نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشیار، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران
2 دانشجوی دکتری علوم سیاسی ، دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Introduction: After the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, and the emergence of a liberal post-Cold War environment, it was expected that non-democratic regimes in Central Asia would transition to democracy. But the political situation turned out to be different. After independence, all five Central Asian leaders, who shared a communist background, adopted presidential systems and all of them, to varying degrees, exhibited various authoritarian traits. In these regimes, protesters and dissidents were suppressed or nearly eliminated; civil and political rights were minimized, and the emphasis was on providing economic and social goods and maintaining stability. This took precedence over political freedoms. Two years after the independence, the ruling elites succeeded in suppressing or absorbing political opponents. Key opposition leaders were arrested, exiled or joined the ruling governments. For a decade (1991-2001), all Central Asian regimes had a score between 5.5 and 7 on the Freedom Index (a combination of political rights and civil liberties), a situation that has persisted to this day.
After independence, Central Asian regimes adopted democratic processes such as elections, but their true nature remained authoritarian. Indeed, through the interplay of domestic dynamics and international norms, different types of authoritarian regimes emerged in each of these countries. According to the Freedom House report, all five Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, are known as authoritarian regimes. When it comes to the secret of the persistence of political regimes, two factors are usually cited: democratic legitimacy and efficiency. However, despite their lack of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness, Central Asian political regimes have maintained power for years, successfully suppressing their opponents and eliminating their critics. Their stability and continuity have now become a complex issue. The present study focuses on identifying the mechanisms of persistence of ineffective non-democratic regimes in Central Asia.
Research question: The research question is: What strategies do these regimes use to continue their survival?
Research hypothesis: The stability of these regimes is not accidental, but the product of rational elite design at two levels. The first level is internal, such as repression, hereditary networks, symbolic elections and personality cult. The second level is external, such as security and political alliances, presence in regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and cooperation with major powers such as China and Russia.
Methodology and theoretical framework: In this article, based on the rational choice theory of new institutionalism, the strategies for the survival of ineffective undemocratic regimes in Central Asia are discussed. Rational choice, as one of the most important branches of new-institutionalism theory, can help clarify how structures emerge, evolve, and persist. The theoretical model of this research shows that political decision-makers in this region, based on the intensity of the political threat and the amount of financial resources, always choose a strategy that allows them to maintain their power at the lowest cost. Exploratory and comparative methods have been used in the specific content analysis. Data have been collected through library sources, official reports, and the World Bank Website.
Results and discussion: Inefficient and undemocratic regimes in Central Asia ensure their survival by relying on hard and soft strategies. The research findings show that the ruling elites in this region, by calculating the costs and benefits of political actions, use strategies such as repression, propaganda, rent distribution, symbolic elections, protectionism, and regional and international coalition building. They use these strategies in a way that secures the interests of the ruling regime and ensures loyalty to themselves.
Conclusion: Persistence is not only the product of repression, but also the result of conscious, calculated, and purposeful choices by political actors to maximize their own interests. Coercion, repression, propaganda, media control, personality cults, symbolic elections, and financial support allow Asian non-democratic regimes to maintain their power at home and prevent the formation of opposition coalitions abroad. Regionalism and cooperation with great powers provide the basis for the support of foreign powers. The country's rulers intimidate opponents with a strategy of repression. They reduce discontent with propaganda. They create and maintain their power with a cult of personality, and they maintain the appearance of popular rule by holding elections. They ensure the loyalty of domestic and foreign elites by paying rent. Even in conditions of economic inefficiency, this model allows non-democratic regimes to survive.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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