Introduction: Iran and Russia prioritize security, defense, and intelligence cooperation in their operational and substantive joint foreign policy, aiming to protect both sides’ stringent national security agendas and maintain regional order on the periphery. Meanwhile, the implementation and promotion of comprehensive sanctions against Russia, along with the freezing of its strategic assets, has intensified the perceptual alignment between Russian and Iranian leaders. They believe, among other things, that the West is untrustworthy and continues to seek hegemonic dominance, thereby posing an existential threat to them. From this perspective, economic and financial blows and severe sanctions aimed at weakening and harming Iran and Russia as target actors essentially pursue political and security goals, ranging from changing behaviors and decisions to changing regional and domestic systems, and ultimately regime change and overthrow from within.
Research question: How have Iran and Russia's changing views on sanctions affected their economic relations since the Ukraine war?
Research hypothesis: Iran’s and Russia’s security-oriented understanding of sanctions as a weapon for domestic subversion has led to bilateral economic interactions that address strategic economic security vulnerabilities through the selective development of economic relations.
Methodology: This study examines the hypothesis using the causal process tracing method and the conceptual framework of sanctions and regime change. This method identifies the causal mechanisms that drive the relationship between the independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable. The goal of causal process analysis is to evaluate the hypothesis and identify connections that are assumed to be part of the invisible ontological depth at the core of processes, but still exist in reality. Mechanisms are process elements, each with its own logic and function in the sequence of events in the overall process.
Results and discussion: American foreign policy since 1979 has been an attempt to change the Iranian regime from within. The regime change campaign certainly began with sanctions, as seen in the US imposition of secondary restrictions on Iran’s energy industry during the Bill Clinton administration in the 1990s. The regime change campaign became prominent when, following regime change in Iraq, some in the George W. Bush administration supported a military attack on Iran, while others preferred negotiations. Meanwhile, regime change from within was presented as a third and middle option between military force and diplomacy, which meant supporting the Iranian regime's political opponents. As the international community became more united against Iran's nuclear program and the UN Security Council passed numerous sanctions resolutions, the United States and the European Union gradually shifted from targeted to comprehensive sanctions during the Obama administration.
As sanctions against Iran intensified and consolidated in terms of volume and structure, Russian leaders gradually reached an agreement with Iranian elites and openly supported Iran's narrative about the ultimate goals of the sanctions. In the midst of the 2014 Ukraine crisis and the subsequent imposition of Western sanctions against Russia, Kremlin officials took a consistent stance, stating that the sanctions were not intended to change Russia's behavior, but to overthrow the current Russian political system. Therefore, sanctions are seen as a common threat to the political stability of Iran and Russia, which, by reducing the assets and resources available to the governments, destabilize the economic pillars of political stability, leading to the emergence and spread of dissatisfaction in the social structures of the two countries, as well as reducing the ability to resist the illegitimate demands of the sanctioning countries. They have committed to creating an economic cooperation framework that protects strategically important regions from sanctions, with the aim of countering the aforementioned consequences. Three major components shape this cooperation framework. First, the relationship between securing budget resources and covering the country's public expenses through maintaining the profits from energy exports must be maintained. Second, the geo-economic space and corridors needed for trade and transport development must be protected, and third, financial and economic transactions must be avoided through Western platforms, thereby reducing the harmful power of the dollar.
Conclusion: The combined strategic deprivations resulting from sanctions have a similar impact on their political and security stability, despite the fact that the economies of Iran and Russia are dependent on oil revenues and do not appear to be complementary. However, the willingness of the parties to mitigate these impacts creates joint added value that does not necessarily equate to a sharp improvement in economic relations or an increase in trade figures. This framework aims to produce and create alternatives to Western deprivations in the minds and perceptions of citizens of both countries. Both Iran and Russia want to demonstrate that each country, while pursuing a hostile geopolitical strategy toward the West, has the ability to rely on new partners and allies to counter the strategic effects of exclusion, offset sanctions, and create much more sustainable alternative structures to Western models.