بین‌المللی‌‌سازی بازدارندگی ایران در خاورمیانه، اوراسیا و جنوب آسیا

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

دکتری روابط بین‌الملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

10.22059/jcep.2024.364228.450162

چکیده

نظریه و راهبرد بازدارندگی در دوران پس از جنگ جهانی دوم و پیدایی سلاح‌های هسته‌ای، به دوران اوج شکوفایی خود رسید. باوجود کاستی‌های بازدارندگی، این راهبرد ازنظر قدرت‌های هسته‌ای، همچنان پاسخ مناسبی به معمای امنیت بوده، تا جایی‌که درطول هشت‌دهۀ گذشته، جنگ بزرگی در میان قدرت‌های اتمی رخ نداده است. در این چارچوب، قدرت‌های بزرگ با کاربست روش‌های گوناگون، ژرفا و گسترۀ زیر پوشش راهبرد بازدارندگی خود را گسترش داده و از این راه به کارآمدسازی بازدارندگی خود پرداخته‌اند. پرسش اساسی که این مقاله در تلاش، برای پاسخ به آن است، چیستی ویژگی­‌های مفهومی بین‌المللی­‌شدن بازدارندگی به‌عنوان یک چارچوب نظری جدید و اِعمال آن بر راهبرد بازدارندگی ایران در مناطق پیرامونی است. در پاسخ به این پرسش، نگارنده با ارائۀ نظریۀ «بین‌المللی‌­شدن بازدارندگی» یا راهبرد «بین‌المللی‌سازی بازدارندگی»، با استفاده از روش کیفی موردپژوهی به کاربست این راهبرد در سطح جهان و همچنین توسط ایران در سطح مناطق پیرامونی شامل خاورمیانه، اوراسیا و جنوب آسیا می‌پردازد. بین‌المللی‌سازی بازدارندگی، راهبردی است که در چارچوب آن، قدرتِ بازدارنده با هدف افزایش کارآمدی بازدارندگی، بخشی از ظرفیت‌های نظامی و امنیتی خود را به متحدان خود انتقال می‌دهد. با توجه به گسترش تهدیدهای فرامرزی، در طول سال‌های گذشته، بین‌المللی‌سازی بازدارندگی متعارف با محوریت برنامۀ موشکی و گرو‌ه‌های شبه‌­نظامی، بخشی از راهبرد نظامی و امنیتی ایران در سطح مناطق پیرامونی در خاورمیانه، اوراسیا و جنوب آسیا بوده است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Internationalization of Iran's Deterrence in the Middle East, Eurasia and South Asia

نویسنده [English]

  • Rahim Baizidi
PhD in International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

Introduction: Although deterrence can be traced back to the military literature and the writings of Carl von Clausewitz, deterrence theory neverthelessflourished in the Post-World War II era and after the advent of nuclear weapons. The deterrence strategy is especially important in some regions such as the Middle East, Eurasia and South Asia, which are among the most intense  conflict zones in the world.
Research question: What are the conceptual coordinates of the internationalization of deterrence as a theoretical framework and its application to Iran's deterrence strategy in the peripheral regions?
Research hypothesis: In response to the main question of the article, using the case study method, the author proposes the concept of internationalization of deterrence and examines its application first by the great powers of the world and then by Iran in its peripheral regions including the Middle East, Eurasia and South Asia. The internationalization of deterrence means a situation where the deterrent power provides part of its military and security capabilities including weapons, forces, and allies to other actors who intend to raise the level of deterrence, increase its effectiveness and expands its geographical scope, thereby creating fundamental changes in the strategic calculations of a potential aggressor. Internationalization of deterrence using missile power and paramilitary groups has been a part of Iran's military and security strategy in peripheral regions including the Middle East, Eurasia and South Asia.
Methodology and theoretical framework: In this research, using Qualitative case study method, the concept of internationalization of deterrence and its application by Iran at the regional and global level has been analyzed. This paper presents the theoretical framework of the internationalization of deterrence. In the framework of this theory, political actors in the field of world politics transfer part of their military and weapons capacity to allied actors with the aim of strengthening deterrence.
Results and discussion: Deterrence theory flourished after World War II and after the advent of nuclear weapons. The United States as the first nuclear power, maintained a monopoly on nuclear weapons for four years. During the Cold War, as part of the nuclear sharing policy, the United States deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to counterbalance the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries. Nuclear sharing was in fact a kind of internationalization of US nuclear deterrence. In addition to nuclear deterrence, world powers internationalized their conventional deterrence at lower levels. The deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey, the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the deployment of the American and Soviet missiles on European soil, and the AUKUS treaty are among the most important examples of internationalization of conventional deterrence after World War II. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new threats such as terrorism, cyber attacks and limited wars, caused a change in the deterrence strategy of countries and more attention to improving conventional deterrence.
Iran is one of the countries that has changed its conventional deterrence strategy in the last few decades. The 1979 revolution can be considered as the origin of Iran's proxy deterrence because one of its most important goals was the export of its revolutionary thinking for the freedom of the nations of the region. Although this ideal did not change any country in the region, it aligned some groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and etc.  with Iran’s regional doctrine. The 8-year Iran-Iraq war can be considered as the source of Iran's missile deterrence. In the early years after the victory of the revolution, the structure of Iran's military forces was practically in disarray. Saddam Hussein also tried to use this opportunity to achieve his expansionist goals in the oil-rich areas of Iran. During the war, while the Iraqi army had access to many conventional and unconventional weapons from 80 countries, Iran was under arms embargo and in order to receive a limited number of missiles, it had to enter into tough diplomatic and military negotiations with four countries: Syria, Libya, North Korea, and China. After the end of the war, the development of the missile program became a key to Iran's deterrence strategy. Due to arms embargoes and financial problems after the war, Iran first built its pillars of deterrence on the two bases of proxy and missile deterrence, and in the second stage, it internationalized its deterrence in peripheral regions such as the Middle East, Eurasia and South Asia.
Conclusion: The 1979 revolution and the 8-year war with Iraq prompted Iran to use a different deterrence strategy in its peripheral regions in order to internationalize its deterrence. Financial problems after the 8-year war with Iraq, as well as arms embargos, led Iran to internationalize its deterrence using missile power and allied groups. This policy has changed the strategic calculations of possible aggressive powers and has prevented a new large-scale war against Iran.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Deterrence
  • Internationalization
  • South Asia
  • Middle East
  • Eurasia
  • Iran
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