure, creating stability and security, there were other goals on the agenda, the most important of which was access to important mineral resources and energy transfer routes from Central Asia to South Asia, preventing Russia from regaining power and controlling China and Iran. It is obvious that the achievement of the above-mentioned goals by the United States required the existence of a grand strategy in the foreign policy of this country regarding the issue of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, a review of the actions and approaches announced and implemented by the American government during the three terms of the presidency of George Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump, clearly confirms this issue. Adopting different and sometimes conflicting approaches and strategies, Bush's "Anti-Terrorism and "Counterinsurgency Strategies", Obama, and Trump's "Zero Base Strategy" is at least three distinct strategies of the US government in this era, which ultimately ended in the withdrawal of the US military forces from Afghanistan after 20 years of presence in this country.
Research Question: The main question of the article is what are the evidence for the change in the approach of the US foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the three mentioned periods? And what is the relationship between Afghanistan's internal developments and this change of approach?
Research Hypothesis: The change in the US foreign policy approach towards Afghanistan has been affected by the internal developments of this country caused by the resistance of armed groups, especially the Taliban, against US policies and the failure of the announced and implemented programs of this country during the presidency of Bush, Obama and Trump.
Methodology and Theoretical Framework: Since the first question of the article seeks to provide evidence of the change in the strategy of the United States regarding Afghanistan in the three terms of the presidency, by adapting the methodology of a comparative study at the descriptive level, the most important features that support the change in these three periods should be mentioned. Next, by focusing on the second question, we will investigate the relationship between two variables: the change in the US approach with the internal developments of this country from a descriptive and inferential point of view and analyzing the logic governing this change of approach, focusing on one of the causes mentioned in the systemic theory of James Rosena
Results and Discussion: The findings show that the US diplomatic system did not follow the same approach in Afghanistan during the two terms of Bush's presidency and unlike the 2002 strategy, which sought a combination of ideological and strategic goals from its presence in Afghanistan, in the 2006 strategy, the security aspect of these goals was dominant got more priority. In the Obama administration, the revival of the US global influence and the destruction of terrorist groups required a transition from a counter-terrorism strategy to a counter-insurgency. In the Obama administration, the restoration of the US global influence and the destruction of terrorist groups required a transition from anti-terrorism strategy to counter-insurgency. From this point of view, both the weakening of Bush's anti-terrorism strategy and the clarification of Obama's counter-insurgency strategy clearly indicate the role of Afghan internal groups in the failure of America's policies and successive changes in strategy.
Conclusion: Apart from the ups and downs of the US relations with Afghan government officials, there are three other reasons: the rise of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban during the time of the US presence, the emergence of many internal problems in Afghanistan and the disgust of a large part of the Afghan people with the US government due to its inability to reduce insecurity. There are three reasons all of which confirm the prominent role of internal developments, especially the confrontation of groups such as the Taliban with the US policies. This means that even armed local groups with minimal facilities, if they stand up, can force them to make continuous changes in their strategy in addition to the failure of the policies of the great and superior powers. It is not possible simply by relying on the established approaches of power in the paradigm of realism.