Introduction: Since the inception of the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran's Middle East policy has been one of the most significant arenas of action and contention in the country's foreign policy. This policy has taken shape against the backdrop of geopolitical rivalries, confrontation with the United States and Israel and complex interactions with regional actors; it carries implications extending beyond the region and has influenced the broad orientation of Iran’s foreign policy. Against this backdrop, Iran’s inclination to cooperate with non-western powers and institutions—particularly following the intensification of sanctions—has been shaped by a strategy known as "Look to the East." Iran's full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization reflects this developement. In recent years, Iran's official foreign-policy discourse has portrayed this membership as a symbol of emerging from isolation and strengthening the country's security and political standing. However, this perspective raises important questions regarding the nature, function and actual capacity of this organization in relation to Iran's policies in the Middle East. This study analyzes the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's response to the Islamic Republic of Iran's policies in the Middle East and assesses the organization's capacity to provide security support and align its defense posture with Iran. This research seeks to identify the gap between Iran's strategic expectations and the actual performance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and to examine the institutional and structural factors contributing to this disparity. This was particularly evident during the 12-day war, as policymakers and even Iranian public opinion apparently expected China and Russia to support Iran in this conflict, yet such support did not materialize.
Research question: This study seeks to answer the question of What the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's approach is towards Iran’s policies in the Middle East, with an emphasis on the 12-day war and to what extent this approach facilitates security and defense alignment with Iran.
Research hypothesis: This hypothesis argues that, despite Iran's full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the organization's stance on Iran's Middle East policies is driven primarily by institutional neutrality, the avoidance of costly security commitments and a prioritization of Eurasian stability.
Methodology and theoretical framework: Drawing on defensive realism theory, this article analyzes the behavior of Shanghai Cooperation Organization's - as a Eurasian regional institution- regarding Iran's policies in the Middle East. Drawing on defensive realism, this study examines the behavior of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and assesses the extent to which the organization’s institutional processes and security responses foster defensive security alignment with Iran. This study employs the hypothetico-deductive method to analyze the official documents, organizational statements and the behavioral patterns of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Data have been gathered from official documents, organizational reports, statements and other relevant documentary sources.
Results and discussion: The aim of this research was to analyze the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's approach to Iran's policies in the Middle East and to assess the gap between Iran’s strategic expectations and the organization's actual capacity. Findings indicate that despite Iran’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its enhanced role within the organization’s institutional framework, the multilateral body’s operational and security capacities to address threats facing Iran are limited and there is a significant gap between Iran’s strategic expectations and the organization’s actual performance. An analysis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's institutional structure reveals that its consensus-based, non-alliance nature inherently imposes serious limitations on its security and deterrence capabilities. The charter and operational procedures emphasize the national sovereignty of members, non-interference in internal affairs, and the avoidance of binding obligations. The present study indicates that members prefer to maintain regional security and stability with minimal military and political costs, while avoiding costly or extra-regional conflicts.
The operational performance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the face of crises—particularly the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June 2025—demonstrates that the organization primarily resorts to symbolic gestures and normative statements for crisis management, while avoiding the acceptance of direct security commitments or the undertaking of tangible military actions. Therefore, the organization's operational performance differs significantly from Iran’s expectations of active security support and full defense alignment. Russia, India and Central Asian countries each have distinct objectives in the region and these differences are reflected in their foreign policies and international cooperation. China focuses on sales and energy markets; Russia seeks to maintain its regional and global leadership role and Central Asian countries aim to ensure their survival and economic development. The diversity and heterogeneity of interests lead the organization to adopt security stances and measures, even in the context of regional crises.
Conclusion: The results of this study indicate that Iran’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, while enhancing the country’s political and symbolic standing on the international stage, does not eliminate tangible threats nor does it lead to the establishment of security mechanisms. The organization's actual capacity to provide security support is limited to issuing statements, norm-based condemnations and political coordination; it refrains from undertaking military commitments or engaging in direct action. From a theoretical perspective, this study demonstrates that defensive realism - as a limited analytical framework- is a useful tool for explaining the behavior of multilateral organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The organization's conduct regarding Iran-related crises in the Middle East aligns perfectly with these premises, demonstrating that multilateral organizations are not always capable of playing an active role in the realm of security; rather, their performance depends heavily on institutional capacities and the divergent interests of their members. The present study emphasizes that, due to its institutional and structural characteristics, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization possesses limited capacity to address Iran’s security threats and the security alignment it offers is defensive, minimal and non-binding in nature. These findings indicate that any strategic analysis or planning regarding Iran within the framework of this organization must be based on a realistic understanding of institutional constraints, divergent member interests and regional priorities. Therefore, Iran’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—rather than guaranteeing robust security support—offers an opportunity to strengthen regional diplomacy, gain symbolic legitimacy, and manage crises at a minimal level; this conclusion carries significant implications for Iran’s strategic policy and the analysis of regional security.